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Abstract
D U R IN G  the late eighteenth century, Britain, as a country of 
mercantile capitalism , was mainly interested in world-w ide 
markets. At the same time, Russia was conscious of the 
restrictions which her existing territory placed on commerce 
during the winter. Therefore, she was especially interested in an 
ice-free port for trade and as an outpost from which to extend 
her power and influence to southward regions.
At the end of the eighteenth century, the Near Eastern 
Question might be defined as the relations between Russia and 
Turkey. However, from the early nineteenth century, it involved 
growing rivalry between Britain and Russia because of an 
inevitable conflict of their interests in the region, while Anglo- 
Russian interest in and advance towards the Far East were also 
proceeding with the same above-mentioned ideas.(CHAPTER I)
In the late nineteenth century, Korea's ownership of Gomun 
(Port Hamilton) Island involved her initially in the struggle of 
these Powers which wanted to obtain rights in Korea, and she 
soon became the centre of international rivalry.(CHAPTER II) 
While Great Britain was also interested in Korea as a market, 
Russia tried to get an ice-free port in the peninsula. Therefore, 
for both strategic and economic reasons, it was natural that 
Korea would be a battle-field for Anglo-Russian rivalry sooner or 
later.(CHAPTER III)
In the Middle East, a new phase of Anglo-Russian rivalry
opened with the Afghan border crisis in March 1885. The crisis 
brought about the possibility of war between them. This 
possibility of war induced Britain's occupation of Port Hamilton 
as a preparatory step to war with Russia in the Far East. A few 
months after the occupation of Port Hamilton in May 1885, 
Britain and Russia fortunately solved the Afghan border problem 
without war. However, the solution of the Afghan problem meant 
that Britain lost her justification for occupying Port Hamilton. 
Consequently, in the face of protests by neighbouring Powers, 
Britain had to reconsider the grounds for retaining possession of 
Port Hamilton. In the process, Britain found stronger reasons for 
withdrawal from Port Hamilton, and she carried it out in February 
1887. This situation seemed to show the end of Anglo-Russian 
conflict in the Far East.(CHAPTER IV, V & VI)
On the other hand, events, after the British withdrawal 
from Port Hamilton, in the Far East (the Sino-Japanese war and 
Russia's influence in Korea and Manchuria) led to a resumption of 
rivalry between Britain and Russia in the region.(CHAPTER VII) 
After the Russo-Japanese war whose outbreak and outcome partly 
depended on the effects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Russia's 
scheme for aggrandizement in the Far East was frustrated, and 
th is meant the end of Anglo-Russian riva lry in East 
Asia.(CHAPTER VIII)
Subsequently, this chapter of a rivalry so centra l to much 
of nineteenth century international politics was closed with the 
Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. With a re-evaluation of 
Anglo-Russian rivalry, in the conclusion, I identified Port 
Hamilton's position and influence in this period of world history. 
(CHAPTER IX)
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.
IN the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Anglo-Russian 
rivalry was rife in the Near, Middle and Far East. On 30 March 
1885, local Russian authorities broke their pledge to refrain from 
further advances on the Afghan frontier until the jo in t Anglo- 
Russian commission should have determined the northern frontier 
of Afghanistan. Roused to a high pitch of excitement, Britain 
prepared for war. Among other measures, Britain chose to follow 
a traditional strategic plan-to attack Russia with her fleet at 
some weak point in Russia's far-flung possessions. With 
V lad ivostock as the ob jective, consequently, the British 
Admiralty decided to occupy two Korean islands at the southern 
extremity of the peninsula, which enclosed a safe anchorage 
known as Port Hamilton.
On 26 April 1885, simultaneously with an announcement 
to China, Korea, and Japan, Admiral Sir William Dowell occupied 
Port Hamilton with a British squadron. Although the Anglo- 
Russian war crisis over the Middle East had been relieved by 
G ladstone's arbitration proposal of May 1885, the British 
squadron remained in occupation of Port Hamilton. The Japanese 
and Korean Governments form ally protested aga inst the 
occupation, and the British Government attempted to end the 
protests by offering to purchase or lease the islands from Korea. 
This indication of a more prolonged occupation aroused the 
opposition of China also.
On the other hand, Russia made no countermove during the
1
occupation of the Port Hamilton; and it is claimed that she had no 
intention of making any forward move at the time. Indeed Russia 
gave China an undertaking that, if Britain were induced to leave 
Port Hamilton, she would guarantee not to occupy any Korean 
territory. When Britain received this undertaking from Korea and 
the suzerain power, China, she withdrew from Port Hamilton in 
February 1887.
The rise and early stages of the Anglo-Russian rivalry
Early Anglo-Russian relations were almost wholly commercial, 
and, since the needs of the two countries were complementary, 
conducive to friendship. Rivalry started in the eighteenth 
century, when Russia under Peter the G reatM 689-1725) and 
Catherine II the GreatM762-96^ emerged as a great Continental 
Power and, what concerned Britain more closely, a respectable 
naval Power.
The Near Eastern Question became one of the great 
diplomatic preoccupations of modern centuries, and, in particular, 
it induced a long struggle between Britain and Russia. At the end 
of the eighteenth century, the Near Eastern Question might be 
defined as the relations of Russia and Turkey. From the days of 
Peter the Great to those of A lexander I (1801-25L Europe 
acquiesced in the assumption that Russia would claim a 
preponderant interest in the settlement of the Near Eastern 
Question.
For some two hundred years British merchants had been 
keenly alive to the commercial value of the Levant. The
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politicians, however, were curiously but characteristically tardy 
in awakening to the fact that the development of events in the 
Ottoman Empire possessed any political significance for Britain. 
The statesmen of the eighteenth century observed with equal 
unconcern the decrepitude of the Turks and the advance of the 
Russians.
The first statesman to sound a warning note on the matter 
of Russia was William Pitt in 1791. The capture by Russia of 
Ochakov from Turkey seemed to him to herald Russian control of 
both Turkey and Poland. He was ready to fight Russia to preserve 
the balance of power in the Black Sea-Ukraine area; but his 
Cabinet colleagues, his whig opponents, the newspapers, even the 
navy were unenthusiastic, not to say hostile. When the Prussians 
refused to act as allies, Pitt had to climb down and withdraw his 
u ltim atum .
By 1821, the role of Britain in the Near Eastern Question 
was becoming rather clearer. Turkey’s survival did not seem to 
damage British interests and might well be of positive value. The 
British did not threaten to take large stretches of Turkish 
territory-as did Russia, Austria and even France.
However, the Greek rising in 1821 was in a wholly 
different category. When Prince Alexander Ypsilanti. a member 
of one of the greatest Phanariot families and himself a General in 
the Russian army, unfurled the flag of Greek independence in 
Moldavia, still more when the insurrection spread to the Morea 
and the islands of the Aegean archipelago, it meant that a new 
force was manifesting itself in European politics, and that an old 
problem was entering upon a new phase. The Greek rising was an
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appeal to the sentiment of nationality: Pan-Hellenism-the
achievement of Hellenic unity and the realization of Hellenic 
identity-was the motto inscribed upon their banner. Plainly, a 
new factor had entered into the complex problem of the Near East. 
But the nationality factor was not the only one disclosed to 
Europe by the Greek insurrection.
The very nature of the Greek rebellion invited Russian 
intervention. In the first place, the prospect of an Orthodox 
Christian people struggling against Moslem Turks was bound to 
excite Russia's sympathy; and in any case the Greeks confidently 
expected Russian support. Their ultimate aim was a revived 
Byzantine empire based on Constantinople; and this had been 
Russia's aim for over three hundred years now. Secondly, Greek 
merchants had founded the Philike Hetairia (the Friendly Society) 
on Russian soil at Odessa in 1814. ( The head of this society from 
1820 was Ypsilanti.) And when Ypsilanti began the insurrection 
in 1821, he did so by marching an army from Russian-controlled 
Bessarabia into Moldavia and Wallachia. Thirdly, one of two joint 
Russian foreign secretaries from 1816 to 1822 was J o h n  
C apodistrias. a Greek born in Corfu, who was a powerful influence 
on Alexander I until he left the Tsar's service in 1822. And 
Russia's ambassador at Constantinople, Count Stroaanov. while he 
officially condemned Ypsilanti's revolt, at the same time gave 
open encouragement to the Greeks. Fourthly, the Greek war 
intensified existing disputes between Russia and Turkey which in 
themselves were already sufficient material for fresh Russo- 
Turkish conflict. From 1821, the Turks almost com pletely 
stopped the passage through the Straits of Greek ships carrying 
wheat exports from Odessa. Russia was once again made acutely
aware of the importance of the Straits to her economic 
development. And since 1812, the Russians and Turks had not 
ceased to quarrel over the terms of the treaty of Bucharest,1 
particularly those concerning the Caucasus region. Until then, the 
Near Eastern Question had meant the growth or the decline of 
Ottoman power. However, it had now centred in the rivalry 
between the Sultan and the Tsar. From here, therefore, it was 
recognized, primarily through the action of Russia and the newly 
aroused sympathies of Britain, as an international question.
In Britain, Canning, the foreign secretary, was fully alive 
to the significance of the Hellenic movement, alike in its primary 
aspect and in its secondary reaction upon the general diplomatic 
situation. And behind the statesmen there was for the first time 
in Britain a strong public opinion in favour of determined action 
in the Near East. At the time, Canning's new policy of acting with 
Russia in order to control her was therefore largely forced on him 
by the policy of the new Russian Tsar. Tsar Nicholas I (1825-55) 
did have some of the brooding, mystical attachment to autocracy 
which his brother had felt; he had no special liking for Greeks or 
for rebels in general; but he was more than willing to use the 
Greek situation to Russia's advantage, and to act while the Greek 
rebellion was still alive. Canning sensed the probability that, 
unless restrained, Nicholas might make war on Turkey, partly to 
save the Greeks from Ibrahim, but more particularly to advance 
Russia's boundaries and influence in the Balkans and Caucasus 
regions. If Russia declared war, Canning felt, "she would gobble 
up Greece at one mouthful and Turkey at the next."2
The consequence of Canning's endeavouring to control this
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diplomatic situation was the Russo-Turkish treaty of Akkerman 
signed in October 1826. The Turks gave way at every point. They 
promised to carry out the Bucharest terms relating to Serbia and 
the Principalities, and to recognize Russian gains on the 
threatened shores of the Black Sea and in the Caucasus region.
In this, at any rate, Canning was temporarily successful. 
But Turkey's unwillingness to carry out the Akkerman agreement 
led directly to her war of 1828-9 with Russia, a war which 
largely destroyed Canning's hopes.
The treaty of Adrianople which concluded the war of 
1828-29, was a major advance for Russia, though it had been 
harder won than observers realized and Russia was quite ready 
for a lengthy breathing-space afterwards. Indeed, Russia was by 
no means the irresistible and overwhelming force that she 
seemed to be for much of the nineteenth century; and Turkey had 
not been quite so near collapse in 1829. Nevertheless, the terms 
of the Adrianople treaty gave Russia complete control of the 
Danube delta and also extensive gains to the east of the Black 
Sea. In particular, Georgia was fully absorbed and Russia claimed 
control of Circassia- a claim which, five years later and again 
nearer the Crimean War, aroused British concern. Moldavia and 
Wallachia also became autonomous and were placed under a 
virtual Russian protectorate. Russian merchants and merchant 
ships had renewed rights through the Sultan's territories. And 
finally, the Sultan was made to accept the 1827 treaty of London 
as the further step to the independence of Greece; that is, it was 
independent Russian m ilitary action, rather than Canning's 
pressure which in the end forced Turkey to make peace with the
Greeks; and which also made possible the establishment of an 
autonomous, or even totally independent, Greek state.
After the treaty of Adrianople, therefore, Great Britain 
was able to influence the final settlement of the Hellenic 
question, but the Greeks owed most to Russia's successful war 
against the Sultan in 1828-29. By the Treaty of London (1832), 
Greece was established as an independent kingdom, under the 
protection of Great Britain, Russia, and France.
Two decades after the Greeks' independence, another 
Russo-Turkish war began in 1853 because the Sultan refused a 
Russian demand to have permanent protective right over his 
twelve million Christian subjects. This demand was itself the 
outcome of two preceding episodes; the Holy Places' dispute 
between Russia and France, and a successful Austrian 
intervention against Turkey in Montenegro. In none of these 
affairs did Britain have any direct concern. Truly, the Russo- 
Turkish war made it clear that neither Lord A b erdeen , the British 
Prime minister, 1852-5, nor Napoleon III, nor Nicholas I wanted a 
great power war; but the outcome of the war-the pattern of 
thrust and counter-thrust which developed between them- 
produced a situation in which considerations of prestige made a 
military solution the only possible one. P a lm e r s to n , inheriting 
the diplomatic traditions of Pitt and Canning, was quite open in 
his criticism of the British Government's behaviour-'Russia was 
led on step by step by the apparent timidity of the government of 
Britain'. Had Aberdeen imposed anything like unity on his Cabinet, 
had he made clear to the Russians Britain’s intention to maintain 
Turkish independence by force if necessary, had even British and 
French ministers been fully open with each other, it was possible
that war might still have been avoided. But all parties indulged 
in d isplays of m ilitary strength to give weight to the ir 
diplomatic moves and, once the fleets and armies were in 
position, retreat was difficult.
The situation was now extremely confused. Although the 
British press was outspokenly hostile to Russia, Nicholas I still 
believed that Aberdeen would not go to war. On the eve of the 
Crimean War, the Tsar made specific informal proposals based on 
the Russo-British understanding of 18443 to Sir H a m i l t o n  
S e y m o u r , then British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The 
overture was based upon the assumption that the dissolution of 
the Ottoman Empire was imminent, and that it was the duty, as 
well as the obvious interest, of the European Powers most closely 
concerned to come to an understanding as to the disposition of 
the estate. British statesmen refused to admit the accuracy of 
the Tsar's diagnosis, and questioned the propriety of the 
treatment prescribed.4
However distasteful the Tsar's proposals might have been 
to the moral sense or the political prejudices of British 
statesmen, it could not be denied that they were of high intrinsic 
significance because Russia would have become virtually 
supreme in the Balkans and over the Straits, while Britain would 
have established herself in Egypt and Crete. Nevertheless, the 
refusal of the British Government even to consider such 
suggestions led to the Crimean War (1854-56).
The Crimean War was fought ostensibly to maintain the 
independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. That principle 
received its consecration in the Treaty of Paris.5 The supreme
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purpose which inspired the Western Powers in the treaty was to 
repudiate the claims of Russia to an exclusive protectorate over 
Christian subjects of the Porte, and to arrest her progress in the 
Black Sea and the Straits.6 Consequently, the war registered a 
definite set-back to the policy of Russia in the Near East. 
Furthermore, for the moment it was sufficient to observe that 
the Crimean War did at any rate give the Sultan an opportunity to 
put his country in order, had he desired to do so. The events 
proved that the Sultan's zeal for reform was in direct ratio to his 
anxiety for self-preservation.
In the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the Balkan 
peoples began to take matters into their own hands. Crete had 
been in a state of perpetual revolt ever since it had been placed 
again, in 1840, under the direct government of the Sultan. In 
1875 the unrest spread to the whole Balkan area. It was first 
manifested among the mountaineers of the Herzegovina; from 
there it spread to their kinsmen in Bosnia, Serbia,and Montenegro. 
The insurrection among the southern Slavs in the west found an 
echo among the Bulgars in the east. The Sultan then let loose his 
Bashi-Bazouks among the Bulgarian peasantry. The European 
Powers could not stand aside and let the Turk work his will upon 
his Christian subjects, but mutual jealousy prevented jo in t 
action, and in 1877 Russia was compelled to act alone.7
On 24 April 1877, claiming to be acting on behalf of 
Europe, Tsar Alexander II H855-811 declared war on Turkey. 
Balkan Christians, and Bulgarians in particular, were about to be 
rescued. Britain, meanwhile, remained neutral. If the Turks 
expected solid support on the Crimean War pattern, they were
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disappointed British public opinion was not ready for that yet, 
nor was the Cabinet. The Russians also assured all and sundry of 
their good intentions. In particular, they promised to respect the 
existing status of Constantinople and the Straits, and to make no 
move that might threaten Egypt and the Suez Canal. But it 
remained to be seen what sort of terms the Russians would press 
upon Turkey, and Britain therefore wanted no slackening of effort. 
At the beginning of February 1878, Parliament accordingly agreed 
to grant £ 6 million for military preparations, and on 12 February, 
Admi ra l  Hornbv at last received orders to take the British fleet 
up to Constantinople.8
For two months, thereafter, there was a clear likelihood 
of war between Britain and Russia. Much hinged on the outcome 
of the Russo-Turkish negotiations and on the Russian troop 
movements in the neighborhood of Constantinople. So far, the 
Russians had hesitated, in the face of certain British and probable 
European-wide opposition, to storm the city. But it was very 
difficult to calculate accurately the aims of Russian policy at 
this juncture.
Consequently, the response was to send 10,000 troops to 
the town of San Stefano, on the coast of the Sea of Marmora, 
about eight miles from Constantinople. Here, on 3 March, the 
peace treaty between Russia and Turkey was signed.9 The terms 
of that famous Treaty were highly displeasing, not only to 
Austria and Great Britain, but to the Greeks and Serbians, whose 
ambitions in Macedonia were frustrated by the creation of a 
Greater Bulgaria. Great Britain, therefore, demanded that the 
Treaty should be submitted to a European Congress. Russia, after 
considerable demur, assented. Bismarck undertook to act as the
10
"honest broker" between the parties, and terms were ultimately 
arranged under his presidency at Berlin in 1878 .10
The Berlin Congress was the last of the splendid 
diplomatic festivals held by the great powers. It was the great 
powers who made all the decisions; no representatives of Serbia, 
Montenegro or Rumania were allowed to attend and even the 
Bulgarians were entirely represented by Russia. In this way, 
quick and straightforward solutions were arrived at and imposed 
on the Balkan nationalities; but this left a fund of resentment in 
the Balkans which in the end meant that the Berlin settlement 
could not be final one. However, for the time being, the great 
powers held sway.11
The Berlin Congress ushered in a fresh phase in the 
evolution of the Near Eastern Question and Anglo-Russian rivalry. 
In the Congress of Berlin, once again the Russians had been 
frustrated in their scheme to advance their bases in the Balkans 
as far as the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, by a change of policy 
which was an outcome of the Crimean defeat, Russia had already 
since the 1860s pursued systematic aggrandisement in the Middle 
and Far East because she seemed to believe that her international 
position would be restored when her expansionist policy in Asia 
had put the British on the defensive.
India and the Anglo-Russian rivalry
The real beginning of British India's involvement in the Turkish 
question dates back to the 1830s. By this time India had become a 
major imperial base from which British political and commercial
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activities could be extended westward into Turkish dominions, 
through which passed their shorter routes to India. But their 
interests seemed threatened by the activities of their imperial 
rival-Russia- in the Near and Middle East. Russia had penetrated 
far into Persia and Turkey, approaching the natural lines of 
communication to India, and even her physical frontiers.1
The independence of Greece in the early 1830s had not 
only made a serious inroad upon the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire in Europe, but had precipitated a disastrous conflict with 
Russia. Muhammad A li, the brilliant Albanian adventurer, who had 
made himself Pasha of Egypt, would have restored Greece to the 
Sultan Mahmud II. The island of Crete seemed to the vassal an 
inadequate reward for the service rendered to his Suzerain. But 
Ali had an ambition to independent rule in Egypt; to the pashalik 
of Syria; perhaps to the lordship of Constantinople itself.
In November 1831, Ali declared war on Sultan Mahmud. 
When the Sultan appealed to the European Powers to save him 
from Muhammad Ali, Russia alone responded to the appeal, and as 
a reward for her service imposed upon the Porte the humiliating 
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, 1833.2 By the terms of that Treaty 
Russia became v irtua lly  m istress of the Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles. The Tsar bound himself to render unlim ited 
assistance to the Porte by land and sea, and in return the Sultan 
undertook to close the Straits to the ships of war of all nations. 
To all intents and purposes the Sultan had become the vassal of 
the Tsar.3
Britain, as a whole, gave up the attitude of an onlooker 
to the Russian advance towards the Mediterranean because Russia
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seemed to have established a military protectorate over the 
European dominion of the Sultan by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi.
On the other hand, both the British Government and the 
Indian authorities at the time were aware of the numerous 
advantages of the Mesopotamian route. It was obvious that 
British political influence would considerably increase in that 
quarter if this route were developed under British auspices. It 
would substantially check the eastward progress of any European 
rivals of Britain. One such rival was apparently Russia. The 
establishment of a Russian consulate-general at Erzeroum soon 
after the conclusion of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi appeared as 
an attempt by Russia to extend her imperial influence along the 
line of the Euphrates. The route was likely to provide facilities 
for obtaining information about the power, position and political 
combinations of the local tribes and native powers, which would 
be extremely advantageous to Britain's eastern possessions, in 
case she were required to counteract the intrigues or hostility of 
any other power in Syria and Mesopotamia. Britain would possess 
an advantage over her antagonists by developing and controlling 
this route.4
Consequently, this situation prompted Britain to attempt 
to reopen and develop the alternative route to India via 
Mesopotamia and Syria. The British were less familiar with this 
route than the Egyptian and Red Sea route, but strategically it 
was much more important than the latter. Palmerston wanted to 
develop this route as the chief means of arresting the dissolution 
of the Turkish empire and as an additional safeguard for India 
against hostile Russian designs. The concrete manifestation of 
this aim was a scheme formulated for the exploration of the
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Euphrates route and navigation of the Mesopotamian rivers.
Palmerston considered this route highly advantageous to 
British imperial interests. In his scheme of things Syria was to 
revert to Turkey sooner or later, and then the Syrian port of 
Alexandretta was to be linked with the Persian Gulf by rail and 
w ater com m unication.5 In his opinion the political situation in 
the Near East after 1833 made the Euphrates route the only 
feasible one, for complications seemed to threaten the safety of 
the Egyptian route.
Now, British policy in the 1830s revealed that Britain 
would not tolerate any interference with her routes to India and 
would actively intervene in the states flanking India like Sind, 
Punjab, Persia and Afghanistan if the "avenues" to her empire 
were threatened. It began what has been called "the stupid and 
hideous dream of Anglo-Indian chauvinism", the sustained 
nightmare of a Russian threat to India.6
In the second half of the nineteenth century, with India's 
importance to Britain increasing, and with Russian forces moving 
rapidly into the Middle East, it was also a matter of guarding the 
Indian frontiers from landward attacks which might be launched 
through Persia and Afghanistan. After the 1820s, naval control of 
the Mediterranean was not only concerned with the European 
balance. The development of steamships and railways meant that 
the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and Persian Gulf also became 
the chief routes to India from Britain. The opening of the Suez 
Canal in 1869 emphasized this importance. After the treaty of 
Berlin, statesmen in Britain were beginning to accept that Herat,7 
in northern Afghanistan, and not Constantinople, was the new "key
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to India". Moreover, British policy on the Eastern question was 
increasingly a matter of sealing off other powers' land routes to 
India by assuming responsibility for the defence of Turkish 
Armenia, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Especially, occupation of 
Egypt in 1882 was perhaps the biggest single reason for Britain's 
diminished concern in the fate of Constantinople. Practical 
control of the Suez Canal gave British forces a flex ib ility  
possessed by no other power. Consequently, there seemed far 
less purpose in pursuing a doubtful strategic advantage at the 
Straits now that such a massive one had been gained in Egypt.8
On the other hand, there was an obvious economic interest 
(in addition to political and strategic concerns) behind Britain’s 
involvement in the Eastern Question. The routes to India were 
trade routes, as well as routes for warships and armies; and the 
expanding China trade followed the same route through the Middle 
East. Russia had been also pushing steadily on towards the 
Pacific, and after the Treaty of Berlin, find ing herself 
diplomatically isolated by what she saw as Bismarck's defection9 
and not yet allied with France, she had become deeply interested 
in China. It was not, however, until the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries that between Britain and Russia any serious 
conflict in that region developed.
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Anglo-Russian Advance toward the Far East
GREAT BRITAIN
In the early nineteenth century, in China, the opium poppy had 
been known for at least thirteen centuries, its medical use for 
nine centuries, and that the medical properties lay in the 
capsules for six centuries; and opium, in its modern form, has 
been produced in China for four centuries and more; it was now 
used for opium-smoking, which had come into China through 
tobacco-smoking, by the Chinese.1
Foreign opium was first introduced into China by the 
Portuguese trading from Goa and Daman in 1729. From 1729 the 
import of foreign opium increased, unchecked by the government, 
at the rate of 20 chests a year, until 1773. In that year, in order 
to settle conflicts constantly arising between the agents of the 
British, Danish, Dutch, and French East India Companies having 
factories in India, the British company assumed the monopoly of 
all the opium produced in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa; the other 
three companies were given the right to receive specified 
quantities in each year. For a few years the traffic was left to 
private traders, but in 1780 the British East India Company 
exercised its right of monopoly, and took the trade into its own 
hands.2
During the 1820s, the Celestial Government had forbidden 
opium import, but the demand was so insistent that an illicit 
trade developed. The East India Company had a monopoly control 
over all the opium produced in India, but it did not wish to 
endanger its equally valuable monopoly of the tea trade by 
engaging in smuggling, no matter how profitable. Accordingly, it
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licensed private merchants, or "country traders"-the British. 
Parsees or Indian Jews-who bought the opium for silver, which 
paid for the company's tea purchases, and in turn sold it illegally 
and very profitably with the bought connivance of the local 
Chinese officials.
This system encouraged the development of aggressive 
and ruthless independent trading concerns, with considerable 
support in Britain among the many foes of the East India Company. 
When the Company's monopoly of the China trade ended in 1833, 
these independent traders came to the fore, demanding a 
relaxation of the Chinese restrictions on commerce. The Chinese 
authorities, far from yielding, precipitated a crisis by trying to 
suppress the opium trade.
The Opium War followed, from 1840 to 1842. It was in
fact less about opium than about free trade, and its result was
the annexation of Hong Kong by Britain in 1841, and the Nanking 
Treaty of 1842 which named Shanghai, Canton, Ningpo, Foochow 
and Amoy as the first treaty ports. At these treaty ports the 
merchants lived in special districts where they enjoyed extra­
territorial rights and virtual self-government, coming under the
control of their own consuls and judges; the British were the 
dominant group, in numbers and wealth alike.3
After the first treaty, the foreign residents of Mid-China- 
Shanghai and Ningpo-lived their ordinary life and enjoyed their 
responsible pleasures, w ithout molestation or insult from the 
people of the country. In June 1856, the foreign residents at
Ningpo were reminded that, while a certain temple near the city
was a "place to which the public may legitim ately repair
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according the treaty," still they were not entitled to its exclusive 
use. Apart from these was no record of any acts of molestation 
affecting the security or the comfort of the foreign residents at 
these ports.4
On 8 October 1856, the Hong Kong-registered lorcha 
'Arrow' which lay off the city of Canton, flying the British ensign 
at the mizzen-gaff, and the Blue-Peter at the foremast-head to 
indicate that she was British, was boarded by four Chinese 
officers and about sixty soldiers, who hauled down first the 
British flag, and then the Blue-Peter; and all the crew, Chinese, 
twelve in number, were bound and taken from the lorcha into the 
gun-boats. The master, Thomas Kennedy, was at the moment 
visiting another lorcha close by, and returned on board before the 
soldiers left with their prisoners; he immediately rehoisted the 
British flag, and protested against the arrest and removal of his 
crew.
During the examination of the incident, in 1857, the 
two nations drifted into the Second Opium War, the so-called 
"Arrow W ar".5 The incident of the lorcha Arrow had, in the 
absence of wise statesmanship by the Chinese, been seized by the 
British representatives as the ir opportunity to make other 
demands, in order that other and greater questions might find 
their settlement. These demands were formulated on the Treaty 
of Tien-tsin in 1858;6 and the murder of the French missionary 
Chapdelaine furnished the French Government with a ground for 
joining hands with Britain in the same object. The renewal of 
hostilities by China in 1859 resulted in the imposition of further 
penalties on the empire in the conventions of 1860 signed at
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Peking.
The Convention of Peking in 1860 resulted in the 
opening of further treaty ports and of the Yangtse River, while 
Britain added mainland Kowloon to its colony of Hong kong. The 
British also gained at this time the right to recognize and to 
appoint the head of the Chinese Maritime Customs which for 
eighty years remained virtually a British preserve.7
Fifteen years after the Convention of Peking, in 1875, Mr. 
T.F. W ade, minister of Peking, learned of the attack on the 
mission and the murder of Mr. Margary in Yunnan on 11 March , by 
a telegram from the India Office in London;8 and he seized the 
opportunity provided by the incident to press for a favourable 
settlem ent of all outstanding questions between the two 
governments. These demands were formulated in the Chefoo 
Convention in 1876. The Chefoo Convention was drawn up in three 
sections, the first being headed "Settlement of the Yunnan case." 
The second section was headed "Official Intercourse." The third 
section related to "Trade." It has been described as the third 
stage in the history of relations between Britain and China, 
ranking next in importance to the treaties of 1842 and 1858-60; 
and this, the non-British view, seemed the more reasonable.9
In a word, Britain's China policy was in the declaration of 
Lord C la re n d o n  in 1870 that "British interests in China are 
strictly commercial, or in all events only so far political as they 
may be for the protection of Commerce." 10
In Japan, the American initiative, by which in 1853-54 
Commodore P e rry  broke the long isolation imposed by the 
Tokugawa Shoguns, was not allowed to pass unchallenged. The 
British had been glad to let Perry, acting for the United States,
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take the risk of opening Japan to the West and hoped to profit by 
the results, though Perry's success had been limited. Even at the 
threat of war, Japan yielded only to America's most pressing 
demands in the Treaty which she signed at Kanagawa 31 March 
1 854 .11
During the above-mentioned Arrow War the Palmerston 
Cabinet transferred plenipotentiary power in China to a special 
envoy, James Bruce, the eighth Earl of Elgin, in April 1857. At the 
time, Elgin was instructed to negotiate about the recent 
situation at Tien-tsin with the emissaries of the Chinese Court. 
In addition to this assignment, he was instructed to negotiate a 
commercial treaty with Japan while in the Far East.12
Elgin was pressed for time. He hoped at least to explore 
the possibilities of a treaty with Japan and then return to China 
w ithin a month. Contrary to Japanese expectations, his 
intentions were peaceful. He deeply regretted Britain's policy in 
China and did not wish to repeat it in Japan. Moreover, his
instruction from Clarendon, in 1857, had forbidden the use of 
force to obtain his ends. Even his naval escort was small: a 
steam frigate, H.M.S. 'Retribution', a gunboat, 'Lee', and the
'Emperor', a steam yacht to be presented to the Shogun as a gift 
from Queen V ictoria. Elgin disregarded Japanese harbour 
regulations and laws at will and, insisted upon going to Yedo to 
open treaty negotiations. There he encountered skilful diplomats 
among the Bakufu and, yielding to their will, followed the pattern 
of the American treaty in the terms finally agreed upon between 
Japan and Great Britain. The treaty was signed at Yedo on 26
August 1858 by Elgin and seven of the Shogun's representatives-
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without Imperial approval.13
The treaty of Yedo with its accompanying trade regulations 
provided that the opening of Nagasaki, Kanagawa, and Hakodata to 
British residents and trade would take place on 1 July 1859; that 
Niigata or another port on the Japan Sea would be opened from 1 
January 1860 and Hyogo (Kobe) from January 1863. Foreigners 
would be granted residence in Yedo from 1 January 1862 and in 
Osaka from 1 January 1863. A British diplomatic agent was 
permitted to live at Yedo and consuls to reside at the open ports. 
The ranking representatives could travel freely throughout Japan 
but other British subjects were restricted to lim ited areas 
around the trea ty  c ities . The British were granted 
extra territo ria l rights and consular ju risd iction , freedom of 
worship, and most-favoured-nation treatment. The Japanese 
further agreed to freedom of trade between private individuals 
and to British employment of Japanese subjects in any capacity 
without government interference. Arms could be sold only to the 
Japanese Government or to foreigners. The importation of opium 
was forbidden but the Japanese Government was given entire 
responsibility for the control of smuggling. Export and import 
duties were fixed but could be revised after five years.14
With Britain at its height as the world's principal 
financial and maritime power and Japan at one of the low points 
in her political and economic history, their confrontation could 
easily have ended as conqueror and conquered, had not each 
government determined to keep it otherwise. Sobered by her 
mistakes in China, Great Britain aimed to avoid their repetition in 
Japan while enforcing her unwelcome treaty to its limits and
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extending her commercial frontier as far as possible with them. 
Japan on the other hand was equally intent upon maintaining her 
independence at all costs while mastering the techniques and 
po litica l sk ills  of the W est. She aimed to meet its 
encroachments with her own weapons. Thus in the midst of 
Britain's profit-making and Japan's struggles for political and 
economic rebirth through the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the 
relationship between the two nations became essentially that of 
instructor and instructed for the benefit of both. Even before the 
treaties and during their early years Japanese officia ls and 
scholars had chosen Britain as their nation's model. Recognizing 
the similarity of Japan's geographical relation to Asia to that of 
Britain's to Europe, and wishing to emulate British achievements, 
they set about making Japan the Britain of the East.15
By the early 1880s, over twenty-five years had passed 
since fear of British might had forced Japan to open a few ports 
to Western trade. An influx of men, ideas and commodities had 
fired Japanese ambition to lay the foundations of a modern state. 
The long-standing differences between the two island empires 
had lessened considerably.
RUSSIA
The great Russian expansion over the Urals and across Siberia to 
the Pacific was accomplished before the reign of Peter the Great. 
Excluded from the Amur valley, Russian activity in Siberia 
remained of necessity limited. Moreover, the development of the 
Siberian lands was, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, lim ited by three factors: the lack of adequate 
com m unications, the b itte r clim ate, and the d ifficu lty  of
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acquiring suffic ient provisions. These problems led to a 
consideration of the advisability of acquiring the Amur river 
valley, despite the treaties with China. It was hoped that 
communications with the Pacific could be improved and that food 
for future settlements could be grown. The inauguration of an 
energetic, aggressive policy began with the appointment of 
Nicholas Muraviev in 1847 as governor-general of eastern Siberia. 
W ithout consulting his government, Muraviev proceeded to 
establish posts along the Amur on what was legally Chinese 
territory. He also sent an expedition to the island of Sakhalin. 
His activ ities met with little  approval in St. Petersburg. 
However, in moving against China at this time Russia was in fact 
paralleling the imperial policies of the western nations, in 1842, 
after the Opium War, the Chinese had been forced to open their 
trade to the European powers.1
After the Crimean War the renewed conflict of the British 
and French with China in 1857 and 1858 allowed Russia the 
opportunity of legalizing and extending her conquests. In 1858 
Muraviev signed the Treaty of Aigun with a local Chinese 
commander, who was in fact not authorized to conclude such an 
agreement. This treaty gave Russia territory on the north bank of 
the Amur and provided for a joint occupation of the Ussuri region. 
At the same time Admiral P u tva tin  negotiated the Treaty of 
Tientsin with the Chinese Government, which extended to Russia 
the same commercial privileges that had previously been extorted 
by the British, French, and American Governments. In 1860, N. P. 
Ignatiev, who was the Russian representative in Peking, used the 
desperate situation of the Chinese Government to gain the highly
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advantageous Treaty of Peking. Here the territorial provisions of 
the Treaty of Aigun were confirmed and, in addition, Russia 
received the enormous stretch of territory between the Amur, the 
Ussuri, and the Pacific Ocean. New trading privileges were also 
granted. With the acquisition of this land the Russian Government 
proceeded with the construction of Vladivostock-"Ruler of the 
East'', which, since it was frozen only from December to March, 
allowed them more favourable port facilities on the Pacific.2
A lexander H erzen, the great spokesman of Russian 
liberalism said that " the Pacific Ocean is the Mediterranean of 
the future. In this future the role of Siberia, as a country lying 
between the ocean, south Asia and Russia, is of extreme 
importance. It is understood that Siberia must extend down to 
the border of China."3 Although the Amur question was settled 
peacefully and to the Russian advantage because of western 
pressure on China, a second dispute involving another sector of 
the long and turbulent Russo-Chinese border, threatened to end in 
war between the two countries. In 1862 a revolt broke out among 
the Mohammedan tribes in Chinese Turkestan where the peoples 
were of the same racial stock as those in Russian Turkestan. 
Their able leader, Yakub Beg, was able to establish a regularly 
organized state. The British Government sent a mission to his 
court and his troops received training from British and Polish 
officers. The inability of the Chinese Government to control the 
situation alarmed the Russian Government because of the possible 
effect of the movement on its own tribesmen. The strategic 
importance of the area, the Ili valley, was immense, since this 
was the great "Gateway of the peoples" through which the early
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invasions of Russia had flowed. In 1871 Russian troops entered 
the territory and occupied Kuldja. At the same time they assured 
the Chinese Government that the move was only a temporary 
measure. In 1877-78 Chinese troops were able to put down the 
rebellion, and they then requested that the Russian armies 
withdraw. Even though the Treaty of Livadia of 1879 was signed, 
which constituted a major Russian triumph, China did not accept 
the treaty and prepared for war.
The crisis over the Kuldja territory placed the Russian 
Government in a difficult position. The primary Russian interests 
were, as always, clearly in Europe and at the Straits. The Russo- 
Turkish War of 1878 had just been concluded, and again Russian 
military weaknesses had been exposed. Although the possession 
of the Kuldja territory would give Russia a welcome strategic 
advantage, she was not in a condition to go to war over the 
question. Therefore, in the negotiations that now commenced, 
considerations of prestige and commerce were placed first. In the 
final Treaty of St. Petersburg of 24 February 1881, Russia 
accepted a much reduced territory, but received instead as 
increased indemnity of 9 million roubles as well as added 
commercial privileges. The entire incident, despite the final 
Chinese victory, embittered the relations of the two nations in 
the follow ing years. Moreover, the Chinese, having now 
apparently imposed their will upon a European power, became 
more confident.4 They had, it seemed, as the British ambassador 
in St. Petersburg concluded, in fact achieved much: "China had 
compelled Russia to do what she has never done before, disgorge 
territory that she had once absorbed."5
During the preparations for the Amur expedition, years
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before China surrendered her northern territories to Russia, 
Captain Nevelskoy had explored the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin. 
Little was known about even the elementary facts of their 
geography. The western world assumed that Sakhalin was a 
peninsula jutting out from the Asiatic mainland. In Japan, on the
other hand, it was held that Sakhalin was a projection of the
northernmost Japanese island of Yezo (Hokkaido). Japan learned 
the truth about Sakhalin's geography in 1808, but this knowledge 
was not imparted to Europe, and not until N e v e l s k o v
circumnavigated Sakhalin in 1849 did it become known that it 
was separated from Asia by what later came to be called the 
Tartar Straits. Although only a few Japanese had settled at its 
southern tip, where they had engaged in fishing, Japan considered 
Sakhalin her own.6
The first dispute with Japan over Sakhalin arose when the 
Russian envoy, P u tya tin . reached Nagasaki in 1853, soon after 
Perry's firs t v isit. The arrival of Russian vessels caused
considerable confusion in Tokyo. Reiterating the main Russian 
contention, Putyatin sent the Japanese authorities a message 
stating that he "was not seeking small trading advantages but 
was the bearer of an important dispatch." Eventually he was 
received in Nagasaki, but no agreement on Sakhalin was reached. 
The Japanese were ready to cede the northern part of the island 
(north of the 50th parallel) to the Russians, but Putyatin insisted 
that all of Sakhalin should belong to the Tsar. By a protocol 
signed in 1855, Putyatin obtained Japanese perm ission for 
Russian vessels to enter certain Japanese ports. This was the 
firs t Russo-Japanese trea ty .7 However, the Sakhalin issue
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meanwhile remained unsettled because not only Muraviev but the 
Tsar himself remained adamant.
In 1862 a Japanese mission visited St. Petersburg; it 
proposed the 50th parallel as the border line between Russia and 
Japan on Sakhalin Island; Russia, in turn, demanded the 48th 
parallel, which would have given her control of four-fifths of the 
island. Three years later Russia for the first time offered to 
exchange the Kurile Islands for Southern Sakhalin. The almost 
unpopulated Kurile Islands had been claimed by the Japanese since 
the eighteenth century. Only on the southernmost of the Kuriles, 
on Iturup, were there any Japanese settlers. A few Russians 
came to the same island in 1806; since 1830 the Russian- 
American Company had been in control of all the Kuriles except 
Iturup. The first Russo-Japanese treaty of 1855 recognized it as 
Japanese, and all the other islands of the Kuriles as Russian 
possessions.
Finally, in 1867, an agreement between the two countries 
was reached which established a condominium over Sakhalin. The 
island remained under jo in t occupation, and the subjects of 
Russia and Japan were alike free to move and reside in all the 
unsettled areas. In order to gain possession of as much land as 
possible the Russian authorities began to transfer to the island 
convicts sentenced to hard labour or exile. An exchange of 
Sakhalin for the Kuriles was formally agreed upon on 1875. In 
gaining control of Sakhalin Russia had obviously made the better 
bargain. However, the Japanese kept their right to fish in 
Sakhalin waters.8
After 1875 the bilateral nature of early Russo-Japanese
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relations gave way to the more complex interplay of political and 
economic forces on an international scale and the influence of 
individual Russian and Japanese adventurers faded into the 
b a c k g ro u n d .9 In general, at this time the relations of the two 
countries remained good, although limited in extent.
In linking the above-mentioned stages of Anglo-Russian 
rivalry to the Port Hamilton Affair, it is worth recalling Nish's 
remarks in his book A n a lo -Ja p a n e se  Alliance, on the light the 
affair threw on British policy in the Far East:- " It suggests that 
there was an irrevocable rivalry with Russia there and that 
Britain was much concerned with Korea. If this was true of 
Britain's attitude in 1885, it did not hold good for the 1890s. 
Partly Britain learnt the lesson of the Port Hamilton incident; 
partly her leaders saw the need to give Russia some latitude in 
the Far East. Britain had two major interests in Asia: the Indian 
Empire and the China trade. The first greatly outweighed the 
second. Both were affected by Russia's expansion in Asia; and it 
was thought that Britain's interests would best be served if 
Russia's attention were diverted from India. This could best be 
attained by not exaggerating Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Far 
East. Similarly, Britain hereafter took only a secondary interest 
in Korea and Russia's actions there."10
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CHAPTER II: THE OPENING OF KOREA, 1876-1882.
1. KOREA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF HER OPENING.
DURING the first half of the nineteenth century, the Western 
Powers were to bring the Far Eastern societies into the modern 
world. While China and then Japan were coping with these
outside forces, Korea remained a "hermit nation,"1 maintaining
relations only with China and, to an insignificant extent, with
Japan. Korea's traditional "foreign relations" were characterized 
by tributary relations with China and restricted neighbourly 
relations with Japan; the Sino-Korean relationship was dominated 
by China, and the Korean-Japanese relationship was dominated by 
Korea. For Korea, the tributary relationship with China had a 
strong self-protective quality. It was the political side of a
policy of minimal interaction with the outside world. Such a 
policy of national preservation was generally subsumed under the 
term "seclusion." This policy was also directed against Japan.
On the other hand, nineteenth century Korea, to Western
eyes, was an example of a secluded, backward country with little
civilization. Charles G u tz la ff. the German missionary, in the
early 1830s wrote of Korea that "we cannot think the interior is
as thickly inhabited as the maritime provinces of China. Their
state of barbarism, cherished by the odious system of exclusion,
which had nowhere, by a maritime nation, been carried further
than in Korea, does not admit a numerous and flourishing
population; nor do we think there are any large cities to be 
2
fo u n d ."  Gutzlaff drew these conclusions after only a brief 
glimpse of Korea's coastal areas, but he did not and could not
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evaluate the significance seclusion had for the Koreans.
Seclusion was a positive concept as far as the Koreans
were concerned. It was the expression of a self sufficient
system that excluded the ra ison d ’etre  of relations with
countries outside this system, and it was instrum ental in 
preserving the stability of the Far Eastern balance of Power. Up 
to the nineteenth century, seclusion was a tradition that fitted 
Korea's particular status within the Far Eastern world.
During the nineteenth century, Western ships appeared 
more frequently off Korea's shores to back up the Western 
demands to open trade relations. But the Koreans were not 
receptive. They had no reason to admit into their well-balanced 
world those countries that threatened to undermine the system 
with their "heterodox ideas." The intrusion of the West forced the 
Koreans to restate the principles that had guided their "foreign 
policy" for the past two hundred years. This restatement of the 
seclusion policy has become associated with the name of the 
Taew on'aun. who reigned for his son, King Koiona ( r.1864-1907),
during the decade 1864 to 1873. His successful repulsion of the
3 4French in 1866 and the Americans in 1871 proved to the
Koreans that the seclusion policy was effective and gave them a 
false sense of security and preparedness. The Taewon'gun's 
seclusion policy preserved the peninsula's isolation and retarded
5
Korea's response to the outside world after 1874.
In the late 1860s and the early 1870s the Chinese 
Government was called upon to restate the nature of the Chinese- 
Korean relationship. The Chinese, however, failed to perceive that 
the Confucian concept of suzerain-state vis-a-vis vassal-state
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could not be equated with state sovereignty as set forth by 
modern international law; the Chinese found it difficult to adapt 
their relations with Korea to the exigencies of the modern world. 
Instead, China was content to refer to the fact that Korea was 
subordinate to China, although Korea was solely responsible for 
matters such as her trade with foreign lands, the propagation of 
alien religions, and her own laws. Furthermore, there was no 
responsible government organ in Peking which specialized in 
Korean affairs. The traditional agency, the Board of Rites, only 
fu lf ille d  the pure ly cerem onia l function of transm itting  
correspondence to and from Korea. On the other hand, the Tsunqli 
Yamen (Chinese foreign office), although not nominally in charge 
of Korean affairs, came to assume the role of interpreting 
Chinese-Korean relations to the outside world. Since the Yamen 
was preoccupied with problems of more immediate concern to 
China, however, its pronouncements on the Korean case lacked 
determination and firmness. Consequently, China's inattention to 
the full proportions of the Korean problem irreparably damaged
g
her influence over her vassal.
In contrast to China's slow absorption of the West's new 
ideas concerning international relations, Japan was quick to 
realize the advantage international law brought to herself and to 
her relations with neighbouring countries. The Meiji restoration 
in 1868 had deeply reformed Japan's own th inking and 
institu tions, and thus, demands to change the stagnating 
relationship with Korea became strong and irreversible. Under the 
circumstances, the daimyo of Tsushima was no longer satisfied 
with his trad itional, v irtua lly tributary relationship with the
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Koreans and urged economic and ceremonial reforms that would 
improve his status vis-a-vis Korea. The most revolutionary of 
his proposals was that demanding the replacement of the Korean 
seals of authority with Japanese seals. In protest against this 
attempt of the daimyo of Tsushima, the Korean Government 
claimed that the Japanese had violated the treaty relationship by 
sending an "irregular envoy" through Tsushima and also protested 
against the abolition of the Korean seal and the use of a number 
of Chinese characters that were reserved only for the ir
correspondence with China. Consequently, Korea's stubborn
rejection of subsequent missions, and her refusal to acknowledge 
the announcement that the Japanese Foreign Office had taken 
charge of Korean affairs (on 8 September 1871) created a sense 
of frustration in Japanese Government circles that eventually 
gave rise to demands for "armed diplomacy."7 In June 1873, 
continued disputes and exchanges of protest climaxed in a 
warning issued by the prefect of Tongnae, which was located near 
Pusan. The prefect bluntly attacked Japan's adoption of
institutions "from other countries" and called her a "land of no 
law." This document prompted some segments within the
Japanese Government to formulate the se ikanron , the "debate
g
about the punishment of Korea."
Korea's complete failure to communicate with Japan was 
an expression of the general consternation and alarm the Koreans 
felt about Japan's rapid westernization. The adoption of Western 
ways meant to many tradition-minded Koreans a breach with 
tradition that revealed the unstable and fickle nature of the 
Japanese people. The Koreans feared that Japan might conspire
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g
with the West against Korea. During their long period of 
minimal contact, Korea and Japan had lost the substance of 
"neighbourly relations" and, thrust into the turmoil of nineteenth 
century international politics, they did not easily find the ways 
and means for a rapprochement.
When King Kojong assumed the full responsibilities of 
governm ent in 1874, he inherited his fa ther's "restored" 
government. Kojong thus inherited a politically and economically 
self-sufficient country. The king and his officials had confidence 
in the country's strength. The seclusion policy had been 
successful, and the moral superiority of the Confucian state had 
been demonstrated. There was no reason for Kojong to give up 
this inheritance when the Japanese returned to Korea in the same 
year with their renewed determination to open Korea to Japanese 
diplomacy and trade.
2. THE KOREAN-JAPANESE TREATY, 1876.
In 1876 the Meiji government of Japan, after several years of 
unsuccessful attempts to establish official relations with Korea, 
sent a form idable term of m ilitary observers to Korea 
commanded by Lieutenant-General Kuroda Kivotaka. His objective 
was to conclude a treaty of friendship and commerce with Korea, 
but the treaty was only to revive Japan's attempt in post-1868 
to in troduce  into the tra d itio n a l pa tte rn  of fo rm a l 
communications innovations that were more in line with Western 
practices. For this purpose, Kuroda was to play the role of an 
aggrieved party demanding satisfaction for an alleged Korean 
attack in 1875 against the Japanese warship U nyokan'.1
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Kuroda's mission, if successful, was bound to bring about 
a basic modification in this China-centred international system 
and in Korea's status vis-a-vis the "Celestial Court." It was not 
surprising, therefore, that the Japanese Government dispatched to 
China, almost simultaneously with its decision to send the Kuroda 
expedition, an able Western-trained diplomat to obtain China's 
acquiescence in the new status of Sino-Korean relations. More 
specifically, Japan desired that China should relinquish its 
suzerainty over Korea.
The Sino-Japanese conversations were inconclusive at 
best. Li Hung-chang. the governor-General of Chihli Province, 
rebuffed the Japanese demand with the ready explanation that 
Korea, although independent in all matters relating to her 
government and religion, was subordinate to China. However, in 
the face of Japan's seeming willingness to risk a war with Korea, 
if necessary, to obtain a treaty, Li felt compelled to advise Korea 
to consider the Japanese demands in friendly manner. This was 
the maximum concession Li would make. 2
A combination of these three factors-Japanese 
determination, Chinese counsel, and a change in the Korean 
Government (as the Taewon'gun yielded to the greater strength of 
the queen Min and the Mins who wanted to open the country) 
helped to produce a treaty of amity, friendship, commerce, and 
navigation signed at Kanghwa city by Sin Hon. who had had a 
brilliant military career under the Taewon'gun, for Korea and by 
General Kuroda for Japan on 26 February 1876. (Appendices I & II) 
The treaty was modelled on the Western treaties with Japan and 
China and provided for the exchange of diplomatic emissaries, the 
opening of two ports besides Pusan, and the granting of
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extraterritorial rights for Japanese citizens in Korea. In other 
words, Japan imposed "unequal" terms on Korea that were similar 
in nature to the provisions of the "unequal" treaties which the 
Western powers had extracted from Japan only a dozen or more 
years before. Furthermore, the most significant statement was 
contained in the first article which read: " Korea being an 
independent state enjoys the same Sovereign rights as does 
Japan." The Koreans considered it mere reaffirmation of a 
tradition-sanctioned reality but the Japanese intended to use it 
as a means of isolating Korea from the Chinese tributary 
system .3
The Korean-Japanese treaty was the first modern treaty 
Korea entered into with any country. Far from having only 
bilateral significance, it laid the basis for more far-reaching 
changes in the old Far Eastern order than was realized at the time 
of its conclusion. The Koreans saw the treaty in a narrow 
perspective. They rationalized the peaceful continuation of the 
"three hundred year old friendship" with Japan as the natural 
response of a morally superior country toward the change of a 
neighbour that had lost all sense of propriety and etiquette by its 
hasty adoption of Western ways. Especially, the Koreans had no 
intention of altering the quality of the relationship and therefore 
envisaged the new agreement as one of local significance, dealing 
with trade and safeguarding against Western intrusion. At the 
time, Kojong's flexibility was directed only at a normalization of 
relations with Japan. On the other hand, the Korean-Japanese 
treaty contained neither the psychological nor the po litica l 
preconditions for ending seclusion.4
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3. CHINA'S RECONSIDERATION OF KOREA'S PROBLEM 
In the Chinese view, Korea's security was guaranteed by the 
trad itional formula of Korea's tributary relationship to the 
"superior country". Even after the Kangwha Treaty of 1876, China 
upheld this concept, although it was seriously challenged by 
Japan's advances in Korea. Whenever necessary, the Yamen 
repeated its ambiguous pronouncement that the whole world was 
aware of the fact that Korea was dependent on China and at the 
same time independent as far as her internal and external affairs 
were concerned.1 Korea herself helped preserve the fragile 
facade of her dependent relationship by continuing, after 1876, to 
send to China tributary missions and detailed reports on her 
dealings and negotiations with Japan.
In the late 1870s, China had to reevaluate her stand on the 
Korea problem. Japan's ruthless annexation of the Ryukyu Islands 
in 18792 showed the Chinese that no region within Japanese 
reach was inviolable. The possibility that Japan would seek a 
quick military solution to the opening of additional Korean ports 
could not be ruled out. Moreover, Russia's presence in the Far East 
was of even more concern. Russian infringement upon China's 
territory in the Amur region, legalized by the Treaty of Peking in 
1860, made a deep impression on China and changed her attitude 
toward Russia's eastward advance. The troubles in Chinese 
Turkestan in the 1870s brought China again into d irect 
confrontation with Russian expansionism. Turkey's defeat by
Russia and subsequent settlement of the Turkish problem in the 
late 1870s added yet another dimension to China's fear of a 
concentrated Russian effort in the Far East.
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Above all else, however, Japan's annexation of the Ryukyu 
Islands shocked the Yamen into reexamining its stand on Korea 
and made it receptive to new ideas.3 A man whose opinions were 
highly respected in the Yamen was the British minister in Peking, 
Sir Thomas F. Wade. In the summer of 1879, Wade went to Prince 
Kung and expressed his fear that Korea was in immediate danger 
of being swallowed up by her neighbours. He emphatically 
repeated his view that countries like Korea could only be saved by 
opening themselves to all nations.4 Wade's viewpoint was 
eloquently argued on the Chinese side by the experienced T ing 
J ih -c h 'a n g . former governor of Kiangsu and Fukien and close 
friend of Li's. In a treatise on maritime defence, Ting wrote that 
Korea had been forced to conclude a treaty with Japan, and that 
China would be well-advised to encourage Korea to conclude 
treaties with the Western nations. Then, he reasoned, if Japan 
directed her aggressive intentions against Korea, all the 
countries bound to Korea by treaty would stand up in Korea's 
defence and expose Japan's sinister motives. Ting recommended 
that Korea be secretly advised to send observers abroad and yield 
whenever Western nations requested the conclusion of treaties. 
Ting's suggestion was received by the Yamen with the comment 
that it was indeed a timely argument.5
The Yamen did not hesitate to collect these suggestions 
and to act upon them immediately. At this point, emphasizing 
that the Yamen did not intend to interfere unduly with Korea's 
affairs, they recommended Li Hung-chang on 21 August 1879, to 
transmit to Korea the ideas expounded by Ting. Li carefully 
reviewed the problem and considerably expanded Ting's line of 
reasoning. To Li it seemed a proven fact that the Japanese were
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Korea's principal enemy and that they were pursuing the policy of 
"gaining one pace, advancing one pace." Japan's recent experiment 
with "enriching the nation and strengthening the army" left her 
destitute and would force her into new adventures abroad as a 
means of freeing herself from her onerous debts. Therefore, a 
Ryukyu-like attack on Korea was not out of the question, and 
Russia, on Korea's northern border, seemed to be waiting for a 
good opportunity to push southward into Korea.6 This assessment 
of Korea's situation led Li to believe that only one strategy could 
lead Korea out of her isolation and give her security against 
stronger neighbours: the conclusion of treaties with the Western 
nations.
By the end of 1880, a permanent Japanese diplomatic 
mission was established in Seoul. Detailed agreements about 
trade and commerce were negotiated and signed, and the volume 
of trade increased rapidly. A group of promising young Koreans 
was sent to Japan in 1881 to study various aspects of a modern 
society; some of these students, upon their return from Japan, 
became the leaders of a movement for modernization and reform. 
However, a reaction to these innovations and changes soon set in 
while, in China, Li viewed with alarm the steady growth of 
Japanese influence in Korea. He had already held that the 
greatest danger to Korea and eventually to China would come from 
Japan. As countermeasures, Li proposed to Korea that <a> it 
should build up its military strength and <b> should conclude 
treaties with the Western powers "in order to check the poison 
with an antidote."7 Of the Western powers which had shown 
interest in establishing official relations with Korea, Li singled
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out the United States as the best partner for Korea's first treaty. 
In Li's estimate the United States had no territorial designs and 
was the most reliable of the Western nations.8 An imperial edict 
of 23 February 1881, which directed Li and the Chinese minister 
in Japan, Ho Ju-chang. to enlighten and guide Korea, thus relieving 
the trad ition -bound Board of R ites in Peking of th is 
responsibility, symbolized a change in China's policy toward 
Korea and was calculated to pave the way for a Korean-American 
trea ty .
4. THE KOREAN-AMERICAN TREATY, 1882
The American negotiator was to be Commodore Robert W. 
S h u fe ld t. U.S.N. Shufeldt had visited Korea twice previously (in 
1867 and 1880) in unsuccessful attempts to establish a 
diplomatic channel of communication with the government in 
Seoul. Despite these failures, he was determined to be a 
Commodore Matthew Perry in opening Korea. Shufeldt returned to 
the Far East in the summer of 1881 and sought Li's friendly 
intercession. The American officer was now to be rewarded for 
his long wait.
On 25 March 1882, the formal negotiations began between 
Li and Shufeldt. Kim Yun-sik. the Korean envoy in China, was not 
present at this first session, nor was he to be at any subsequent 
meeting. Following the preliminary remarks, Shufeldt presented 
the American draft of a treaty. The main provisions were the 
establishment of diplomatic relations on the basis of equality and 
reciprocity, relief for the shipwrecked, the right of American 
na tiona ls  to reside and trade at the open ports ,
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extra te rrito ria lity , ta riff rates on exports and imports not 
exceeding 10 per cent ad valorem, and a most favoured-nation 
clause. Besides these provisions which Western nations normally 
included in treaties with Asian countries in the nineteenth 
century, Shufeldt's draft also included a ban on the opium trade. 
It, however, contained "no reference to China's claim to 
suzerainty over Korea, on the inclusion of which, it was well 
known, the viceroy was determined to insist."1
In contrast, the Chinese draft which Li handed to Shufeldt 
in return, referring to it as a Korean draft,2 contained, at the 
beginning of Article I, an explicit statement that "Korea is a 
vassal state of China, but has always enjoyed autonomy in both 
its internal and external affairs."3 China's claim to suzerainty 
was also implied in an unusual ratification procedure stipulated 
at the end of the draft treaty; Korea was to forward a copy of the 
signed treaty to the Board of Rites in Peking.4
Under the circumstances, the most important difference 
between the Chinese and the American drafts related to the 
question of Korea's status vis-a-vis China. Li focused his 
remarks at 25 March meeting on this issue and expressed his 
resolve that "the mistake" of the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876 
between Japan and Korea should be avoided. Shufeldt maintained 
that the question of Chinese suzerainty had no bearing upon the 
right of the Unites States to deal with Korea, a nation which was 
self-governing in domestic and foreign affairs. Shufeldt did not 
attempt to deny or challenge the Chinese claim of suzerain right; 
he rather argued that a statement to that effect had no place in a 
Korean-American treaty. Shufeldt also expressed his opposition 
to the last sentence of the disputed Article I which, by providing
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for mutual assistance or mediation, seemed to commit the United 
States to the role of protector, conjointly with China, of Korea.
Unable to resolve the knotty issue of China's suzerainty 
claim, the negotiating parties finally worked out a compromise. 
This compromise enabled the two representatives to conclude the 
negotiations by affixing their signatures on the provisional treaty 
in Tientsin on 19 April. Soon after the 19 April meeting, the 
provisional treaty text was dispatched to Korea by a special 
courier aboard a Chinese warship. Accompanying the document 
was a letter from Li addressed to the Korean prime minister,_Yj 
Chae-ung. that described in detail the Tientsin proceedings and 
informed the Koreans of the impending visit of Shufeldt to Korea. 
Li also commended the provisional articles for Korean acceptance 
and added that a separate communication acknowledging Chinese 
suzerainty should be issued by the Korean king in case a 
statement to that effect could not be included in the treaty 
its e lf .5 After Li had received a letter, which had shown a 
positive response to the possibility of Korean-American Treaty, 
from Yi Chae-ung, Li ordered a squadron of three Chinese 
warships under the command of Admiral Ting Ju-ch 'ang to 
Chemulpo(lncheon) in order to impress the Koreans with China's 
in itia tive in the Korean-American treaty negotiation and to 
counter any agitation against the treaty. Ma chien-chunq. the
Chinese foreign ministry official, also went to Korea to handle
political problems. On the day following the departure of the
Chinese squadron, the U.S.S. Swatara' left Chefoo for Korea with
Shufeldt on board.6
The treaty of Amity and Commerce, known as the
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Chemulpo Treaty of 22 May 1882, (Appendix III) was almost 
identical to the provisional treaty text signed by Li and 
Sufeldt.(The final text signed by the Koreans included, as a part 
of Article VIII, an additional ban on the export of grain.) As 
agreed upon in the Li-Shufeldt compromise, there was no explicit 
statement on the status of Korea vis-a-vis China in Article I. 
Instead, the first article merely stated that there was to be 
"perpetual peace and friendship" between the United States and 
Korea and should either party become subject to unjust or 
oppressive treatment by a third nation, the other party to this 
treaty was to exert its good offices for an amicable arrangement 
"thus showing their friendly feelings."7 Consequently, the United 
States chose to regard the Treaty of Chemulpo as an evidence of 
Korea's sovereign independence. Thus, China's internal weakness, 
particularly in the military sphere, and now Li's handling of the 
Korean-American treaty of 1882, meant a prelude to the end of 
Chinese influence in Korea.
Japan was not particularly pleased to see the Chinese 
intercession open the way for a Korean-American treaty. Tokyo's 
reaction to the Shufeldt treaty was a matter of some concern for 
Washington, and conflicting estimates were given by American 
d ip lom atic  agents.8 It was possible that entry of the United 
States into the Korean scene as a potential rival especially in 
commerce might have given the Japanese cause for anxious 
watchfulness. On the other hand, Shufeldt's steadfast rejection 
of Chinese suzerainty over Korea was a vicarious victory for 
Japan which had for some years championed the cause of Korean 
independence. On the whole, it appeared safe to say that Japan
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did not view the Shufeldt treaty with resentment.9
As for Korea, firstly, the Chemulpo Treaty symbolized a 
success for the anti-isolation policy of its leadership. Whatever 
selfish, ulterior motives the king might have had, he had battled 
since the mid-1870s to term inate Korea's herm it status. 
Fortunately, by letting China take the lead and carry the main 
burden of negotiation, the Korean leaders paid the least possible 
price of political commitment and maximized the ir defence 
against attacks from the powerful isolationist groups at home. 
Furthermore, they had shown no sign of re luctance in 
acknow ledg ing Korea's dependent sta tus in the royal 
communication sent to the United States. Secondly, with the 
coming into force of the Chemulpo Treaty, Korean history entered 
a new era. After the United States other Western nations 
followed suit. Introduction of multiple foreign influences made 
the already bitter partisan strife within Korea more sombre and 
complex. Korea took a few halting steps toward modernization 
w ithou t much success. O vershadow ing such in te rna l 
developements loomed an international power struggle that left 
its marks on the peninsula.10 Consequently, Korea had now 
emerged from her seclusion.
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Appendices to Chapter II
Appendix |1
T R E A T Y  o f Peace and Friendship between Japan and Corea.* 
— February 26, 1876.
(Translation.)-------------------------- ------
T he Governments of Japan and Chosen being desirous to resume 
the amicable relations that of yore existed between them, and to 
promote the friendly feelings of both nations to a still firmer hasi3, 
have for this purpose appointed their Plenipotentiaries, that is to 
say:
The Government of Japan, Ruroda Eujotaka, High Commis­
sioner Extraordinary to Chosen, Lieutenant-General, and Member 
of the Privy Council, Minister of the Colonization Department, and 
Inouye Ku-o-ru, Associate High Commissioner Extraordinary to 
Chosen, Member of the Genro-in; and
The Government of Chosen, Shinken, Han-choo-BOO Fu Ji, and 
Injisho, To-so-Fu, Fuku-so-Kwan;
Who, according to the powers received from their respective 
Governments, have agreed upon and concluded the following 
Articles:—
A bt. I. Chosen, being an independent State, enjoys the same 
sovereign rights as does Japan.
In order to prove the sincerity of the friendship existing between 
the two nations, their intercourse shall henceforward be carried on 
in terms of equality and courtesy, each avoiding the giving of offence 
by arrogation or manifestations of suspicion.
In the first instance, all roles and precedents that are apt to 
obstruct friendly intercourse shall be totally abrogated, and in their 
stead rules liberal and in general usage fit to secure a firm and per­
petual peace shall be established.
II. The Government of Japan at any time 15 months from the- 
date of the signature of this Treaty shall have the right to send an 
Envoy to the capital of Chosen, where he shall be admitted to confer 
with the Rei-so-han-aho, on matters of a diplomatic nature. He may 
either reside at the capital or return to his country on the comple­
tion of his mission.
The Government of Chosen in like manner shall have the right 
to send an Envoy to Tokio, Japan, where he shall be admitted to 
confer w ith the Minister of Foreign Affairs on matters of a diplo­
matic nature. He may either reside at Tokio or return home on the 
completion of his mission.
•  Laid before Parliament with Correspondence relating thereto in 1876.*
1 British and Foreign State Papers, ed Augustus H. Oakes, vol.67, pp. 530-33.
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III . All official communications addressed by the Government 
of Japan to that of Chosen shall be written in the Japanese 
language, and for a period of ten years from the present date they 
Bhall be accompanied by a Chinese translation. The Government of 
Chosen will use the Chinese language.
IV. Sorio, in Fusan, Chosen, where an official establishment of 
Japan is situated, is a place originally opened for commercial inter­
course with Japan, and trade shall henceforward be carried on at 
that place in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, whereby 
are abolished all former usages, such as the practice of saikensen 
(junks annually sent to Chosen by the late Prince of Tsusima to 
exchange a certain quantity of articles between each other).
In addition to the above place, the Government of Chosen agrees 
to open two portB, as mentioned in Article V of this Treaty, for 
commercial intercourse with Japanese subjects.
In  the foregoing places Japanese subjects shall be free to lease 
land and to erect buildings thereon, and to rent buildings, the pro­
perty of suhjects of Chosen.
V. On the coast of five Provinces, viz., Keiken, Chiusei, Zenra, 
Keisho, and Kankio, two ports, suitable for commercial purposes, 
shall be selected, and the time for opening these two ports shall he 
in the twentieth month from the second month of the ninth year of 
Meiji, corresponding with the date of Chosen, the first moon of the 
year Heishi.
VI. Whenever Japanese vessels, either by stress of weather or 
by want of fuel and provisions, cannot reach one or the other of the 
open ports in Chosen, they may enter any port or harbour either to 
take refuge therein or to get supplies of wood, coal, and other neces­
saries, or to make repairs; the expenses incurred thereby are to be 
defrayed by the ship’s master. In  such events both the officers and 
the people of the locality shall display their sympathy by rendering 
full assistance, and their liberality in supplying the necessaries 
required.
If any vessel of either country be at any time wrecked or stranded 
on the coasts of Japan or of Choseu, the people of the vicinity shall 
immediately use every exertion to rescue her crew, and shall inform 
the local authorities of the disaster, who will either send the wrecked 
persons to their native country or hand them over to the officer of 
their country residing at the nearest port.
V II. The coasts of Chosen, having hitherto been left unsurveyed, 
are very dangerous for vessels approaching them, and in order to 
prepare charts showing the positions of islands, rocks, and reefs, as 
well as the depth of the water, whereby all navigators may be enabled 
safely to pass between the two countries, any Japanese mariner may 
freely survey said coasts.
VIII. There shall be appointed by the Government of Japan an 
officer to reside at the open ports in Chosen for the protection of 
Japanese merchants resorting there, providing that such arrange­
ment be deemed necessary. Should any question interesting both 
nations arise, the said officer shall confer with the local authorities of 
Chosen and settle it.
IX . Friendly relations having been established between the two 
Contracting Parties, their respective subjects may freely carry on 
their business without any interference from the officers of either 
Government, and neither limitation nor prohibition shall be made on 
trade.
In case any fraud be committed or payment .of debt refused by 
any merchant of either country, the officers of either one or of the 
other Government shall do their utmost to bring the delinquent to 
justice and to enforce recovery of the debt.
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Neither the Japanese nor the Chosen Government shall be held 
responsible for the payment of such debt.
Y Should a Japanese subject residing a t either of the open 
ports of Chosen commit any offence against a subject of Chosen, he 
shall be tried by the Japanese authorities.
Should a subject of Chosen commit offence against a Japanese 
subject, he shall be tried by the authorities of Chosen.
The offenders shall be punished according to the laws of their 
respective countries.
Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both 
sides.
XI. Friendly relations having been established between the two 
Contracting Parties, it is necessary to prescribe trade regulations for 
the benefit of the merchants of the respective countries.
Such trade regulations, together with detailed provisions, to be 
added to the Articles of the present Treaty, to develop its meaning 
and facilitate its observance, shall be agreed upon at the capital of 
Chosen or at the Kok’wa-fu, in the said country, within six months 
from the present date, by Special Commissioners appointed by the 
two countries.
X II. The foregoing I I  Articles are binding from the date of the 
signing hereof, and shall be observed by the two Contracting Parties 
faithfully and invariably, whereby perpetual friendship shall be 
secured to the two countries.
The present Treaty is executed in duplicate, and copies will be 
exchanged between the two Contracting Parties.
In  faith whereof we, the respective Plenipotentiaries of Japan 
and Chosen, have affixed our seals hereunto this 26th day of. the 
second month of the ninth year of Meiji, and the 2,536th since the 
accession of Zimmu Tenno, and in the era of Chosen, the second 
day of the Becond moon of the year Heishi, and of the founding of 
Chosen the 485th.
(L.S.) KTJB.ODA KUJOTAKA, High Commissioner 
Extraordinary to Chosen, Lieutenant- General 
and Member o f  the Privy Council, Minister 
o f the Colonization Department.
(L.S.) INOUYE KAOB.TJ, Associate High Commis­
sioner Extraordinary to Ck6senf Member o f 
the Oenro-in.
(L.S.) SHIN KEN, Dai-Kwan, Han-Ghoo-Soo-Fuji o f ■ 
Chosen.
(L.S.) IN-JI-SHIO , Fuhu-Kwant Tosofu, Fuku- 
So-Kwan o f Chosen.
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Appendix 112
S U P P L E M E N T A R Y  T R E A T Y  and Trade Regulation* be­
tween Japan and Corea (Wrecks, lfc.)r— August 24, 1876. 
(Translation.) ------
W hereas on tbe 26th day of the 2nd month of the 9th 
year Mejii, corresponding with the Corean date of the 2nd day of 
the 2nd month of the year Heisbi, a Treaty of Amity and Friend­
ship* was signed and concluded between Xuroda ^ECujotaka, High 
Commissioner Extraordinary, Lieutenant-General of H .I. J.M. Army, 
Member of the Privy Council, and Minister of the Colonization 
Department, and Inouye Kaoru, Associate High Commissioner 
Extraordinary and member of the Genrd-Iu, both of whom had 
been directed to proceed to the city of Kokwa in Corea by the 
Government of Japan; and Shin-Ken, Dai Kwan, Hanchoosoofuji, 
and In  Ji-ahid,' Fuku-Kwan, Tosofu, Fukuso Kwan, both of whom 
had been duly commissioned for that purpose by the Government of 
Corea:
Now, therefore, in pursuance of Article X I of the above Treaty, 
Miyamoto Okadzu, Commissioner despatched to the Capital of 
Corea, Daij6 of the Foreign Department, and duly empowered 
thereto by the Government of Japan, and Cho Inki, Kdshookwan, 
Gisheifudoshd, duly empowered thereto by the Government of Corea, 
have negotiated and concluded the following Articles:—
Aht. I. Agents of the Japanese Government stationed at any of 
the open ports shall hereafter, whenever a Japanese vessel has been 
stranded on the Corean coasts and has need of their presence at the 
spot, have the right to proceed there on their informing the local 
authorities of the facts.
II. Envoys or Agents of the Japanese Government shall hereafter 
be at full liberty to despatch letters or other communications to any 
place or places in Corea, either by post at their own expense, or by 
hiring inhabitants of the locality wherein they reside, as special 
couriers.
I I I .  Japanese subjects may, at the ports of Corea open to them, 
lease land tor the purpose of erecting residences thereon, the rent to 
be fixed by mutual agreement between the lessee and the owner.
Any lands belonging to the Corean Government may be rented 
by a Japanese on his paying the same rent thereon as a Corean 
subject would pay to his Government.
I t  is agreed that the Shumon (watch-gate) and tbe Sbotsumon 
(barrier) erected by the Corean Government near the Kokwa 
(Japanese official establishment) in Soriokb, Fusan, shall be entirely 
removed, and that a new boundary line shall be established accord­
ing to the limitsjiereinafter provided. In  the other two open ports 
tbe same steps shall be taken.
2British and Foreign State Papers, vol.67, pp. 1269-74.
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IV. The limits within which Japanese subjects may travel from 
the port of Fusan shall be comprised within a radius of ten ri% 
Corean measurement, the lauding-place in that port being taken as 
a centre.
Japanese subjects shall be free to go where they please within 
the above limits, and shall be therein at full liberty either to buy 
articles of local production, or to sell articles of Japanese pro­
duction.
The town of Torai lies outside of the above limits, but Japanese 
shall have the same privileges as in those places within them.
V. Japanese subjects shall, at each of the open ports of Corea, 
be at liberty to employ Corean subjects.
Corean subjects, on obtaining permission from their Government, 
may visit the Japanese Empire.
VI. In  the case of tbe death of any. Japanese subject residiu at 
the open ports of Corea, a suitable spot of ground shall be selected 
wherein to inter his remains.
As to the localities to be selected for cemeteries in the two open 
ports other than the ports of FusaU, in determining them regard 
shall be had as to the distance there is to the cemetery already 
established at Fusan.
V II. Japanese subjects shall be at liberty to traffic in any 
article owned by Corean subjects, paying therefor in Japanese coin. 
Corean subjects, for purposes of trade, may freely circulate among 
themselves at the open ports of Corea such Japanese coin as they 
may have possession of in business transactions..
Japanese subjects shall be at liberty to use in trade or to carry 
awav with them the copper coin of Corea.
In  case any subject of either of tbe two countries counterfeit the 
coin of either of them, he shall be punished according to the laws ef 
bis own country.
V III. Corean subjects shall have the full fruition of all and 
eveiy article which they have become possessed of either by pur­
chase or gift from Japanese subjects.
IX . In  case a boat despatched by a Japanese surveying vessel 
to take soundings along the Corean coasts, as provided for in Article 
V II of the Treaty of Amity and Friendship, should be prevented 
from returning to the vessel, on account either of bad weather or of 
the ebb-tide, tbe headman of the locality shall accommodate the boat 
party in a suitable nouse in the neighbourhood. Articles required 
by them for their comfort shall be furnished to them by the local 
authorities, and the outlay thus incurred shall afterwards be 
refunded to the latter.
X. Although no relations as yet exist between Corea and foreign 
countries, yet Japan has, for many years back, maintained friendly 
relations with them ; it is therefore natural that in case a vessel of 
any of the countries of which Japan thus cultivates the friendship 
should be stranded by stress of weather or otherwise on the coasts 
of Corea, those on board shall be treated with kindness by Corean 
subjects, and should such persons ask to be sent back to their 
homes they shall be delivered over by the Corean Government to an 
Ageut of the Japanese Government residing at one of the open 
ports of Corea, requesting him to send them back to their native 
countries, which request the Agent shall never fail to comply with.
X I. The foregoing ten Articles, together with the Regulations 
for Trade annexed hereto, shall be of equal effect with the Treaty of • 
Amity and Friendship, and therefore shall be faithfully observed by
N the Governments of the two countries. Should it, however, be found
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that any of the above Articles actually causes embarrassment to the 
commercial intercourse of the two nations, and that it is necessary 
to modify them, tben either Government, submitting its propositions 
to the other, shall negotiate the modification of such Articles on 
giving one year’s previous notice of their intention.
Signed and sealed this 24th day of the 8th month of the 9th year 
Meiji, and 2,536th since the accession of H.M. Zimmu Tenno; and _  
of the Corean era the 6th day of the 7th month of the year Heishi, 
and of the founding of Corea the 485th.
(L.S.) M IY AMOTO OKADZU, Commissioner, and Daijo 
o f ike Foreign Department.
(L.S.) CHO INKI, KSshoo Kioan, GisheifudSshC.
Regulations under which Japanese Trade is to he conducted in Corea.
1. Within three days after the arrival in a Corean port of a 
Japanese ship (Japanese men-of-war or Bhips exclusively used for 
the transportation of the Japanese mails excepted) to establish her 
nationality the owner or captain shall exhibit to the Corean autho­
rities the receipt of the Agent of the Japanese Government, showing 
that he has deposited, as required by the Japanese regulations now 
in existence, all the ship's papers, the register, sea-letter, &c., in the 
hands of the said Agent, which documents shall remain in his 
custody during her stay in po rt; he shall then make an entry of his 
ship by giving a written paper, stating the name of the ship and the 
name of the port whence, she comes, her capacity in tons or in Tcolcus, 
the name of the captain, the names of passengers, if  any, and the 
number of her crew, which paper shall be signed by the owner or 
captain; he shall at the same time deposit a written manifest of his 
cargo, setting forth the marks and numbers of the packages, if 
mentioned, and their contents, with the name of the person or 
persons to whom they are consigned; a list of the Btores of the ship 
shall be added to the manifest.
The manifest and all other papers shall be written in the Japanese 
language, and shall not be accompanied by a Chinese translation.
2. The owner or consignees of any goods desiriug to land them 
shall make an entry of the same at the Corean Government Office, 
setting forth the names of the goods, the quantity and number of 
packages thereof, and their original cost; on receipt of the -entry, 
the Corean authorities shall immediately give a permit to land the 
goods. %
3. The owner or consignee may land his goods after he has 
received the  ^ permit referred to in Regulation 2. The Corean 
authorities may examine any or all of the packages, but such exa­
mination must be made carefully without any injury to the goods.
4. All goods intended for export shall be entered at the Corean 
Government Office before they are placed on ship-board. The entry
phall be in writing, and shall Btate the name of the ship by which the 
goods are to be exported, with the number of packages and descrip­
tion of their contents, as in an entry of import described in Regula­
tion 2. On receipt of tbe entry, the Corean authorities shall give a 
permit immediately; but the owner shall not refuse, if required, to 
have the goods examined by the Corean authorities.
5. Ships wishing to clear shall give notice to tbe Corean autho­
rities before noon of the day previous to their intended departure; 
on receiving notice the Corean authorities shall issue a clearance, 
aud at the same time shall return all the papers belonging to the 
ship deposited in their hands.
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Ships carrying the Japanese mail may clear without observation 
of thiB regulation, but Bhall give notice to the Corean authorities of 
their sailing.
6. Exportation of rice and other grain shall hereafter be allowed 
in any of the open ports of Corea.
7. The following tonnage duties shall be levied on Japanese 
ships:—
Eor merchant sailing-ship with more than one
mast . .  . .  ..........................  . .  5 yen.
Eor merchant-steamer . .  . .  . .  . . 5  „
Eor one-masted merchant-ship of more than 
500 kokus capacity . .  . .  . .  . .  2 „
For ditto of less than 500 kokus capacity . .  l£  „
Boats attached to the vessel free from duty. Ships belonging 
to the Japanese Government shall pay no tonnage duties.
8. Japanese merchant-ships may be chartered by the Corean 
Government or by individuals for the transportation of goods to any 
of the non-open ports of Corea. When chartered by individuals, 
they shall only be employed under conditions specified in a permit 
to be given by the Corean Government for the purpose.
9. Japanese ships found to be engaged in smuggling or in 
attempting to smuggle goods into any non-open port of Corea 
shall be seized by the Corean local authorities, and delivered to the 
Agent of the Japanese Government residing at the nearest port; 
such goods to be confiscated by him, and handed over to the Corean 
authorities.
10. The sale of opium is strictly prohibited.
11. The above Regulations having been agreed upon by the two 
Contracting Parties shall come into effect from the present date, and 
may be revised, whenever, it may be. found necessary, by Commis­
sioners appointed by each country.
In  witness whereof the'Undersigned have hereunto set their 
hands and seals, this 24th day of the 8th month Qf the 9th year of 
Meiji, and the 2,536th since the accession of H. M. Zimmu Tenno, 
and of the Corean era the 6th day of the 7th month of the year 
Heishi, and of the founding of Corea the 485th.
(L.S.) MIYAMOTO OKADZU, Commissioner 
and DaijS o f the Foreign Department.
(L.S.) CHO IN K I, Koshoo Ktoan, GishiefudSshS.
\
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Appendix 111 3
T R E A T Y  o f Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation 
between the United States and the Kingdom o f . Corea (or 
Chosen).— Signed at Yin-Chuen, M ay  22, 1882.
[Ratifications exchanged at Seoul, May 19,1883.]
Th e  United States of America and the Kingdom of Chosen, beiug 
sincerely desirous of establishing permanent relations of amity and 
friendship between their respective peoples, have to this end ap­
pointed, that is'to say:
The President of the United States, R. W. Shufeldt, Com­
modore, United States’ Navy, as his Commissioner Plenipotentiary; 
and
His Majesty the King of Chosen, Shin-Chen, President of the 
Royal Cabinet; Chin-Hong-Chi, Member of the Royal Cabinet, as 
his Commissioners Plenipotentiary;
Who, having reciprocally examined their respective full powers, 
which have been found to he in due form, have agreed upon the 
several following A r t i c l e s __ 
A rt. I. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between 
the President of the United States and the King of Chosen, and the 
citizens and subjects of their respective Governments.
I f  other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Govern­
ment, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of 
the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing 
their friendly feelings.
II . After the conclusion of this Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 
the High Contracting Powers may each appoint Diplomatic Repre­
sentatives to reside at the Court of the other, and may each appoint 
Consular Representatives at the ports of the other, which are open 
to foreign commerce, at their own convenience.
These officials shall have relations with the corresponding local 
authorities of equal rank upon a basis of mutual equality. The 
Diplomatic and Consular Representatives of the two Governments 
shall receive mutually all the privileges, rights, and immunities, 
without discrimination, which are accorded to the same classes of 
Representatives from the most favoured naticn.
Consuls shall exercise their functions only on receipt of an 
exequatur from the Government to which they are accredited. 
Consular authorities shall be bond fide officials. No merchants shall 
be permitted to exercise the duties of the office, nor shall Consular 
officers be allowed to engage in trade. At ports to which no Con­
sular Representatives have been appointed, the Consuls of other 
Powers may be invited to act, provided that no merchant shall be 
allowed to assume Consular functions, or. the provisions of this. 
Treaty may, in such case; be enforced by the local authorities.
3British and Foreign State papers, vol.73, pp. 586-92.
If Consular Eepresentativea of the United States in Chosen con- • 
duct their busiuess in an improper manner, their exequaturs mav be 
revoked, subject to the approval, previously obtained, of the Diplo­
matic Eepresentative of the United States.
TTT. Whenever United States’ vessels, either because of stress 
of weather, or by want of fuel or provisions, cannot reach the nearest 
open port in Chosen, they may enter any port or harbour, either to 
take refuge therein, or to get supplies of wood, coal, and other 
necessaries, or to make repairs, the expenses incurred thereby being 
defrayed by the ship’s master. In  such event the officers and 
people of the locality shall display, their sympathy by rendering 
full assistance, and their liberality by furnishing the necessities 
required.
If  a United States’ vessel carries on a clandestine trade at a port 
not open to foreign commerce, such vessel, with her cargo, shall bo 
seized and confiscated.
If  a United States* vessel be wrecked on the coast of Chosen, the 
local authorities, on being informed of the occurrence, “shall imme­
diately render assistance to the crew, provide for their present 
necessities, and take the measures necessary for the salvage of the 
Bhip and the preservation of her cargo. They shall also bring the 
matter to the knowledge of the nearest Consular Eepresentative of 
the United States, in order that steps may be taken to send the 
crew home, and to save the ship and cargo. The necessary expenses 
shall be defrayed either by the ship’s master or by the United 
States.
IV. All citizens of the United States of America in Chosen, 
peaceably attending to their own affairs, shall receive and enjoy for 
themselves and everything appertaining to them, the protection of 
the local authorities of the Government of Chosen, who Bhall defend 
them from all insult and injury of any sort. I f  their dwellings or 
property be threatened or attacked by mob3, incendiaries, or other 
violent or lawless persons, the local officers, on requisition of the 
Consul, shall immediately dispatch a military force to disperse the 
rioters, apprehend the guilty individuals, and punish them with the 
utmost rigour of the law.
Subjects of Chosen, guilty of any criminal act towards citizens of 
the United States, shall be punished by the authorities of Chosen, 
according to the laws of Chosen; and citizens of the United States, 
either on shore or in any merchant-vessel, who may insult, trouble, 
or wound the persons, or injure the property of the people of Chosen, 
shall be arrested and punished only by the Consul or other public 
functionary of the United States, thereto authorized, according to 
the laws of the United States.
When controversies arise in the Kingdom of Chosen between 
citizens of the United States and subjects of His Majesty, which 
need to be examined and decided by the public officers of the two 
nations, it is agreed between the two Governments of the United 
States and Chosen that such cases shall be tried by the proper official 
of the nationality of the defendant, according to the laws of that 
nation. The properly authorized official of the plaintiff’s nationality 
shall be freely permitted to attend the trial, and Bhall be treated 
with the courtesy due to his position. He shall be granted all 
proper facilities for watching the proceedings in the interests of 
justice. I f  he so desires, he shall have the right to present, to 
examine, and to cross-examine witnesses. I f  he is dissatisfied with 
the proceedings, he shall be permitted to protest against them in 
detail.
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I t  is, however, mutually agreed and understood between the 
High Contracting Towers, that whenever the King of Chosen shall 
have so far 'modified and reformed the Statutes aud judicial pro­
cedure of his kingdom that, in the judgment of the United States, 
they conform to the lawB and course of justice iu the United States, 
the right of ex-territorial jurisdiction oyer United States’ citizens in 
Chosen shall be abandoned, and thereafter United States’ citizens, 
when within the limits of the Kingdom of Chosen, shall be subject 
to the jurisdiction of the native authorities.
V. Merchants and raerchant-vessels of Chosen visiting the United 
States for purposes of traffic shall pay duties and tonnage-dues, aud 
ail fees according to the Customs [Regulations of the United States, 
but no higher or other rates of duties and tonnage-ducs shall be 
exacted of them than are levied upon citizens of the United States 
or upon citizens or subjects of the most favoured nation.
Merchants and raerchant-vessels of the United States visiting 
Chosen for purposes of traffic shall pay duties upon all merchandize 
imported and exported. The authority to levy duties is of right 
vested in the Government of Chosen. The Tariff of duties upon 
exports and imports, together with the Customs [Regulations for the 
prevention of smuggling and other irregularities, will be fixed by. 
the authorities of Cho&en and communicated to the proper officials of 
tbe United States, to be by the latter notified to their citizens and 
duly observed.
I t  is, however, agreed in the first instance as a general measure, 
that the Tariff upon such imports as are articles of daily use Bhall 
not exceed an ad valorem duty of 10 per cent.; that the Tariff upon 
such imports as are luxuries, as, for instance, foreign wines, foreign 
tobacco, clocks and watches, shall not exceed an ad valorem duty of 
30 per cent., and that native produce exported shall pay a duty not 
to exceed 5 per cent, ad valorem. And it  is further agreed that the 
duty upon foreign imports shall be paid once for all at the port of 
entry, and that no other dues, duties, fees, taxes, or charges of any 
sort shall be levied upon such imports, either in the interior of 
Chosen or at the ports.
United States' merchant-vessels entering the ports of Chosen 
shall pay tonnage-dues a t the rate of 5 mace per ton, payable once 
in three months on each vessel, according to the Chinese calendar.
VI. Subjects of ChoBen who may visit the United States shall be- 
permitted to reside, and to rent premises, purchase land, or to con­
struct residences or warehouses in all parts of the country. They 
shall be freely permitted to pursue their various callings and avoca­
tions, and to traffic in all merchandize, raw and manufactured, that 
is not declared contraband by law. Citizens of the United States 
who may resort to the ports of Chosen which are open to foreign 
commerce shall be permitted to reside at such open ports within 
the limits of the concessions, and to lease buildings or land, or to 
construct residences or warehouses therein. They shall be freely 
permitted to pursue their various callings and avocations within the 
limits of the port, and to traffic in all merchandize, raw and manu­
factured, that is not declared contraband by law.
No coercion or intimidation in the acquisition of land or buildings 
shall be permitted, and the land rent as fixed by the authorities of 
Chosen shall be paid. And it is expressly agreed that land so acquired 
in the open ports of Chosen still remains an integral part of the 
kingdom, and that all rights of jurisdiction over persons and property 
within such areas remain vested in the authorities of Chosen, except in 
so far as such rights have been expressly relinquished by this Treaty.
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American citizens are not permitted either to transport foreign 
imports to the interior for sale, or to proceed thither to purchase 
native produce. Nor are they permitted to transport native produce 
from one open port to another open port.*
Violations of this rule will subject such merchandize to confis­
cation, and the merchant offending will be handed over to the Con­
sular authorities to be dealt with.
VII. The Governments of the United States and of Chosen 
mutually agree and undertake that subjects of Chosen shall not be 
permitted to import opium into any of the ports of the United 
States, and citizens of the United States shall not be permitted to 
import opium into any of the open ports of Chosen, to transport it 
from one open port to another open port, or to traffic in it in Chosen. 
This absolute prohibition, which extends to vessels owned by the 
citizens or subjects of either Power, to foreign vessels employed by 
them, and to vessels owned by the citizens or subjects of either 
Power, and employed by other persons for the transportation of 
opium, shall be enforced by appropriate legislation on the part of 
the United States and of Chosen, and offenders against it Bhall be 
severely punished.
V III. "Whenever the Government of Chosen shall have reason to 
apprehend a scarcity of food within the limits of the kingdom, His 
Majesty may by Decree temporarily prohibit the export of all 
breadstuff's, and such Decree shall be binding on all citizens of the 
United States in Chosen upon due notice having been given them by 
the authorities of Chosen through the proper officers of the United 
States; but it is to be understood that the exportation of rice and 
breadstuff's of every description is prohibited from the open port of 
Yin-Chuen.
Chosen having of old prohibited the exportation of red ginseng, if 
citizens of the United States clandestinely purchase it for export, it 
shall be confiscated and the offenders punished.
IX . Purchase of cannon, small arms, swords, gunpowder, shot, 
and all munitions of war is permitted only to officials of the Govern­
ment of Chosen, and they may be imported by citizens of the United 
States only under a written permit from the authorities of Chosen.
I f  these articles are clandestinely imported, they shall be confis­
cated, and the offending party shall be punished. i
X. The officers and people of either nation residing in the other 
shall have the right to employ natives for all kinds of lawful work.
Should, however, subjects of Chosen, guilty of violation of the 
laws of the kingdom, or against whom any action has been brought,
* The Senate of the United State*, by their Resolution of the 9th January, i 
1883, consented to the ratification of the Treaty subject to the condition follow-' I 
“ g, viz.:— |
“ Reiolved—That it is the understanding of the Senate, in agreeing to the 
foregoing Eesolution, that the clause, ‘Nor are they permitted to transport 
native produce from one open port to another open port,’ in Article VI of said 
Treaty, is not intended to prohibit and does not prohibit American ships from 
going from one open port to another open port in Corea or Chosen to receive . 
Corean cargo for exportation, or to discharge foreign cargo." j
The Treaty was duly ratified on both parts, subject to the said condition, ; 
and the respective ratifications thereof exchanged. ^
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1 conceal t&em'selves in the residences or warehouses of United States* 
citizens, or on board United States’ raerchant-vessels, the Consular 
authorities of the United States, on being notified of the fact by the 
local authorities, will either permit the latter to dispatch constables 
to make the arrests, or the persons will be arrested by the Consular 
authorities and haudod over to the local constables.
Officials or citizens of the United States shall not harbour such 
persons.
XI. Students of either nationality, who may proceed to the 
country of the other, in order to study the language, literature, 
laws or arts, shall be given all possible protection and assistance in 
evidence of cordial goodwill.
X II. This being the first Treaty negotiated by Chosen, and hence 
being general aud incomplete in its provisions, shall, in the first 
instance, be pat into operation in all things stipulated herein. As 
to stipulations not contained herein, after au interval of five years, 
when tbe officers and people of the two Powers shall have become 
more familiar with each other’s language, a further negotiation.of 
commercial provisions and regulations in detail, in conformity with 
international law, and without unequal discriminations on either 
part, shall be had.
X III. This Treaty and future official correspondence between 
the two Contracting Governments shall be made, on the part of 
Chosen, in the Chinese language.
The United States shall either use the Chinese language, or, if 
English be used, it shall be accompanied with a. Chinese version in 
order to avoid misunderstanding.
XIV. The High Contracting Powers hereby agree that, should 
at any time the King of Chosen grant to any nation, or to the mer­
chants or citizens of any nation, any right, privilege, or favour, 
connected either with navigation, commerce, political, or other inter­
course, which is not conferred by this Treaiy, such right, privilege, 
and favour shall freely inure to the benefit of -the United States, its 
public officers, merchants and citizens; provided always, that when­
ever such right, privilege, or favour is accompanied by any condition, 
or equivalent concession granted by the other nation interested, the 
United States, its officers and people, shall only be entitled to the ; 
benefit of such right, privilege, or favour upon complying with the 
conditions or concessions connected therewith.
In faith whereof the respective Commissioners Plenipotentiary 
have signed and sealed the foregoing at Yin-Chuen in English and 
Chinese, being three originals of each text of even tenour and date, 
the ratifications of which shall be exchanged at Yin-Chuen within 
one year from the date of its execution, and immediately thereafter 
this Treaty shall be in all its provisions publicly proclaimed and 
made known by both Governments in their respective countries, in 
order that it may be obeyed' by their citizens and subjects respec­
tively. ■ . % :
Chosen, the 22nd May, a.d . 1882. j
(L.S.) E. "W. SHUFELDT, Commodore, United I
States' Nam/, Envoi/ o f the United States !
to Chosen. J
(L.S.) SHIN-CHEN > .
(L.S.) CHIN-HONG-CHI j *• Chinese.] j
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CHAPTER III: STEPS INTO THE KOREAN PENINSULA :
ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY, 1882-1884.
1. THE BRITISH-KOREAN TREATIES, 1882-1884.
1.1. FROM THE BEGINNING OF RELATIONS TO THE FIRST TREATY 
OF JUNE 1882.
IN 1614. Edmund Saris, who was dispatched to Korea by the East 
India Company, failed to open a new market for textiles. This was 
the first sign of British interest in Korea.
The next indication of her interest was when the British 
sloop 'Providence1 explored the eastern coast of Korea in the hope 
of opening up trade in 1797.1 The embassy to China, under Lord 
A m h e rs t, left Britain in the frigate 'Alceste', commanded by 
Captain Murray Maxweii. C.B., on 9 February, 1816, and landed near 
the mouth of the Pei-ho river, in the Yellow Sea, on 11 August. 
Shortly afterwards the 'Alceste' and the sloop 'Lyra', which had 
accompanied the embassy, proceeded to the coast of Korea, at the 
eastern boundary of the Yellow Sea; for as these ships were not 
required in China before the return of the Ambassador by land to 
Canton, it was decided to devote the interval to an examination of 
some places in those seas, of which little or no precise 
information then existed.2 This was the third sign of a British 
interest in Korea.
In 1832, the 'Lord Amherst' of the British East India 
Company in China visited the west coast of the peninsula for 
trade. Even though it was turned away by local authorities, who 
said that it was against the law to engage in foreign commerce; 
this was the first direct contact between Britain and Korea.3 In 
1845 the British warship 'Samarang' commanded by Captain Sir
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Edward B e lcher, visited Cheju (Quelpart) Island and some 
southern Korean ports on a surveying mission. Belcher made 
inquires into the possibility of trade. But he, too, was told that 
Korea, as a tributary of China, had neither the authority nor the 
desire to trade with foreign countries. Both incidents were
reported to the Ch'ing Board of Rites. On the latter occasion, the 
Korean Government requested that the Chinese authorities 
"instruct" the British in Hong Kong to refrain from sending any 
more ships to Korea. Approving the Korean position, Peking 
obliged. Accordingly, C h 'i-v ina . the imperial commissioner in 
charge of relations with Westerners at the Chinese trade ports, 
explained Korea's unique position to the British: "It [Korea] could 
not be opened to trade by China, for it was not a part of China; it 
could not open itself to trade, for it was not independent."4
The 1860s began with an event that was as shocking to 
the Koreans as it was to the Chinese: in October 1860, Anglo- 
French forces captured and pillaged the imperial capital of 
Peking. The incident had a powerful impact upon the Koreans, who 
for centuries had lived in security under the shelter of Ch'ing 
power. China's defeat in the Opium War and the subsequent 
outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion, disturbing as they were, did not 
unduly shake Korea's faith in the might of the Manchu dynasty. 
Anglo-French occupation of Tientsin, however, alarmed the 
Koreans. The fall of Peking and the flight of the imperial court to 
Jehol two years later, following close upon the resurgence of 
Taiping power, transformed alarm to panic. When news of the fall 
of Peking reached the Korean capital, government leaders were 
seized with fear. Some warned that, should residence in
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Manchuria, the Ch'ing imperial homeland, become untenable in the 
face of the advancing barbarians the fleeing Ch'ing emperor might 
seek refuge on Korean soil. This would inevitably bring, it was 
feared, Chinese interference in Korean affairs and might even 
invite Western attacks on Korea.5
Indeed, this new situation did give rise to a new British 
initiative. In the early 1870s, E. Oppert. a merchant, was called
on by several of his fellow merchants to try and open up Korea,
and he laid his plan before Mr. James W hittal. the managing 
partner of Jardine, Matheson & Co. in China, with the proposal 
that the firm should join in the projected expedition and voyage 
of discovery. The fine steamer 'Rona', Captain James Morrison, 
belonging to the house, had just been chartered for a voyage to
Newchwang, and it was arranged that, instead of going directly to
her destination, the steamer should visit the west coast of Korea. 
Oppert's object was to discover and ascend the large river 
leading to the cap ita l, and to enter into p re lim ina ry  
communication with the Korean authorities, with a view to 
opening up commercial and friendly relations with the country. 
However, after a short visit to Korea, he concluded that Korea 
was a forbidden land.6 Gradually perceiving that Korea's 
commercial potential for British trade was, in any case, minimal, 
the British abandoned for the time being any attempt to open the 
Korean market to British traders.
In the late 1870s, the British minister in Peking, Wade, 
rarely missed an opportunity to describe to the Chinese 
Government Korea's precarious situation between Russia and 
Japan. In Wade's eye Korea's predicament was primarily a 
challenge to Korea and China, and only secondarily did it involve
6 6
Britain. In October 1880 he told Li that Britain really did not 
intend to enter into relations with Korea. His country, however, 
would watch Russia’s moves closely. This essentia lly
unambitious line was also followed by the British minister at 
Tokyo, Harrv S. Parkes. In 1878 he did not respond to the 
Japanese so lic ita tion for Western partic ipation in Korea. 
Moreover, when the Italian minister in Tokyo, Count B a rb o la n i. 
suggested in the summer of 1880 that the maritime powers of 
Great Britain, France, Germany, the United States, and Italy 
should make a combined naval demonstration to induce the
Koreans to conclude treaties and open the country to foreign 
trade, the British answer was cool. Britain, the Italian was told, 
considered such a demonstration unnecessary and would conclude 
treaties only after the successful opening of the country by 
others.7
British interest was stimulated in the early 1880s by 
various factors: Commodore Shufeldt's attempts to conclude a
treaty with Korea; reports about the Korean Government's 
changing mood towards entering into treaty relationships with 
the West; and Japan's continued efforts to induce Britain to break 
the ground for Western countries in Korea. Parkes' analysis linked 
Korea's reported readiness to negotiate treaties to her awareness 
of the Russian threat to Korean territory. He recommended to 
London that Britain should avail herself of this favourable 
disposition without loss of time. Should Russia's pressure
lessen, he reasoned, Korea might retreat to her old concept of
seclusion.8
The British Government was willing to take exploratory
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steps on the basis of intelligence received from Korea. It ordered 
Wade to probe the possibility of using China's good offices. In the 
British view, the conclusion of the Chinese-Russian Treaty in 
February 1881, and the subsequent departure of the Russian fleet 
g rea tly  d im in ished the po litica l advantage of opening 
communication with Korea. At this stage the Korean policy of the 
European powers was formulated on an ad hoc basis and thus 
closely followed the vicissitudes of political expediency.9
When Shufeldt's negotiations with Li in the early spring of 
1882 finally made positive gains, the Europeans looked on with a 
certain amount of anxiety. Parkes was worried that the 
Americans, whose commercial interests in Korea were negligible, 
would make the first treaty with Korea. High tariffs agreed by 
them with the Koreans, he feared, might seriously harm the 
prospects of future British trade in Korea. Vice-Admiral Georae O. 
Willes of the China Station was ordered to cruise in Korean 
waters and observe Shufeldt's actions in Korea.10
Presumably on Wade's recommendation, Britain at last 
decided to seek the conclusion of a British-Korean treaty. Wade 
had urged a meeting upon Li to discuss sending Willes to Korea. 
Upon Wade's assurance that the British would use the wording of 
the American treaty without changing a single character, Li's 
initial reluctance toward the project seems to have disappeared. 
He gave Wade a copy of the American treaty of and a letter of 
introduction to Ma Chien-chung, the Chinese official who had 
accompanied Shufeldt to Korea. W illes had authorization to 
negotiate, "if necessary," with Korean authorities to secure for 
Britain the advantages of most-favoured-nation treatment. It
6 8
rem ained W ade's task to make the beh ind-the-scenes 
arrangements. He advocated using the American treaty with 
Korea as the basis for a British agreement. To be sure, Wade 
found the American-Korean treaty less liberal than the treaties 
between China and foreign states. He was convinced, however, 
that he could not obtain more favourable terms than the 
Americans had without resorting to arms. Furthermore, he 
reasoned, there was enough provision for later modification built 
into the treaty.11
On 25 May 1882, Vice-admiral Willes sailed to Korea 
aboard the dispatch-boat "Vigilant', and Wade's secretary. C.T. 
Maude, sailed on the gunboat 'Sheldrake'. They anchored off Inchon 
on the 27th. The British ships were surprised to find Ma Chien- 
chung and Ting Ju-ch'ang who had returned to Inchon from a royal 
audience in Seoul on the evening of the same day. Maude 
immediately contacted the Chinese who had to postpone their 
departure for China. At his firs t meeting with Ma, W illes 
reportedly wanted to add a few points to the American-Korean 
treaty in order to refine some of the provisions, but Ma opposed 
even the slightest change. In the end, Ma and the two Korean 
negotiators, Cho Yong-ha and Kim H ong-jip . who had been 
hurriedly dispatched from Seoul, agreed to three supplementary 
articles contained in a separate protocol: <1> the three ports of 
Wonsan, Pusan, and Inchon (Chemulpo), which were open to 
Japanese trade, were, although not mentioned in the treaty, 
opened to British trade; <2> British warships were permitted to 
enter any Korean harbour to buy provisions, tank fresh water, and 
do repair work; <3> the British navy was allowed to conduct 
surveys along the Korean coast to make navigation safer. After
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Willes and Maude waited a few days in vain for a British 
interpreter to arrive at Inchon, Willes said that he would rely on 
Ma's assurance that the Chinese text corresponded in all points to 
the British. The British-Korean treaty was signed and sealed by 
Willes, Cho, and Kim in a tent near the beach on the afternoon of 6 
June 1882. The treaty, the text of which was identical with the 
American-Korean document, was supplemented by a protocol and a 
Communication from the King of Korea to the Queen of Britain 
which contained a declaration of Korea's dependency on China.12
1.2. RECONSIDERATION OF THE FIRST TREATY.
During a visit which the principal Korean Envoy to Japan. Pak 
Y o n g -h vo . paid Parkes on 23 November 1882, Pak asked him 
whether the British Treaty had been ratified, and expressed his 
desire to see the people of the two countries entering into direct 
relationship with each other. Pak also observed that, as Great 
Britain was a powerful State, and possessed of wide Asiatic 
experience, Korea which was weak and uninformed, would count 
upon her for support. Pak also hoped that the British 
Representative in Korea would be well versed in Asiatic affairs.1
Pak again visited Parkes on 23 December to take his 
leave, as he was about to return to his country. Pak once more 
directed the conversation to the subject of the British Treaty 
with Korea, and inquired if Parkes had heard anything as to its 
ratification. Having been answered in the negative, Pak observed 
that he regretted the delay as he feared that if it were to 
continue, Korea, owing to the high-handed course which China was 
adopting towards her, would sink without hope of succour.
70
Pak, then, was anxious to know what Parkes thought on 
the subject. Parkes replied that he was not surprised at the delay 
because he thought that the unfortunate events2 which had 
occurred in Korea since the Treaty was made would oblige the 
British Government to proceed with caution, even if they approved 
all the conditions of the Treaty, which he also thought was 
doubtful. And, Parkes added, he had heard of the recent 
arrangements made between China and Korea at Tien-tsin,3 which 
he thought would place additional d ifficu lty in the way of 
ratification. By these arrangements China would be able to trade 
with Korea on far more favourable terms than the Western 
Powers who had made Treaties with Korea. Japan was also placed 
by her Treaty in a much more advantageous position than those 
Powers. It would be useless, it appeared to him, for British or 
any other foreign merchants to endeavour to compete against the 
favoured treatment which Korea had accorded to those two 
nations. Pak then made the following observations:-
I grant that, judging from appearances, you may naturally conclude that the 
recent agreement between China and Korea has been made with the consent of 
the latter, but this is not the fact. It has been forced upon us by China, who 
has taken advantage of Korea's weakness to dictate it. Japan made her Treaty 
with Korea direct, and, therefore, it is a satisfactory one. But when Korea 
had to negotiate with Western Powers China intervened and drafted the 
Treaty, which she told us we should make with those Powers. In our 
ignorance of the subject, we thought that China must know what was the most 
proper course, and would advise us for the best. The unfavourable conditions 
of those Treaties were therefore adopted at her suggestion. We now perceive 
that, taking advantage of our inexperience, she has acted entirely with a view 
to her own interest and to the disadvantage of Korea, and that she now wishes 
to subordinate Korea completely to herself. We hoped that by entering into
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Treaty relations with Western Powers we should be guarded against such a 
result, and we still trust that the latter will afford us their support. Korea's 
position is this. She has no army, as she did not need one for the government 
of her own people. She is, therefore, in the grasp of China, whom she cannot 
resist, and who can, therefore, compel Korea to do whatever she wishes. You 
are doubtless aware that in the draft of the Western Treaties a clause was 
inserted declaring Korea to be a dependency of China, but entirely independent 
both in her external and internal affairs. This clause was removed from the 
Treaties as signed, but it was transferred to the letters which the King 
addressed to the Sovereigns with whom he concluded those Treaties. This 
declaration of the independent position of the King was made with the full 
knowledge and approval of China. Now, however, she is interfering in every 
way in Korea, both internal and external matters, and is depriving the King 
of his rights and his government of their liberty of action. I have no words to 
express my indignation at the flagrant injustice of her proceedings.4
On returning Pak's visit on 26 December, Parkes 
mentioned, once again, as his personal opinion only, that the 
present Treaty was of no value to the British Government. On 
conclusion of the conversation, Pak remarked that he understood 
Parkes' opinion, and that if the British Government had any 
objections to offer to the present Treaty the Korean Government 
would be glad to know them.5
The British Government were, in fact, carefully 
considering representations about the proposed Treaty with Korea 
during this time. In the first place, on 9 January 1883, the 
Yokohama General Chamber of Commerce submitted to Granville 
the following comments upon its provisions:-
Tariff.- The Tariff, or rather the absence of a Tariff, the 
Chamber said, was the first conspicuous feature, for the simple
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statement that a duty not exceeding 10 per cent, should be 
charged on articles of daily use, and not exceeding 30 per cent, 
on luxurie, amounts to nothing, in the absence of provision for 
allowing British officials a voice in the question of whether a 
particular article should be charged as a necessity or a luxury, 
and especially as it was reserved to the Korean authorities to fix 
all duties without reference to British officials. This of itself 
was a bad precedent; but when taken in conjunction with the 
excessive rates of duty proposed to be levied became doubly so, 
bearing in mind the revision of the Treaties with Japan at the 
time pending, and also possible future negotiations with China 
having the same end in view. The Chamber further mentioned that 
it was not clear from the Treaty whether the percentage of duty 
was to be estimated on the first cost at the place of production, 
or on the lay-down cost of the goods in Korea, as per invoice, 
including freight and insurance charges. It might be noted that, in 
their intercourse by Treaty with Korea, the Japanese paid no 
import duties whatever, and also, in the same connection, that, in 
the matter of tonnage dues those proposed to be levied on British 
vessels were out of all proportion to what were paid by Japanese 
vessels.
Leasing Land.-the Chamber mentioned that advantages 
were granted to Japanese by Treaty which were denied to British 
subjects, the most noticeable being that the former were only 
required to pay the same ground-rent as was charged to Koreans 
themselves, whereas the latter, it was stipulated, should pay 
whatever rent the Korean authorities might see fit to impose. 
The Chamber pointed out, moreover, that the British Treaty would 
appear to contemplate the foreign settlements being subject to
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Korean municipal law, an arrangement which, judging from the 
accounts which had been received as to the state of Korean 
towns, roads, &c., it was feared would be found extremely 
unsatis factory.
Coast Trade.-The Chamber commented that the stipulation 
closing the trade between the open ports in Korea, in native 
produce, to British shipping was a feature in the proposed Treaty 
open to several objections, besides again affording a precedent 
for Japan & China. The trade would not fall into the hands of 
Koreans, who had practically no mercantile marine, but into those 
of the Japanese and Chinese, who were not affected by any 
similar prohibition. One of the Chinese Shipping Companies was 
believed to have already secured exceptional privileges in this 
respect. In connection with the coast trade, the Chamber added 
that it might not be out of place to notice here that in cases of 
smuggling it was stipulated in the British Treaty that both vessel 
and cargo should be seized and confiscated, whereas the Japanese 
Treaty stated that cargo only should be so dealt with.
Export o f Grain.-The entire prohibition of the export of 
grain from Inchon, the port nearest to the capital of Korea, the 
Chamber asserted, seemed unnecessary in view of the preceding 
clause, by which the Government of Korea reserved to itself the 
right of temporarily suspending the trade at any or all of the 
ports whenever it might appear desirable to do so. The Chamber 
further mentioned that it should be remembered that Korea had no 
manufactures, and for a long time to come must pay for imported 
goods, as she was then doing, by agricultural produce, and any 
restrictions on the export of grain would therefore had a directly
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injurious effect on the import trade. In the event of the exercise 
of this right of prohibition being contemplated, ample notice 
should be given beforehand to prevent the injury to trade which a 
sudden measure of this kind would undoubtedly cause. It might be 
pointed out that, according to the terms of the Japanese Treaty, 
the export of grain was free from all the open ports, without 
exception, and that no right of prohibition was reserved.
Trade Regulations.-These, it had been stipulated, should be 
framed in conformity with international law, but, the chamber 
pointed out, there was no provision that British officials should 
have a voice in the ir preparation which the com parative 
importance of British interests (shown by the fact that almost 
the whole of the imports at present were of British origin) 
demanded. It was also stated that these Regulations should be 
drawn up after an interval of five years, whereas it was patent 
that they should be ready when the country was opened. The 
Japanese Treaty of 1876 with Korea provided for the drawing up 
of Trade Regulations "by Special Commissioners appointed by the 
two countries" prior to the opening of the ports, and at a later 
period provision was made for revision whenever necessary "by 
Commissioners appointed by each country."
Treaty ports .-The Chamber asserted that the treaty did 
not mention what ports were to be thrown open to the British 
Government.
The Committee of the Chamber suggested that if Korea 
really desired to enter into Treaty relations with Great Britain, 
she should lose no time in signifying her willingness to negotiate 
a new Treaty on a basis similar, in regard to commercial matters,
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to that of the agreement she had recently made with China.6
Secondly, on 17 January 1883, the Shanghai General 
Chamber of Commerce also submitted to Granville, foreign 
secretary(1880-05), their observations on the proposed Treaty, 
and trusted that it would appear to him that the objections 
carried weight, and were worthy of consideration.
The Chamber's report observed that the Treaty was said to 
have been drawn up in the Tsung-li Yamen, and negotiated through 
the Chinese Government. This alone was a sufficient reason for 
examining carefully how far the making of concessions to the 
Koreans might bear upon existing Treaties with the neighbouring 
countries, in the event of their revision at a future time, when 
the waiving of certain privileges contained in the latter might be 
claimed on the ground that they were omitted from the former. 
This knowledge of the real origin of the Korean Treaty made it
almost certain that it had been framed with this object, while it
further appeared that the Concessions made were so hampered 
with restrictions as to be in many instances useless for the 
purposes of trade, which it was understood it was the main 
object of the Treaty to develop.
They, then discussed the Articles of the British Treaty 
with Korea s e r ia t im : Article I, under the guise of general
friendly feeling, disguised the fact that the real object was to
hinder the carrying out of the threatened annexation of Korea by
Russia, a step to be dreaded as much by the Chinese as the 
Koreans; Article II provided for the appointment of Consuls
at the open ports, which, however, were not specified; and as 
merchant Consuls were prohibited, the maintenance of these 
officials would be rather a serious burden in a country
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where the resources of the trade were not for some time likely to 
be very great, more especially under the restrictions contained in 
subsequent A rtic le s / A rtic le  III m ight be passed w ithout 
comment, as a necessary provision in the event of accident. 
Article IV dealt with the punishment of criminal offences and the 
settlement of differences between foreigners and natives, but it 
contained no provision that the judgments of the native Courts 
would be enforced in the event of a foreigner suing a Korean, and 
experience of such matters in China gave little hope that the 
foreign interest would have due protection without some special 
provision for the purpose. As for the rest of them, the Chamber 
made the same objections as the Yokohama Chamber.
In addition, the Chamber observed, the concluding 
paragraph with regard to the cessation of exterritoriality so soon 
as the laws of Korea were assimilated to those of Great Britain 
was hardly likely to come into effect, and as other nationalities 
whose laws differed from the British laws might claim the same 
privilege, there might be some difficulty in compiling such a Code 
as would meet all the exigencies of the case. It was true that the 
British Government was to be the Arbiter in such a case, but the 
clause was likely to be claimed for insertion into treaties with 
neighbouring countries, and might lead to complications which at 
the least would be vexatious and troublesome7
Thirdly, on 20 January, the Hong Kong General 
Chamber of Commerce reported to Granville on the subject of the 
Treaty negotiated between Great Britain and the Kingdom of 
Korea. The Chamber had set up a Committee to express its views 
upon the Treaty, and to set forth the opinions of the Committee
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upon the operation of the clauses which related to trade and 
commerce.
The Committee stated they had no doubt that the 
British Government, when entering into political relations with 
Korea, had regarded that kingdom as a State which was 
completely independent in respect of its domestic administration 
and its international responsibilities, though subject to a certain 
undefined suzerainty exercised by China, s im ila r to that 
acknowledged by Annam and Burmah and hitherto satisfied by the 
rendition of an annual tribute. That such had also been the view 
held by China herself, was clear from the evidence furnished by 
the express declarations of the Yamen of Peking in 1866 and 
1871 on the occasion of French and American difficulties with 
Korea, when the Chinese Government disclaimed all responsibility 
for Korean affairs, and by her acquiescence in the recognition of 
the complete independence of Korea which was declared in the 
Japanese Treaty with that country concluded in 1876.
On the other hand, the Chamber added, as the Kingdom of 
Korea had never been claimed to be an integral part of the Chinese 
dominion, it was either a mediatized State under the protection 
of China, in which case the authority of its King to conclude 
Treaties with foreign nations might hereafter be questioned, or it 
was an independent country, w ith whose autonom y the 
Regulations referred to were inconsistent. It would be 
unfortunate if the recent interference of the Chinese Executive in 
the internal affairs of Korea should be hereafter adduced to throw 
doubt upon the international validity of any of the provisions of 
the foreign Treaties on faith in which commercial intercourse
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with Korea would have been entered upon and was to be conducted.
Furthermore, the frequent disputes which had arisen 
about the interpretation to be placed upon certain clauses of the 
Treaty of Tien-tsin showed the importance of drafting with 
peculiar care agreements, affecting national interests, which had 
to be drawn up in a language so full of obscurities, even to the 
most experienced Sinologue, as that of China, so as to avoid all 
m isunderstanding when the stipulations and covenants to be 
observed on either side come to be made effective. The 
Committee could not fa il to perceive that the d ip lom atic 
instrument signed by Admiral Willes at Inchon in June 1882 had 
been very loosely compiled in point of form, and that many of its 
most important provisions had been expressed in most indefinite 
language, and further, that imperfections, sim ilar to those 
generally recognized as existing in the Treaties with China and 
Japan, had been repeated and intensified in this new Treaty. 
Moreover, after a careful consideration of the whole scope of the 
document, the Chamber added that the com m ittee was 
apprehensive that the limitations which some of its stipulations 
would impose upon foreign intercourse and trade would not only 
be injurious to the operation of the Treaty itself, but would 
seriously prejudice the position hitherto consistently maintained 
by the Representatives of Western nations at the Courts of Peking 
and Yedo in combating proposals to place sim ilar restrictions 
upon trade with China and Japan.8
Finally, on 16 February 1883, the London Chamber of 
Commerce, approached Granville as to the advisability  of 
ratifying the Treaty between Britain and Korea.
The Chamber insisted that they were particularly desirous
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that every opportunity to open up and develop new markets for 
British manufactures be turned to the best account. Such being 
the general policy of this Chamber, they said, it could not but 
express its satisfaction at the promptitude with which Wade and 
Admiral Willes followed the action of the American Government 
in seeking to negotiate a Treaty with the King of Korea. The 
London Chamber would be prepared, when necessary, in the 
instance of new countries, to support, as a means of encouraging 
commercial relations with Eastern nations, the acceptance of 
conditions less favourable to this country, during the first years 
of a new Treaty, than the stipulations of the British Treaties 
with China. It also appeared most desirable that the British 
Government should obtain, through these Treaties, the right of 
appointing consuls, of establishing merchants, and of owning land 
in Korea, both as a means of competing with Japanese influence 
in that country, and of anticipating the commercial efforts of the 
American Government, but particularly with a view to securing 
every means of access to China, and developing Britain's influence 
with and upon that country with the purpose of ulterior trade 
extension.9
During a conversation of 17 February with the Korean 
Confidential Agent, Kim Ok-kiun. Parkes was informed that the 
United States had ratified their Treaty, and this act, Kim thought, 
would serve to test Korea's position and bring to an issue the 
question of her dependency on China. He wished that the test 
could be made more forcible by the ratification of the British 
Treaty. Parkes replied that he thought the British Government 
might think it necessary to understand the position of Korea
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before ratifying a Treaty with her, and that the disadvantageous 
conditions of the Treaty negotiated by Admiral W illes were a 
further impediment in the way of its ratification. He had, 
therefore, pointed out to him that if Korea wanted a Treaty with 
Great Britain, she should lose no time in offering to negotiate one 
that would be acceptable. Kim then inquired whether the British 
Government would be disposed to ask Li whether Korea should 
make with Great Britain a Treaty including similar arrangements 
to those recently concluded between Korea and China, to which 
Parkes replied that the British Government would not lose sight 
of their own dignity in any course they might see fit to take.10
On 6 March, Granville informed Parkes that the British 
Government were not yet prepared, without further information 
on various points raised in the Treaty between Great Britain and 
Korea, which had been signed by Vice-Admiral Willes in June 
1882, and with regard to which investigation was being made, to 
ratify that Treaty as it stood.11 On 9 March, Parkes submitted to 
Granville his view that Mr. Aston should be sent to Korea at once 
because of the importance of timely information being received 
as to the views of the Korean Government in regard to the 
m odification of Vice-Admiral W illes' Treaty, as e ither the 
ratifications of that Treaty have to be arranged, or a contrary 
resolution, if such should be taken by the British Government, be 
communicated to the Korean Government by 6 June.12 On the 
same day, Parkes sent a letter to Cho Y ouna-ha. the Korean 
Minister of Rites as follows:-
. . Your government having studied the conditions which govern international 
intercourse, will now be aware that equality of treatment is the only
satisfactory footing on which relations between different States can be 
conducted. They will, therefore, I trust, perceive that the commercial and 
other arrangements which they have recently concluded with China must 
materially influence the consideration of the Treaty between Great Britain 
and Korea, and I have consequently been instructed by the British Government 
to apprize your Excellency that, if the Government of Korea is willing to 
enter into further negotiations with them on the basis of those arrangements, 
they would be happy to entertain proposals of that nature. Mr. Aston is 
accordingly authorized to received any communication which you may wish to 
make to the British Government on this subject.
On 21 April, Aston who had been sent to Korea as Parkes 
had requested, reported to him his observations about Korea's 
attitude to her Treaty with Britain. He stated that the Korean 
Government were willing to negotiate a Treaty on the most 
favoured-nation basis, to be retrospectively applied so as to 
include the conditions of the Chinese and Japanese Treaties. They 
considered that this basis would be in accordance with the 
Chinese text of the British Treaty, and that the non-retrospective 
character of that Treaty, which appeared in the British version 
(Article XIV), was due to mistranslation. They were willing to 
readjust satisfactorily the Jurisdiction Clauses, to omit the first 
part of the Opium Clause (Article VII), and to modify some other 
minor points (not specified in the telegram); but he added that 
they would resist concession respecting the Tariff Clause 
(Article V), interport trade (Article VI), the export of grain 
(Article VIII), and tonnage dues (Article VI); and, as he understood 
the telegram, that they intended the rate of the latter (5 mace 
per ton) to be Chinese and not Korean mace. This rate, he 
observed, would be 1 mace, or 25 per cent, higher than the rate
82
levied in China, and a far greater advance on the Japanese rate, 
which, as at present levied, was nearly nominal, though the 
Japanese Government desired to increase it. The Korean 
Government would endeavour to reduce the privileges enjoyed by 
China and Japan in Korea to a level with those granted to the 
United States and Great Britain, but they promised to administer 
the Treaties with the latter Powers in a liberal spirit.
Aston had also offered the suggestion that a brief 
prelim inary Treaty embodying the firs t and last clauses of 
Admiral Willes' Treaty might be first concluded, the latter, or 
most favoured-nation clause, having the retrospective character 
mentioned above, and being combined with the provision that 
such a preliminary Treaty, if approved by the British Government, 
should admit of enforcement as soon as the consent of the latter 
had been communicated to the Korean Government. This 
suggestion was being favourably considered by the Korean 
Government.14
When Parkes received Aston's report on the same day, it 
occurred to him that, if the Korean Government were to be 
induced to entertain the idea of modifying the British Treaty, and 
to communicate to Aston their disposition to do so, it was at 
least necessary that that idea should be officially suggested for 
their consideration and that they should be informed that Aston 
was authorized to receive any communication on the subject 
which they might desire to make to the British Government.15
On the next day, unexpectedly, the question was 
solved. Granville informed Parkes, "the ratifications of the 
British Treaty with Korea shall be postponed for six months, on
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the ground that further consideration is required in respect of 
certain portions of it. You will direct Aston to notify to the 
Korean Government the desire of our government to postpone the 
ratification of the treaty, and, if desirable, to sign declaration of 
such postponement."16
On 28 April, Parkes informed Granville respecting a 
draft of the declaration of the postponement:-
Whereas the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce concluded at InchOn on 6 
June 1882, between Vice-Admiral Willes, on the part of Great Britain and 
Ireland, and Isas Ling Hsia and Ching Hung Kie. members of the Royal Council, 
on the part of Korea, contains a stipulation that the ratifications of this 
Treaty shall be exchanged at Inch6n within one year from the date of its 
signature, and whereas the Government of Great Britain is of opinion that 
portions of this Treaty require further consideration, the undersigned being 
duly authorized by their respective governments, have agreed to declare as 
follows:- That the period fixed within which the ratifications should be 
exchanged shall be extended to 31 December 1883. In faith of which they 
have signed the present Declaration made in duplicate and in the British and 
Chinese language, and have affixed thereto their sea ls.17
On 15 May, Min Yong-m ok. president of the Board of 
Foreign Affairs of Great Korea declared that the Korean 
Government accepted the Declaration for extending the period 
stipulated for exchanging the Ratifications of the Treaty between 
Great Britain and Ireland and Korea, signed at Inchon, 6 June 
1882 .18
1.3. THE SECOND TREATY OF NOVEMBER 1883 AND
ITS RATIFICATION, APRIL, 1884.
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On 29 May 1883, Aston had reported to Parkes that he had taken 
advantage of his recent visit to Seoul to endeavour further to 
ascertain the views of the Korean Government as to the basis on 
which they would be willing to reopen Treaty negotiations. Aston 
had found the President of the Foreign Board in a much more 
reticent frame of mind than on the occasion of his previous visit. 
It had plainly been suggested to him, probably by Kim Ok-kiun, 
that the President ought not to commit himself further to any one 
but a duly accredited Envoy, and to Aston's inquiries his 
invariable reply was that he would reserve his answer until the 
arrival of a Plenipotentiary, and for this the President hoped he 
should not have long to wait.1
On 22 June, Parkes forwarded to Granville the draft of a 
Treaty(Appendix I) showing the terms which he considered Britain 
should endeavour to obtain from Korea in place of those secured 
by Admiral Willes, enclosing drafts of Treaty, Regulations of 
Trade, and a Tariff, which composed together one instrument.
In framing them Parkes had been impressed by the 
desirability of adhering as closely as possible to the terms of 
Adm iral W illes1 Treaty. If what he conceived to be its 
deficiencies could have been remedied by Additional Articles or a 
Supplementary Treaty, he would greatly have preferred that 
course. But the alternatives he had to recommend, that in respect 
to jurisdiction, the conditions of residence of British subjects in 
Korea, the tariff, Customs Rules, and other commercial rights and 
privileges were so material that it would be impossible to place 
these in a Supplementary Treaty without practically cancelling 
the first one, or creating occasion for a conflict of meaning 
between the two which it was most desirable to avoid. He had,
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however, endeavoured to observe simplicity and brevity, even at 
the cost of some omission, and had thus confined his draft to the 
same number of Articles as those of Admiral Willes' Treaty, but 
he had not been able to retain the same order.2
On 3 July, Kim again visited Japan and called on Parkes. 
In conversation, Kim expressed the anxiety of the Korean 
Government to establish Treaty relations with Great Britain as 
soon as possible. He referred to the fact that 31 December was 
the limit assigned to the extension of the period for ratification 
of the Treaty concluded by Admiral Willes, and stated that the 
Korean Government looked forward with in terest to the 
appointment, before the expiration of that period, of a Minister 
Plenipotentiary empowered by the British Government to conclude 
with that of Korea the formalities of ratification, or any further 
negotiation that might be found necessary.
In answer to his inquiry as to the intentions of the British 
Government, Parkes could only tell Kim that he knew that they 
were indisposed to ratify Admiral Willes' Treaty as it stood, as it 
contained several objectionable clauses: and as the high tariff of 
that Treaty would prevent the development of trade between the 
two countries. Parkes, however, felt confident that the British 
Government would be guided by the consideration of what was 
expedient in the interests both of Korea and Great Britain, though 
they would naturally decline to accept a commercial Treaty 
containing conditions which would be prejudicial to those they 
had concluded with China and Japan, and which had been 
productive of very great benefit to both those nations. If Korea 
earnestly desired Treaty relations with Great Britain, she should
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be willing to offer the latter sufficient inducements to enter into 
such relations. Such a Treaty as that which was concluded in 
1882 did not contain sufficient inducements: it would entail
considerable cost on the British Government, w ithout any 
corresponding advantage.3
When Parkes was transferred to Peking at the end of 
August, he was instructed to reopen negotiations at Seoul in 
October without giving notice to the Chinese Government. On his 
way to Shanghai to board the ship to Korea, he briefly met Li at 
Tien-tsin. The Viceroy was angry at British audacity in bypassing 
him and sent a communication to the Korean Government warning 
that only changes in commercial arrangements would be tolerated 
by Peking.4
Meanwhile, the British Government was checking Parkes' 
draft for a negotiation of a new Treaty with Korea once again. 
The first part to be reconsidered was that respecting Opium. 
According to Granville's letter to Earl Kimberley, the Secretary of 
State for India, on 31 August, in the Parkes draft which had been 
sent home for the consideration of the British Government, the 
clause affecting opium was thus worded: The importation of 
opium, arms, and all munitions of war, and the exportation of red 
Ginseng, were prohibited, except under the express authority of 
the Korean Government." Parkes further suggested that an 
exception in favour of medical opium should be mentioned in this 
clause of the proposed Treaty, as well as in the Tariff to be 
annexed to the Treaty, where a definition should be given as to 
what was intended by the term "medical opium." At the same 
time Parkes had pointed out that the prohibition to import opium
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into Korea was almost in itself a recognition of the independence 
of the country, inasmuch as China would claim any concession 
granted to a dependency.
On this point, Granville observed that the King of Korea 
claimed for Korea that, while it was simply a dependency of 
China, its internal administration and its external intercourse 
were entirely and in all respects within his direction and control 
as an independent King. Therefore, he asked Kimberley whether he 
saw any objection, so far as Indian interests were concerned, to 
the prohibition regarding the importation of opium into Korea, and 
the definition of "medical opium " proposed by Parkes.5
On 25 September, Kimberley replied to Granville that 
while Indian interests saw no harm in recognizing the prohibition 
by Korea of the importation of opium, it was feared that if the 
British Government undertook to prohibit its importation, the 
position of the Government of India in regard to the general opium 
question would be weakened. Kimberley also stated that Article 
VII of the Treaty negotiated by Vice-Admiral Willes appeared to 
him to be inadmissible because the British Government could not 
undertake to punish a British subject for any interference with 
this trade on their part as it would prove extremely embarrassing 
in negotiations with China on the opium question, especially in 
view of the relations of Korea with China. He further mentioned 
that the clause proposed by Parkes was not open to this 
objection, and he did not consider that the making of opium 
contraband in Korea need in itself be opposed from the point of 
view of Indian interests. But Granville would doubtless consider 
whether the insertion in the Treaty of such a clause as was 
proposed would give China any opening to claim a sim ilar
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concession. Kimberley suggested that it might be better to omit 
all mention of opium in the body of the Treaty, and simply to 
enter it as contraband in the Tariff Schedule.6
On 10 October, Granville instructed Parkes that, in 
negotiating a fresh Treaty with Korea, it was desirable that all 
mention of opium should be omitted in the body of the Treaty, and 
that it should be simply entered as contraband in the Tariff 
Schedule.7
The second part to be reconsidered was Article XII of the 
proposed Treaty with Korea. On 17 October, Granville instructed 
Parkes that in paragraphs 1 and 2 of that article after the word 
"p a rtic ip a te " should be inse rted  be fore  the word 
"unconditionally," and after the word "advantages," the words 
"especially in relation to import and export duties on goods and 
manufactures." At the end of this Article, he added, it would be 
desirable to make the following addition:- "This Article shall be 
interpreted in the most liberal sense."8
The third consideration was in respect of missionary 
activity. On behalf of the Board of Directors of the National 
Bible Society of Scotland, on 18 October, Lord Balfour of Burleigh 
sent a le tter to Granville in connection with any Treaty 
arrangements that might be made between the British Government 
and the Government of Korea. He pointed out that, as Granville 
would be aware, provision had been made under Article VIII and IX 
in Lord Elgin's Treaty with China, signed at Tien-tsin in 1858, for 
the protection of persons, native or foreign, who might teach or 
profess the Christian religion, and for liberty to British subjects 
to travel, with passports, to all parts of the interior; while under
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the most favoured-nation clause missionaries and Bible Society 
agents had been able to reside in any part of China to which their 
duty had called them. In the interests of their mission, and of 
possible native converts in Korea, the Directors of this Society 
were anxious that similar arrangements should, if practicable, be 
made with the consent of the Government of Korea; and they 
respectfully solicited Granville's powerful sympathy and aid on 
their behalf. He assured Granville that any agents the British 
Socity might send to Korea would take care, as those in China had 
always done, to conduct themselves prudently, and with due 
regard to local regulations and circumstances.9
On 13 November, the United Presbyterian Church Foreign 
Mission Office also sent Granville a letter similar to that of the 
National Bible Society as follows:-
That the Board of Foreign Missions of the United Presbyterian Church have at 
present in their service a staff of upwards of seventy full qualified 
missionaries, besides a large number of native agents, labouring in several 
mission fields, whom they support at an expenditure of 37,000 L. per 
annum.
That of these missionaries, three ordained missionaries, one medical 
missionary, and a lady missionary are located in Manchuria, who make 
occasional journeys to the Korean border, while some of the native agents are 
labouring in Korea itself.
That the Board are desirous that their missionaries entering Korea should 
have the same protection and privileges which were secured to all 
missionaries in China by Article VIII and IX of the Treaty signed at Tien-tsin 
in 1858 and ratified at Paking in 1860.
The Board, in these circumstances, beg most respectfully that in any Treaty 
arrangements between the British Government and the Government of Korea, 
your Lordship's good offices may be used in favour of securing protection to
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all persons in Korea, native or foreign, who may teach or profess the 
Christian religion, and of securing liberty to British subjects to travel with 
passports to any part of the interior.10
On 10 and 20 November, Granville replied respectively to 
the National Bible Society and the United Presbyterian Church in 
Scotland that the proposals which would be made to the Korean 
Government would include the concession to British subjects of 
the right to build schools, hospitals, and places of worship, to 
travel with passports in the interior, and to enjoy under a most­
favoured-nation clause all the privileges and advantages that 
might be granted by Korea to the subjects of other Powers. If the 
above proposals were accepted by the Korean Government, 
Granville hoped that the objects which the National Bible Society 
of Scotland and the United Presbyterian Church in Scotland had in 
view would be sufficiently secured.11
After sending Aston ahead for preparatory negotiations, 
Parkes arrived at Inchon on 26 October, and prepared the final 
treaty draft which he handed to the Foreign Office on 3 November. 
The negotiations, conducted on the Korean side by Kim Hong-jip, 
Yi Cho-Yon. and von M ollendorff. proceeded smoothly, and 
agreement was easily reached on the treaty. Opinion on the trade 
regulations and the tariff, however, differed considerably. 
Agreement was finally reached on 24 November. Two days later, 
on 26 November, the British-Korean treaty was signed by Parkes 
and Min, the president of the Foreign Office.(Appendix II)
On the occasion of consequence of the successful British-Korean 
Treaty, in a note of 27 November supplied by the Korean Foreign 
Office,the King of Korea remarked that the two countries would
91
henceforward be in perpetual peace and friendship one with the 
other, and the advantages which their respective subjects would 
derive from this Treaty would be entirely due to the exertions of 
Parkes, to whom he alluded in the most laudatory terms.12
After Parkes had returned to Tien-tsin, he called on Li 
on 5 December because Parkes found that Li was anxious to know 
what Parkes had done in Korea, and Parkes thought it would be 
polite to be frank with him on the subject, and to give him a full 
recital. This led, as Parkes anticipated, to a request that he 
would show Li the Treaty, and Parkes observed that, although 
Parkes would be transgressing rules in doing so, he would 
communicate it to Li in strict confidence, which he felt assured 
would not be breached. Li observed to Parkes that the French 
Minister had told him, shortly after Parkes had left for Korea, 
that the negotiations would create a false position for China in 
respect to Korea, but that Li had replied that he did not apprehend 
any result of that nature. Parkes replied that when Li read the 
Treaty he would see that his confidence had been fully justified. 
Parkes accordingly gave Li a copy of the Treaty and Trade 
Regulations when Li returned Parkes' visit on the following day. 
Li read these documents through from beginning to end, and then 
spontaneously expressed a hearty approval of them.13
Li's initial approval, however, turned into opposition in 
the spring of the following year. He had been severely criticized 
in Peking for having failed to send a Chinese official along with 
Parkes, a procedure which Li had considered impolitic at the time 
The scapegoat in Seoul was Min Yong-mok. the chief negotiator on 
the Korean side, who had to resign as president of the Foreign
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Office because of Chinese pressure. Before Chinese objections to 
the ratification of the treaty reached Seoul, however, Parkes 
secured on April 14, 1884, through his secretary, W.C. Hillier. an 
official declaration from the Korean Government that the treaty 
had been ratified by the king.14
On 28 April 1884, Parkes reported to Granville that the 
exchange ceremony had taken place at Seoul. He added that it was 
appended, on the page marked "Ratification," to the original 
Chinese version of the said Treaty, was signed by the King, and 
sealed with the Korean Seal of State, and its terms were exactly 
conformable to those of the ratification of the Queen of Britain.
He also enclosed the certificate of the exchange of the said 
ratifications in British and Chinese which he executed that day 
in duplicate with the President of the Foreign Office of Korea.15 
On 1 May 1884, Parkes and his suite were received splendidly by 
the King, and Parkes presented his credentials and a letter from 
Queen Victoria.16
The British treaty served as model for most of the later 
treaties Korea concluded with Western nations.
2. Pressure upon Korea from Russia and
the Russo-Korean Treaty, July 1884.
Following the ratification of the Treaty of Peking of 1860, in 
which China ceded her territories east of the Ussuri River to 
Russia, Korea shared a common boundary with Russia at the mouth 
of Tumen River. The Czarist Government had revealed its interest 
in Korea as early as 1864.1 Along the borders connecting China, 
Korea, and Russia, there were Russian settlements that attracted 
Chinese and Koreans to emigrate to Russian territory. After 1863
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in particular, Korea became increasingly concerned over the flight 
of peasants across the border into Russian territory. Fearing 
collusion between these "renegade" Koreans and the Russians, the 
government tightened border security and ordered frontier 
officials not to let foreigners enter the country. During 1864- 
1865, however, dozens of Russians came to the border town of 
Kyong-hong of Ham-gyong Province to demand trade. The alarmed 
Korean officials refused to talk with the Russians, and they 
arrested and executed Koreans who allegedly had aided the 
intruders. The Seoul government repeatedly appealed to the 
Chinese authorities to check Russian activities along Korea's 
northern bo rde r.2 In January 1866, a Russian man-of-war 
appeared outside Wonsan, on the east coast of the peninsula by 
Broughton Bay, and the Commander presented a letter to the 
Korean Government demanding the right of trade and residence for 
Russian merchants. The letter also intimated that if the demands 
were not satisfied, Russian troops would cross the frontier to 
enforce them. During the period 1866-68, the Russian Government 
lured many Koreans to Russian territory, and several incidents 
occurred between the countries at the border.3
Many Western nations, as well as China, were alerted to 
pressure upon Korea from Russia. In 1874, Parkes, wrote to a 
friend in China: "I hope Korea may not pass into [Russia's] hands 
some fine day." Two Chinese officials in early 1875 memorialized 
the Emperor, warning of the dangers arising from Russian 
pressures on the boundaries of China and Korea. Wade, the British 
diplomat, also warned Li in December, 1875, after the Kang-wha 
incident, that Russia had dispatched troops to the mouth of the
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Amur River. The next year, when Li conferred with the Japanese 
M inister Mori Yurei. the latter mentioned that Russia was 
organizing Mongolians and Koreans who had settled on the right 
bank of the Ussuri River, and Japan feared that Russia would 
encroach on Korean territory as well as on china's own. Similar 
warnings made by other Japanese to the Korean Government can 
be found, for instance, in former loyalist Samurai, M iyam oto 's  
conversation with Shin Hon after the conclusion of the Kang-wha 
T re a ty .4 There was even a rumour that a war was going on 
between Korea and Russia. All these warnings serve to illustrate 
the concern for Korea on the part of China, Japan, and the Western 
Powers that was aroused by Russia's expansionist designs. Later 
the Koreans, too, became aware of the pressure from Russia in 
the north. Yi Yoo-won. the King's former tutor and former second 
state councillor, wrote to Li early in 1879:
Russians use various methods to encroach on our northern boundary. The
inhabitants there assist [the Russians] secretly, and [our government] can 
5not enforce the ban.
The Korean Government had already been alerted by Hanabusa. 
Assistant Japanese Foreign minister. In late 1877, when 
Hanabusa was in Seoul to negotiate the opening of new ports and 
permanent residence of a Japanese minister in Seoul, he had 
warned the Korean Minister of Rites, Cho Yong-ha, that Russia 
might use the Russo-Turkish War, then in progress, as a pretext 
for seizing the Gulf of Lazareff, on the east coast of Korean 
peninsula.6 Two years later, Inouve Kaoru. the Japanese Foreign 
Minister, was reported to have told Parkes that "Russia had made 
attempts to get possession of the Port Lazareff, and would
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certainly renew those attempts in the event of complications.7
The Chinese Minister in Japan, Ho Ju-chana. was 
particularly concerned about the threat posed by Russia. In April, 
1880, he wrote to the Yamen:
The troubles of Korea stem not from Japan but from Russia. . . If Russia were
to use force, the first step would be the Ham-gyong Province of Korea.
Judging from the relative strength, Korea would not be able to defend herself.
If Korea should perish . . .  How could China remain at peace?.. .  That Russia
Q
has the heart of tiger and wolf is known by all under the sky.
Early in 1880, China and Russia were in dispute over the 
lli question. The situation became more serious when China 
refused to ratify the treaty, which had been fraudulently signed. 
It seemed likely that there would be a war, and that it would 
directly involve Korea. The dispatch of a Russian fleet to the 
East was regarded as a threat to Korea. Parkes warned Marquis 
Tseng C hi-tse. Chinese Minister to the Court of St. James, in 
February 1880, that both Japan and Russia were contemplating an 
invasion of Korea and that China should be prepared; the best 
method to defend Korea would be to advise her to enter into 
commercial and diplomatic relations with the Western Powers. 
Though at the time Tseng discounted the likelihood of such an 
eventuality, he wrote to the Yamen in June calling attention to 
the possibility of a jo int action by Japan and Russia against 
China's dependent state, Korea. He suggested that the Chinese 
Government plan to amend its policy of non-intervention in Korea 
and advise the latter to enter into treaty relations with foreign 
po w e rs .9 In April 1880, a Russian mission was sent to Kyong-
96
hong Prefecture in Ham-gyong Province to negotiate a treaty of 
friendship and commerce between the two countries. The 
proposition was rejected. It is significant however that the 
mission was composed primarily of cavalrymen. According to
press accounts, the official of the group asked the Korean local 
officials why their country would conclude a treaty with Japan 
but not with Russia. The questions were not answered by the 
Prefect. The same account also indicates that the Russians were
ready to employ force to back up their demands.
The Chinese Consul in Nagasaki wrote to Li on 14 June 
1880, reporting movements of the Russian Navy that might be in 
preparation for an attack on the port of Wonsan. Other sources 
also prove that Russia had moved toward Korea. On 23 
September, Admiral Charles Duperre of the French Navy informed 
Li that a Russian admiral had arrived at Chefoo and was
proceeding to Hun-ch'un (at the Ussuri River on the Sino-Korean- 
Russian borders) to attack the Korean coast. Li told Admiral 
Duperre that the Russians were only attempting to trade with
Korea, but the Admiral answered that the northwest coast of 
Korea had excellent harbours, which were the real objective of 
the Russian Navy. To be sure, Li was troubled by the presence of 
Russian warships; a few days later he memorialized the Emperor:
Since the winter of 1879, as the Sino-Russian negotiations [over Hi] dragged 
on, there have been many rumours to the effect that about twenty Russian 
warships were sailing to the East while their army assembled along the coasts 
of Chi-lin province in places like Vladivostock, Nova-Kievska. These places 
are close to Korea, and the all important Northeastern Provinces. As they use 
the eastern sea ports as bases, naturally they will have ambition to expand.
To conquer Korea is just the same as to encroach upon the back of our Three
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Eastern Provinces and will cause disturbances to China.10
In August 1880, when Kim Hong-jip went to Japan on a 
friendly mission, the counsellor of the Chinese Legation in Tokyo, 
Huang Tsun-hsien. presented a long paper entitled "Policy for 
Korea" to the Korean King through Kim. What interests here is 
that the underlying theme of the paper was the defence of Korea 
against Russia. Huang said:
Since Russia was deterred in the European expansion by Britain, Austria, 
France, and Italy, she turned to the Orient. In the last decade or so, she has 
obtained Sakhalin from Japan, the left bank of the Amur River from China. 
Now she stations troops at the mouth of the Tumen River in order to make it a 
point d'appui. . . Her contemplation is obviously in Asia. Korea is the frontier 
region and will be the center of conflict.11
A few months later, the Japanese Minister in Seoul was 
able to obtain a copy of the record of a conversation between the
Korean King and the Prime Minister, the essence of which was
that the Koreans found Japan's policy vis-a-vis Korea to have 
changed from hostile to friendly and the major threat to Korea 
now to come from Russia.
There is little need to point out that the other Western
nations generally employed diplomatic methods in attempting to
open the door the to Korea. Russia, however, was in the habit of 
using a direct approach, often accompanied by threats in the early 
1880's which, however, never did materialize. Nevertheless, the 
constant pressure from that country was undoubtedly one of the 
most important factors contributing to the opening of Korea.
In March 1882, a Korean was sent by the local Russian
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authorities to the prefect of Kyonghong to deliver a letter which 
did not propose a treaty, but which was intended to resolve a few 
local issues. This letter was received with surprise because it 
was written in Korean script, Han'gul. Although the government 
in Seoul ordered the local officials to answer with "nice words," 
it wanted to have it made unmistakably clear that further contact 
was not desired. Shortly afterwards, however, the Korean 
Government was again confronted with a Russian request for 
treaty relations. The Russian minister at Peking, Eugene de 
B u tzow . approached Chang Shu-sheng early in June with the 
proposal that a treaty be negotiated which would grant overland 
trade and settle the border between the two countries. Chang 
instructed Ma, who was in Korea in the second half of June, to 
approach Kim Hong-jip about the Russian request. At the end of 
the month the Russian plan was rejected by Chief State 
Councillor Yi Cho-ung. whose views were supported by Ma Chien- 
chung. Yi stated that the border area between Russia and Korea at 
the mouth of the Tumen River was too insignificant to render 
trade there feasible. It was therefore convenient, Yi insisted, "to 
wait for another day to conclude a treaty."12
The day truly came with the vice-president of the Korean 
Foreign Office, von Mdllendorff's own ideas about Korea's 
diplomatic future. He doubted that China would be strong enough 
to keep Japan in check and therefore only Russia, he thought, 
would be an effective counterbalance. America was too weak 
militarily to play such a role, and Britain was siding with Japan 
against Russia. It was for this reason that von Mollendorff 
strongly favoured the conclusion of the treaty with Russia in the
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Summer of 1884. This treaty, he was convinced, would secure for 
Korea a certain degree of independence from Japan as well as 
from China.
Consequently, on 7 July 1884, a Treaty of Friendship and 
Commerce was signed between Russia and Korea. (Appendix III) 
By this step Russian diplomacy seems to have followed the 
example of the other powers. The treaty made no appreciable 
difference in Russo-Korean trade relations or the Russian 
attitude toward Korea.
Besides making the customary arrangements for mutual 
trade, the treaty included a provision which allowed warships of 
either country the right to visit any port of the other signatory 
country, irrespective of whether that port was an open or a 
closed one. This provision enabled Russian naval forces to take 
an active interest in the ports and harbours of Korea, which had 
been closed to vessels of other nations. Before the treaty was 
ratified and the Russians could take advantage of this provision, a 
crisis between Britain and Russia developed in the Far East, 
because the British claimed that Russia intended to seize one of 
these closed ports.13
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Appendix 1113
T R E A T Y  o f Friendship and Commerce between Russia and 
Corea,— Signed at Hanyang, 1884.:
[Ratifications exchanged, October 14,1885.] 
(Traduction.)
Si. Majestd l’Empereur et Autocrate de Toutes lea Russies, Ac 
Sa Majesty le Roi de Corde; pendtres du ddair sincdre d’dtablir entre 
lea deux £tats dea relations amicalea et commerciales permanentea 
et de lea consolider par un Traitd, ont ddsignd & cet effet leurs 
Pldnipotentiairea:—
Sa Majestd FEmpereur et Autocrate de Toutes lea Russies, le 
Conseiller d’fitat Charles Weber, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Saint- 
Anne de deuxi&me classe; et
Sa Majestd lc Roi de Corde, Kim-Peng-Si, Prdaident du Ministdre 
dea Affaires fitrangeres, Eonctionnaire de premiere classe, Prdaident 
du Conseil d’Etat, Membre du Conseil Privd de Sa Majestd et 
Premier Inatituteur de l'Hdritier;
Lea Pldnipotentiairea prdcitds, munis de plains pouroirs, trouvds 
endue forme, ae aont entendua et ont conclules Articles suivants:—
Ahx. I.—1. Dordnavant la paix et l’amitid aeront perpdtuelles 
entre Sa Majestd FEmpereur de Toutes lea Russies et Sa Majestd 
le Roi de Corde et entre leurs aujets respectifs, lesquels jouiront 
dans les territoires dea deux fitats d’une sdcuritd complete et de 
toute la protection pour leurs personnes et pour leurs biens.
2. En caa de diffdrend entre l’une des Hautes Parties Contrac- 
tantes et une troisi&me Puissance, l’autre Partie Contractante, aur la 
demande de la premiere, pretera sea bona offices en vue de la solution 
pacifique de diffdrend.
II.—1. Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantespeuventappointer 
cbacune un Reprdaentant Diplomatique en rdsidence permanente ou 
temporaire dans leurs capitales respectives, ainsi que des Consuls- 
Gdndraux, Consuls, et Vice-Consuls dans quelques-uns ou dans tous 
les ports ouverts au commerce dtranger et ou sont admis a rdaider 
les Agents Consulaires des autrea Puissances. Les Reprdsentants 
Diplomatiques et les Agents Consulaires des deux Puissances 
jouiront sans exception de toutes les facilitds pour les communica­
tions personnelles ou dcrites avec les autoritds locales, ainsi que de 
tous les droits et privileges acquis aux Agents Diplomatiques ou 
Consulaires dans les autres pays.
2. Les Reprdsentants Diplomatiques et les Agents Consulaires 
des Hautes Parties Contractantes et toutes les personnes qui leur 
sont attachdes jouiront du droit de voyager librement dans toutes les 
parties de leurs territoires respectifs, et les autoritds de la Corde 
muniront de passeports les dits fonctionnaires Russes voyageant en 
Corde et d’une escorte pour les ddfendre si besoin est.
8. Les Agents Consulaires des deux Puissances ne procdderont 
& l’exercice de leurs fonctions qu’apr&s y avoir dtd autorisds par 
l’Empereur ou par le Gouvernenient du pays oh ils rdsident 
respectivement, mais il leur est ddfendu de se livrer au commerce.
III.*—1. La juridiction sur les sujets Russes en Corde et sur leur 
propridtd appartiendra exclusivement aux Agents Consulaires Russes j
* Seo Protocol,
^British and Foreign State Papers, vol.75, pp. 510-28.
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tractantes, et que dans le cas oil elles ratifieraient le Traits, les 
Conventions contenues dans cc Protocole auraient ausai force 
legale.
Eu foi de quoi les Plenipotentiaires des deux Puissances out 
Bigne ce Protocole special et y ont appose leurs seiugs.
Fait dans la ville de llanian (Seoul) en l’an de grace 18S4, le 
25e jour de Juin (7 Juillet), correspondant, d’apres l’dro Coreeune, 
au 15° jour de la 5® lune de l’ann6e 493, ou d’upr&s l’dre Chinoise a 
la 10° annoe du regne de Huan-SuL
(L.S.) CIT. WEBEB. 
(L.S.) KIM-PENG-SI.
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CHAPTER IV: THE FIRST PHASE OF THE PORT HAMILTON AFFAIR,
GRANVILLE'S TERM OF OFFICE; MARCH-JUNE, 1885.
1. THE PRELUDE TO THE AFFAIR;
THE AFGHAN BORDER CRISIS OF MARCH, 1885
IN  the late nineteenth century Russian expansion was partly 
checked by British rivalry in the Near East and Asia. At the 
Congress of Berlin, the Russians were frustrated in their scheme 
to advance the ir bases into the Balkans, as far as the 
Mediterranean. Since then the Russian Government had turned 
their policy again to the East; the Middle and Far East. The 
Russians seemed to believe that their international position would 
be restored when their expansionist policy in the East had put the 
British on the defensive.
Russian expansion in the Middle East was untroubled by 
wider international implications, though her movement in the 
general direction of the frontiers of British India was to provoke 
the British into m ilitary action on the ir northern borders. 
Britain's attitude towards the states on the northern borders of 
India was conditioned by her fear of Russian expansion in the 
middle East. Russia, too, feared the extension of British influence 
on her borders, even when those borders were hundreds of miles 
apart. Both Russia and Britain had their theorists of what came to 
be called the "forward" movement. Russian generals, no doubt, 
dreamed of an attack upon British India and were encouraged by 
politicians who had no particular desire to conquer India, but saw 
a method of putting pressure upon the government in London. 
Statesmen do not have to believe in the dreams of their soldiers, 
even if they do nothing to discourage them.
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Considerable ignorance, both topographical and strategic, 
led to British actions which, in the perspective of history, appear 
almost ludicrous. But, at the time, Russian expansion in the 
Middle East did appear to menace India. British aims, therefore, 
were to forestall Russian domination on the periphery of northern 
India and to create buffer states in which B ritish-lnd ian 
influences would be predominant.
An early British reaction to spring from her fear of 
Russian intentions occurred with the Afghan war of 1839-42. At 
this date, the Russian advance base at Orenberg was nearly 2,000 
miles away from the nearest British post at Ludhiana on the 
frontier of the Punjab. In between lay, not only Afghanistan and 
other independent emirates, but the independent Sikh kingdom of 
the Punjab. Both militarily and politically, the war was disastrous 
for Britain. In 1848, however, the Punjab was annexed, bringing 
the frontier of British India up to that of Afghanistan, a fact 
which only intensified British anxiety over Russia's intentions.
A further British reaction to spring from her fear of 
Russian intentions occurred with the Afghan war of 1878-79. By 
the summer of 1877, the viceroy of India, Lord Lvtton  ordered 
military preparations to be made in India for the occupation of 
western Afghanistan. Lytton was mainly concerned with Britain's 
prestige, and he insisted that failure to act in Afghanistan might 
have harmful effects inside India. The secretary of State, Lord 
Salisbury, though not accepting the premise of a Russian attack on 
India, did authorize Lytton to repeat the demand for the 
establishment of the British representative at Kabul.
In 1878, tension between Russia and Britain had been
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increased because of Russia's war with Turkey. In order to bring 
pressure to bear upon Russia, at the time, D israe li ordered the 
occupation of the island of Cyprus and rushed Indian troops to 
Malta. Russia's response in Asia edged Britain towards the 
logical conclusion of Lytton's policy-a military expedition against 
Afghanistan; on 13 June, a Russian agent set off for Kabul with 
instructions to demand from the Ameer an arrangement very little 
different from that demanded by the British. From that time, the 
likelihood of a clash between the two empires in Afghanistan had 
some substance.
With this consideration of Russia's movements, the 
British Government decided that their troops would cross the 
Afghan frontier if no satisfactory reply to an ultimatum was 
received: when the ultimatum expired, on 21 November 1878, the 
invasion of Afghanistan began. In May 1879 by the Treaty of 
Gandamak, the Regent agreed to conduct his foreign relations only 
with the advice of the British. A British Resident was to be
appointed to Kabul. A telegraph line between Kabul and Kurrum
was agreed to. The British were to occupy Kurrum, Pishin, and 
Gibi, and the Khyber and Mishmi passes. But all was by no means 
over. In the autumn, a massacre of the new mission in Kabul, 
followed by renewed invasion by the British ended in a
compromise settlement, reassuring to Britain without humiliating 
Afghanistan.
In the 1880s, Lord Ripon. Lytton's successor, wanted to 
reinforce the Afghan settlem ent by reaching a d ip lom atic
understanding with Russia. Now that the forward policy had been 
abandoned, there seemed reasonable grounds for assuming that
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agreement could be reached. Unfortunately, though the Russian 
Government was apparently amenable, Russian generals were still 
pushing southwards and were now only 200 miles from the Merv 
oasis on the northern border of Afghanistan. The Russian 
Government explained that the continuing advance was designed 
merely to impose peace, and that further military operations in 
the Middle East were not under consideration. But the Russian 
generals were determined to press on with their own ambitions, 
and the British Government-in spite of Russian assurances-issued 
a public declaration in April 1881 that it would not tolerate any 
interference in Afghan affairs.
Now the British cabinet was divided. One group believed 
that no treaty could restrain Russian ambitions. Another was 
equally convinced that Russia intended to continue her policy of 
appearing to menace British India. The prime minister and the 
viceroy felt that diplomacy in the Russian capital was preferable 
to action in Afghanistan. The consequence of these differences of 
opinion was that the British Government had no policy at all. In 
December 1882, however, Lord Kimberley became secretary of 
state for India. He had no faith in the value of direct negotiation 
with Russia, and he instructed the viceroy to promote closer 
relations with the Ameer of Afghanistan and to increase the 
annual subsidy paid to him by the British. No more pointless 
policy could have been devised, since Abdur Rahman. Ameer of 
Kabul, was still not obliged to follow British advice or even, for 
that matter, to ask for it. The Russian advance in the Middle East 
continued, and, in February 1884, the Russians occupied Merv.
There was now no purpose in having a treaty to halt 
Russia's advance, as her territories abutted on Afghanistan. The
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British cabinet therefore decided to negotiate an agreement on the 
demarcation of Afghanistan's northern boundary. Russia took the 
in itia tive  and proposed that the two governm ents should 
immediately define the area to be surveyed by any boundary 
commission. The British agreed and suggested that, as a 
preliminary, Russia should withdraw from Pul-i-Khatun and the 
Afghans from Sari Yazi. Russia rejected this proposal and 
demanded instead that the Afghans should withdraw from Panjdeh, 
which they had occupied in June 1883, on the grounds that it and 
Pul-i-Khatun were not Afghan territory. Both the British and 
Indian Governments took this demand as a sign of imminent 
aggression, and the Russian Government was warned that its 
policy might lead to war. Under the circumstances, in April 1884 
the British Government declared that "Her Majesty's Government 
are of opinion that it would be desirable that the principal points 
of the boundary line should be laid down on the spot for the 
delimination of the frontiers of Afghanistan from Khoja Saleh 
Westwards, and that a Joint Commission, including an Afghan 
Representative, should be appointed for that purpose, and should 
commence operations next autumn." But before the settlement of 
the Afghan frontier by the Anglo-Russian Joint Commission, the 
Russians had fought with Afghan troops at Panjdeh (30 March 
1885). 1
When the Foreign Office received the news of the Panjdeh 
encounter, Gladstone proclaimed:-
. . .  it was a very solemn covenant. It was a covenant involving great issues. .
. What has happened? A bloody engagement on 30 March followed the
covenant of the 16th. . . The cause of that deplorable collision may be
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uncertain. What is certain is that the attack was a Russian attack. What was 
the provocation is a matter of the utmost consequence. We only know that the 
attack was a Russian Attack. We know that the Afghans suffered in life, in 
spirit, and in repute. We know that a blow was struck at the credit and the 
authority of the Sovereign-our ally-our protected ally-who had committed 
no offence.
The pledge of the British Prime Minister to have "right done in the 
matter" brought his nation to the verge of war with Russia.2 
Fortunately, neither the British Government and their military 
advisers nor even the Ameer of Afghanistan thought that Penjdeh 
was worth a full-scale fight.3 But a few more miles to the south 
lay Herat-the cause of two British wars with Persia, and long 
regarded as the 'gate' or 'key' to India.
Herat was an ancient city, and had in the days of 
Tamerlane and his son been a metropolis of Muslim culture and the 
glory of Asia. Now it was poor and ruinous, important only for its 
strategic situation on 'the main highway to India '.4 Sir P. 
L u m sd e n . the British commissioner, when asked for a report on 
Herat by the Secretary of State for War, recounted the many 
sieges Herat had undergone, by Mongols, Uzbeks, Turkomans, and 
Persians. "The Herat valley", he continued, " has in past times 
subsisted very large bodies of men for considerable periods, and 
there can be no question but that under favorable circumstances 
the resources of the valley will again in the future be capable of 
producing all the food and forage required for a large army." He 
pointed out that in almost every invasion of India from the 
north, "Herat has afforded a resting place, base, and depot of 
supply, whilst from its position it covers Turkestan, overawes
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Khorassan, and threatens Afghanistan and India." Its value to an 
invader of India was great since "in it concentrate the highways 
from Persia, the Caspian, Merv, Bokhara, and Afghan Turkestan; 
and from it, roads lead by Hazara to Kabul, and by Furrah to 
Kandahar and Seistan". Herat, Lumsden concluded, "has displayed a 
recuperative power in recovering from blows which would have 
entire ly obliterated any place that did not possess great 
advan tages in na tura l p roductiveness and com m erc ia l 
development.5
Thus, in 1885 the fate of Herat was the subject of 
immediate and grave concern. Many statesmen feared that the 
Russian drive which had incorporated Penjdeh on 30 March aimed 
at Herat as its real objective. The British Government had for 
several weeks before the incident at Penjdeh begun to consider 
the problem of Herat. As early as 29 January Sir E. Thornton. 
Ambassador in St. Petersburgh, told Granville, foreign secretary, 
privately that the military men were steadily gaining influence 
over the more moderate elements in the Russian Foreign Office,6 
and on 17 February Colonel T re n ch , the military attache, at St. 
Petersburg reported that the Russian military party talked of 
taking Herat.7 Kimberley commented:-
This is a very important Memorandum:-The suggestion that our escort should 
in the event of the negotiations breaking off take up its quarters in Herat 
appears to me to be a very good one. I will telegraph today privately to 
Dufferin to ask his opinion on it, and whether the Ameer might not, as 
Dufferin suggested to me as a possible measure, receive some money to put
g
Herat in a state of defence against a coup-de-main.
140
An exchange of views took place among members of the Cabinet. 
Later, when the viceroy Dufferin asked if it was intended to keep 
Herat out of Russian hands at any price, he was told at once that 
"An attack on Herat will mean war with Russia everywhere."9 
Kimberley amplified this declaration in a private letter two days 
la te r :-
Both my 'secret' and 'private' telegrams of the 25th about Herat were seen 
and approved by the Cabinet, and expressed our inner-most' mind on the 
subject. Our feeling is that it is now not a mere question about a few miles 
more or less of Afghan territory but of our whole relations with Russia in 
A sia .10
Simultaneously, Thornton carried out his instructions to inform M-l 
de G iers. Russian minister for foreign affairs, that any attempt by 
Russian troops to occupy Herat would be considered tantamount to 
a declaration of War.11
On 31 March 1885, Colonel Trench sent Thornton the 
following information, "that in the event of the outbreak of 
hostilities it is contemplated by the Russian military authorities 
here at once to seize Penjdeh and to advance with the utmost 
speed with all available forces to Herat, in order to gain 
possession of it, if possible, before the Anglo-Indian forces can 
reach that city." He said, "It seems to me that, considering how 
much nearer the Russian forces, even at Askabad, are to Herat than 
the Anglo-Indian forces will be when they commence their march 
from the Indian frontier, that this plan of the Russians will very 
probably be crowned with success."12
On 8 April, Colonel Trench contacted Thornton again 
respecting Herat. Trench said, "I had reason to believe that the 
Russian Government was well aware of the very defenceless state
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of Herat as regards efficient artillery for its defence. In view of 
their known intention, to which I referred in a former despatch, of 
endeavouring, in case of an outbreak of war, to seize Herat, I 
would again urge the great importance of at once endeavouring to 
remedy this defect by the despatch, even now, of some efficient 
artillery from our Indian frontier." He added, "Should measures be 
taken at once with this object, some efficient guns might reach 
Herat, even under Afghan escort, in the course of a month or six 
weeks from the date of their dispatch from Quetta, and there
might be a reasonable hope of their arriving in time to defend the
city against any attack by the Russians. The artillery with which
Herat is at present provided is of the most nondescript,
miscellaneous, and inefficient kind possible, and the available 
ammunition for these guns is of the same character."13
On the other hand, the Russian Government explained their 
position concerning the conflict with Afghan troops in Penjdeh on 
30 March. The "St Petersburgh Gazette," 29 March (10 April), 
observed the cause of the conflict on the Kushk River as follows:-
The Afghans were cautioned by the British Government, after the Agreement 
of the 5(17) March, that in the interests of the Ameer and of his high 
Protectress they ought to keep quiet, and the fault does not lie with the 
Russian Government if they received a severe lesson for not behaving 
accordingly. All that could be done on our part to preserve the peace was done 
by us, and even when the guns went off by accident our officers did their best 
to protect the lives of the British officers; if they failed in their endeavours 
it was because the Englishmen's horses were too fleet.
Whatever may be the consequences of this affair on the Kushk River we 
may wash our hands of it, but not so the British, whose warlike preparations 
and outcries were calculated to operate on the impressionable Asiatic friends
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of the British Government. Let us hope that the lesson received by the Afghans
will impress them with the necessity of more closely following the judicious
advice of their protectors with greater care, and that the matter on the Kushk
will serve to establish that peace which is essential for the prosecution of the
work of drawing a 'scientific frontier' between Russian Turkestan and British 
1 4Afghanistan.
According to a Memorandum of 22 April by Mr. M ich e ll. the 
British Consul in St. Petersburgh, on the opinions of the Russian 
Press, the "M oscow  G aze tte " tre a te d  the p re se n t 
misunderstanding between Russia and Britain in a lofty and 
defiant tone, being quite convinced that Britain could not attack 
Russia either by land or sea, in consequence of some alleged 
unfavourable political combinations which would preclude the 
possibility of her conducting any kind of hostilities. "Germany," 
the "Gazette" asserted, "is in favour of closing the entrance to the 
Baltic against the British fleet, while Turkey will carefully guard 
the Straits. With reference to the encounter on the banks of the 
Kushk, it states that the effect of the Russian victory has been to 
shake the faith of the Afghans in the power of Britain. Now that 
Russia may at any moment occupy Penjdeh, and that all the 
country as far as the gates of Herat remains unprotected, the 
occupation of the Delimitation Commission is gone. The British 
must accordingly recognize accomplished facts, as the Afghans, 
much against their will, have already done."
According to the "Novoe Vremya," the brilliant Russian 
victory in the country inhabited by the Saryks had been followed 
by results most favourable to Russia, and the rumour of it had 
spread throughout Central Asia and Mussulman India. The "Svet"
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newspaper in each issue strongly urged the necessity of the 
occupation of Herat by Russian troops, the delay of which would 
only occasion loss and complications, so far as Russia was 
concerned.
The "Russki Vedomosti," published in Moscow, was 
moderate in its tone, and advocated a peaceful solution of the 
dispute. In a recent letter from its St. Petersburgh correspondent 
the complete apathy of the Russian public on the whole question of 
the Russo-Afghan boundary was forcibly depicted. It also pointed 
out that the idea generally entertained at St. Petersburgh that 
peace would not be disturbed because Britain was incapable of 
waging war on the large scale was a most irrational one.15
With the above exception, Michell mentioned that the 
whole of the Russian press of St. Petersburgh and Moscow might 
be said to be very hostile to Britain and unanimous in the advocacy 
of an unyielding attitude on the part of the Russian Government as 
regards any demands of concession that Britain might urge. Their 
diatribes were based on a profound belief that Great Britain was 
incapable of opposing Russian schemes by armed force, even if she 
were really inclined to do so; and it seems to be a general 
conviction that Britain was endeavouring by intimidation to force 
Russia to surrender the fruits of her military successes on the 
borders of Afghanistan.16
In effect, the Afghan border crisis in the Anglo-Russian 
rivalry aroused expectation of a war between those nations, 
Britain and Russia, which would not be confined to Cetral Asia.
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2. THE NECESSITY OF TEMPORARY OCCUPATION.
2.1. POLITICAL VIEW.
IN the nineteenth century, Russia's ambitions included an ice- 
free port on the Pacific as the outpost from which to extend to 
southward regions.1 Some writers claimed that the Russians had 
desired such a port since the time of count Nikolai N ikolaevich 
M uraviev-Am urskii (1857), governor General of Eastern Siberia.2 
However, there were no indications that the Russian Government 
was dissatisfied with the port of Vladivostock before 1885, and 
the tremendous expenditures for its fortification and development 
in 1877-1879 indicated that it was to serve as the main port of 
Russia in the Far East.3 Therefore, before 1885 Russia had 
neither the resources nor the naval strength in the Far East which 
would require the acquisition of an ice-free port in Korea.
On the other hand, some nations sensitively reacted to the 
possibility of Russia acquiring of an ice-free port in Korea. In 
1876, Japanese diplomats warned Korea and China of "the Russian 
danger", the Japanese distrusting Russian activities on the Tumen 
River on the border between China, Russia and Korea which 
indicated an advance to the south, and fearful of the occupation of 
Tsushima in the impending Russo-Chinese War.4 In 1878, the 
Viceroy Li Hung-chang warned Korea that unless she did open up 
her ports to China "She would be isolated in case of a Russian 
Attack."5 In 1880 both Great Britain and the United States warned 
Korea that Russia might seize the northeastern part of her 
territory, including Port Lazareff, and the American Commodore, 
R. W. Shufeldt. who was then attempting to open Korea to 
American trade by treaty, warned of this threat.6 Finally, in
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1882 a book that became extremely popular and was widely read- 
"Korea, the Hermit Nation"-by William Elliot Griffs gave great 
impetus to the spreading of the impression of Russian aggressive 
intention and particularly of the theory of the ice-free port.7
On 30 March 1885, as already related local Russian 
authorities broke their pledge to refrain from further advances on 
the Afghan frontier until the jo in t Anglo-Russian commission 
should finish the delimination of the new northern border of 
Afghanistan, and precipitated an acute crisis in Anglo-Russian 
re la tio n .8 Roused to a high pitch of excitement, Great Britain 
prepared for war.9 Consequently, the British chose to follow a 
traditional strategic plan-to attack Russia with her fleet in the 
Black Sea and at some weak point like Vladivostock in Russia's 
far flung possessions. Therefore, the British Government needed 
the occupation of Korean islands at the southern extremity of the 
peninsula which enclosed a safe anchorage known as Port 
Hamilton; as a base for the blockade of the Russian forces in the 
Pacific and as an advanced station to support operations against 
V lad ivostock.10 On the other hand, to Russia Port Hamilton would 
also be an important depot and and naval port because it was free 
from ice at all seasons, and in this respect it was far superior to 
Vladivostock. It possessed every qualification for a naval port 
and could be easily defended.11
Under these circumstances, the matter of the ice-free port 
which involved Port Hamilton became a political aspect of 
Anglo-Russian rivalry; it was exceedingly probable that if the 
British Government did not occupy Port Hamilton the Russians 
would do so.12
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2.2. COMMERCIAL VIEW.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century Great Britain was 
interested in the trade of the Far East, and British trading 
interests here focused more particularly on what became known 
as the 'Open Door' and the territorial integrity of China. It was 
one reason in the 1880s why British statesmen were conscious of 
the growing importance of the Far East in international diplomacy: 
Lord S a lis b u ry . Foreign Secretary, mentioned the 'extreme 
importance' of China,- " The Power that can establish the best 
footing in China will have the best part of the trade of the 
w o r ld ."1 Sir Robert M orier.the ambassador to Russia (1884- 
1889), also expressed the opinion that, political complications 
being as they were, Peking, St. Petersburg and Constantinople 
were likely to be the three key posts in the future; China was 
"just getting within touch of planetary influence-we ought to 
secure C hina."2 It was also a reason at the time that British 
businessmen were conscious of the problems which Protection in 
old markets and industrial competition in old and new were 
creating for British trade; Sir Lowthian B e ll. President of the 
British Iron Trade Association, pointed to the differential duties 
and protective barriers which were being raised against British 
trade in Europe; the most promising fields for future British 
enterprise were likely to be in newer and more distant markets, 
the Indian possessions, Australia, and now, China.3 British 
commercial supremacy, G. N. Curzon in his book 'Problems of the 
Far East,' argued, must be preserved not merely for the sake of 
British Empire but to feed Britain's own people; it was only in the 
East, and especially in the Far East, that Great Britain may still
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hope to keep and create open markets for British manufacturers."4
Under the circumstances, it was natural that Port Hamilton 
would also be related to British commercial policy in the Far East. 
As a depot for British trade, Port Hamilton might, if it were made 
a 'free port' under the British flag, be of the greatest possible 
benefit to British trade in that part of the Far East; for example, 
if British manufacturers hoped to force the sale of British goods 
on Eastern nations, they would have to look to native agents to do 
it or they would find themselves beaten out of the field by the 
Germans and other foreigners who worked at lower rates than 
Great Britain did. In such a case, Port Hamilton might offer a 
depot for British goods, which, taken in connection with 
Singapore and Hong Kong would give them a control over Eastern 
markets with which other nations would find it d ifficu lt to 
com pete.5 Some people did mention the commercial value of Port 
Hamilton at this time: On 4 April 1885, Evan M acareaor. the
Secretary to the Admiralty, reported to G ranville that the 
commissioners of the Admiralty fully understood the importance 
of Port Hamilton in relation to Russian commercial interests in 
China or its neighbourhood.6 Mr. P lunke tt, the British Minister at 
Tokyo, urged Granville,- " Even though Korea and her neighbourhood 
have not yet appreciated the commercial value Port Hamilton 
might be , as a depot for goods, in future years when higher 
Tariffs come to be enforced in China and Japan, and the Russian 
ports become more populated."7
2.3. STRATEGIC VIEW.
On 5 February 1885, Sir Edward Hertslet , the Librarian of the 
Foreign Office reminisced on the strategic importance of Port
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Hamilton in his Memorandum as follows:-
ln July 1875 it was reported that the situation around the Korean 
peninsula had taken a bad turn: some difficulties between Korea and Japan, 
further steps for an attack on Korea by Russia and Japan and a survey of the 
West coast of Korea by Japanese and German vessels. In view of these 
important events, Sir H. Parkes. the British minister in Peking in early- 
1885 and Admiral Ryder suggested Port Hamilton which was strategically 
valuable in Far East should be occupied by a British forces. Port Hamilton 
which is formed by a group of three small islands off the south end of Korea 
is a spacious and well sheltered harbour, and its position is considered to be
the key to the Korean Straits.1
Lord D e rb y . Foreign Secretary (1874-1878), however, had 
suggested that the occupation of Port Hamilton should be avoided 
because it was not desirable to show to other nations the 
example of occupying places to which Great Britain had no title. 
Thereafter the subject was dropped.
After ten years, the strategic importance of the islands was 
reconsidered: On 4 April 1885, Macgregor reported to Granville 
that the Commissioners of the Admiralty fully understood the 
strategic importance of Port Hamilton to any maritime Power- 
such as Great Britain: First, it facilitated the presence of British
ships of war necessary in the area. Even though Hong Kong was the 
important base in the East strategically, it was d ifficu lt to 
control a Far Eastern area which is located upwards of 1,000 
miles, over which distance a strong monsoon is always blowing 
one way or the other.2 Secondly, the vicinity of Port Hamilton to 
the Russian possessions rendered it of more value to Great 
B rita in .3 Thirdly, its geographical formation made it suitable for 
occupation by a maritime Power; it was healthy, well
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supplied with water, and possessed every requisite for a naval 
station- the configuration of the islands forming Port Hamilton 
was such that fortifications on a small scale ought to suffice for 
its defence.4 Fourthly, situated as Port Hamilton was within 
about 100 miles from Tsushima and Pusan, 160 miles from 
Nagasaki, and under 300 from Shanghai, the provisioning of the 
islands ought not to be more difficult than was that of Malta in 
the Mediterranean, or that of Syra in the Aegean; even if the 
neighbouring large Island of Quelpart did not contribute to its 
su p p o rt.5 Fifthly, the argument that the money might be better 
employed at Hong Kong and Singapore, lost weight from the 
improbability that whatever might be saved, by not taking Port 
Hamilton, would be devoted to some other military purpose in 
these quarters.6 At that time, the Royal Commission on Defence 
of British Possessions was convinced that the stra teg ic 
importance of Port Hamilton would greatly strengthen the British 
position in the Chinese seas as against Russia, and materially add 
to the security of Hong Kong, or to act with effect against the 
Russian ports.7
In effect, from the above-mentioned views as to its 
political, commercial and strategic importance, it could be 
guessed what the British Government would do to Port Hamilton 
sooner or later.
3. DECISION AND EXECUTION.
On 11 April, the British Cabinet decided upon the temporary
occupation of Port Ham ilton.1 On the same day, G la d s to n e
reported to the Queen the decision that Granville should make such
arrangements with China and Japan as would render the occupation
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acceptable in case of need, i.e. war with Russia.2
On 15 April, Vice-Admiral Sir W illiam  D ow ell. British 
Naval commander in the Far East, reported to Macgregor that, by 
the command of the A dm ira lty ,3 the B ritish warships, 
'Agamemnon1, 'Pegasus', and 'Firebrand', had left immediately for 
Port Hamilton to occupy the habour, but were not to hoist the flag 
until further orders unless Russian men-of-war came in.4 After 
Granville had received Dowell's report, he sent a letter on 17 April 
to Plunkett to inform him of the British decision to occupy Port 
Hamilton . In the letter, Granville directed that even though he 
had been informed of the British decision to occupy Port 
Hamilton, he should keep this decision secret until the place had 
been occupied by the British Squadron.5 On that day, he also gave 
to Mr. O 'C o n o r.the charge d'affair to Peking since the death of 
Parkes in March, the same instruction as to the envoy in Japan.6 
On 23 April, Granville sent a letter again to O'Conor to give the 
same instruction as that relating to Japan and China when 
communicating the news to the Korean Government.7
On 26 April, simultaneously with an announcement to 
China, Korea, and Japan, Vice-Admiral Dowell occupied Port 
Hamilton with the British Squadron, but still were not to hoist the 
flag.8 On 28 April, Gladstone asked Granville and Lord Northbrook, 
the First Lord of the Admiralty :-
" Can we answer
'Port Hamilton has not been occupied, that is to say there is no annexation,
or British jurisdiction or flag. So the rest of the question falls to the
9ground.' May I say no?"
Granville replied:-
" Would it not be sufficient to say 'no'-(The Russian Government have not
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made any representation).
I will speak to Northbrook at the Cabinet, but I do not think that we can 
deny the occupation- 
( . . . . )
Northbrook agrees with me, that "no' is the best answer to the Port 
Hamilton question."10
On 11 May, the senior officer of the British ships at Port 
Hamilton, Captain M aclear. of the 'Flying Fish', reported to Dowell 
the circumstances under which he had hoisted the British flag on 
the islands forming the harbour, in token of the British having 
occupied Port Hamilton.
According to his report, on 10 May, evening, the Russian 
vessel 'Vladivostock' entered the port and the Russian Captain said 
she was from Yokohama en route to Vladivostock and was short 
of coal, that his boiler was leaky, that he wished to remain 24 
hours, and he asked to land and look about him. However, Captain 
Maclear suspected it was the same vessel that was harbouring 
about a week ago, and that it might be the Russian Captain's 
design to hoist the Russian flag. He had, therefore, hoisted the 
British Union Jack on the highest hill, and on each island, in sign 
of occupation. Additionally, he sent word to the Russian Captain, 
that he wished to see him on board before he landed. The Russian 
Captain had also hoisted next morning the flag of the Russian 
Transport or Volunteer Fleet.
Respecting this visit from the Captain of the 'Vladivostock', 
Maclear reported:-
When visiting me the Russian Captain alluded to the British flags, and spoke 
of this place as an British colony, asking how long the occupation would last-
152
would it be permanent? I could not inform him on that point. He repeated to 
me that his boilers were leaky, and stated that he is in want of water. I have 
offered every assistance, and will help him with his watering. He asked 
permission to land, which I granted, but I requested him not to go to 
Observation Island.
Captain Maclear added that the Japanese sloop 'Seiki' 
arrived on 10 May en route from Shanghai to Pusan, her boilers 
leaky; she would probably telegraph the news of the British 
occupation and their proceedings here from Pusan.11
In effect, with the hoisting of the British flag on 10 May, 
Port Hamilton had been formally occupied by the British Squadron.
4. JUSTIFICATION AND REACTION.
4.1. CHINA
In early April, neighbours interested in the Korean peninsula 
reacted sensitively to the news of the occupation of Port Hamilton 
by British forces. On 8 April, the Chinese Government sent a 
telegram to Marquis T se n g , their minister in London, to ask 
whether it was true or not. When Dr. H. Macartney, who was 
attached to the Chinese legation in London, called on, by direction 
of Tseng, the British Foreign Office, Granville told him that 
nothing was known at the Foreign Office of such a proceeding. At 
the same time Granville told him that if the occupation of Port 
Hamilton was undertaken by British forces, the matter could 
without difficulty be arranged diplomatically with China, which 
would prefer a British to a Russian occupation.1 Next day, 
Macartney mentioned that the Chinese minister was of the opinion 
that it would be agreeable to his government if the British
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Government planned to enter into an arrangement with China for 
the occupation of Port Hamilton. The reason was that the Chinese
Government was very distrustful of Russia and no doubt feared
that if Port Hamilton was not taken by the British it would fall 
into Russian hands. Subsequently, Macartney expressed his 
personal view that Great Britain could acquire Port Hamilton with 
a good title, and that, in seeking the consent of the Chinese 
Government, it would, in effect, be recognizing Chinese suzerainty 
over Korea.2
On 16 April, when Granville received the report respecting 
the steps taken for occupying Port Hamilton by Vice-Admiral
Dowell, he sent a letter to Tseng as follows:-
The British Government find it a necessity to occupy Port Hamilton
temporarily without prior agreement with China. However, this British
decision does not mean we wish to do anything that will be injurious to the
prestige of China, and we will prepare to come to such an agreement as will
3
not be harmful to Chinese interests in those parts.
On 27 April, Tseng replied to Granville that Port 
Hamilton's occupation could not be viewed without concern at 
Peking because Korea was not only conterminous with China, but 
was a vassal of the Chinese Empire. Therefore, before authorizing 
the occupation of Port Hamilton, Great Britain had to come to an 
understanding with the Chinese Government on the subject. There 
were reasonable conditions for an understanding that the 
occupation would only be of a temporary nature, would not be 
injurious to the prestige of China, and would not be hurtful to 
Chinese rights and interests in Port Hamilton. Therefore, Tseng
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suggested to Granville that he should inform the Chinese 
Government as to the kind of Agreement which the British
Government would propose in order to secure these objects.4
On 28 April, in accordance with Tseng's suggestion 
Granville sent Tseng a Draft Agreement between the British and 
Chinese Governments respecting the British occupation of Port 
Hamilton, which it would be prepared to sign with Tseng. In the 
Agreement, it was stated that Granville had met Tseng that day at 
the Foreign Office where an exchange of views took place with 
regard to the possible occupation of Port Hamilton by Great 
Britain. Tseng had stated that he was authorized by his
government to declare that his Emperor would offer no objection 
to such an occupation; and, Granville having taken due notice of 
this declaration, it was mutually agreed that from the day on 
which the British Government should deem it advisable to occupy 
Port Hamilton it should be acknowledged by the Chinese Emperor 
as lawfully occupied and administered by Great Britain.
It was further agreed that the British Government should
annually pay to the Korean Government the whole of the revenue 
that might have been received by them from Port Hamilton during 
the occupation, and pay to China any portion of that revenue which 
had hitherto been paid to China by Korea as tribute in regard to 
these islands. In addition, it was stated that the British 
occupation was not to prejudice either the rights or the privileges 
of the subjects of Korea inhabiting the islands. Tseng telegraphed 
his government the substance of that Agreement.5
In reply, the Yamen sent the following telegram, which 
Macartney was instructed by Tseng to communicate for Granville's
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in fo rm ation .
The Chinese Government would have been much gratified had circumstances 
permitted their meeting the views of the British Government in the matter of 
the proposed occupation, but in view of the Russian Minister at Peking having 
given Yamen to understand that should the Chinese Government consent to a 
British occupation of the islands forming Port Hamilton, the Russian 
Government would feel it necessary to occupy some other island or portion of 
the Kingdom of Korea. Also, in view of the possibility of Japan following in 
the same course, the Chinese Government regret that, in order to avoid these 
inconveniences, and the possible complications which might result from 
them, they cannot authorize their Minister to sign the Agreement proposed by 
the British Government, and instruct Ts6ng to express the hope that the
c
British Government will not find it necessary to occupy the islands.
After O'Conor heard on 2 May of the occupation of Port 
Hamilton by British naval forces, he informed the Chinese 
Government formally on 8 May that the British Government had 
decided to occupy temporarily the islands. On the same day, he 
learned from a conversation with the Prince and ministers of the 
Yamen that they did not themselves object to the occupation of 
Port Hamilton by the British forces, as they believed it would be a 
temporary one.7 However, they said that both the Russian and 
Japanese ministers had been very strongly urging the Chinese 
Government to protest, and had threatened, if the Chinese did not 
do so, to take the same liberty of action with regard to some other 
Korean island. In order, therefore, not to injure their position 
vis-a-vis other powers, or to lay themselves open to reproach 
from other quarters of having in any way sanctioned the 
occupation of Port Hamilton, they thought they were called upon to
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offer at least some form of objection to the British occupation.
The Prince mentioned especially that the Chinese 
Government could manage Japan, but Russia was more powerful, 
and it was necessary that their conduct towards the British 
should not injure their position as against Russia. He added that 
he would like to be able to regard the 'occupation' as consisting of 
making use of Port Hamilton as a temporary anchorage for British 
ships, and that if further questioned by the Representatives of 
other Powers he would explain the occupation in this way.8
4.2. JAPAN.
The Japanese Government also reacted sensitively to the news 
respecting the occupation of Port Hamilton by the British forces. 
On 9 April, In o u ve  K a o ru . the Japanese Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, told Plunkett that the Japanese Government had been very 
disturbed by the news respecting the occupation of Port Hamilton 
by Great Britain because it would encourage Russia to seize 
something in return, which would be dangerous for Japan. At that 
time , Plunkett replied that he had heard nothing from the Foreign 
Office of such a proceeding.1 On 20 April, Mr. Y o s h id a . vice- 
m inister of the Foreign Office under Inouye, asked Plunkett 
whether he had information respecting Port Hamilton. Yoshida 
said that he had been informed from a quite reliable Chinese 
source that Granville had confidentially told Tseng that for the 
purpose of defence against Russia it had become necessary for the 
British to temporarily occupy Port Hamilton.2 Count Ito Hirobumi. 
Prime Minister, told the Viceroy Li on 21 April that he had heard 
the news on the subject from Kawase Sanataka. the Japanese 
M inister in London.3 Therefore, even though the fact that the
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British Navy had begun to take steps for the occupation of Port 
Hamilton since 16 April, was not yet generally known by the 
public, it was already suspected by many.
On 23 April, Plunkett telegraphed Granville that the 
Japanese Government could not assume the attitude of an onlooker 
about the occupation of Port Hamilton, even though the Japanese 
had good relations with Great Britain. Moreover, the Japanese 
Government wished to know what arrangement had been made with 
Korea.4 On the same day, Granville had an interview with Kawase 
to justify the occupation of the island by the British forces. In 
the interview, Granville stated that the principal purpose of the 
British Government in giving discretionary orders to Dowell to 
occupy Port Hamilton was to prevent other nations anticipating 
Great Britain, especially Russia, and that the British Government 
had hoped Japan would have approved of this temporary precaution 
on their part. He further stated that in order to make an 
arrangement with Korea, he had instructed O'Conor to inform the 
Korean Government of the occupation of the islands.5
In the meeting with Inouye on 25 April, Plunkett 
mentioned unofficially the substance of the interview in London 
again. In the meeting Inouye had rather avoided the subject of 
Port Hamilton; he seemed concerned that Russia might otherwise 
misconstrue it into an implied approval of British proceedings;6 
Inouye expressed great anxiety as to the difficulties which a war 
between the British and Russia might create for Japan, and lost no 
opportunity of repeating his earnest hope that some peaceful 
solution might still be discovered. He also expressed concern that 
the Goto Islands, which lie about 50 miles distant from Nagasaki
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and contain an excellent harbour, but which were quite 
unprotected by any military forces, might fall a prey to Russia or 
some other ambitious power; he added that the Japanese 
Government had no further news of Russian designs on Korea, but 
believed that Russia was devoting herself to preparing 
Vladivostock and the Siberian coast against attack by Great 
B rita in .7
In effect, Inouye hinted that the Japanese Government would 
react strongly against the occupation of Port Hamilton by British 
forces.
4.3. KOREA.
When O,Conor received Granville's instruction to inform the Korean 
Government in a confidential note that the British Government had 
found it necessary to authorize a temporary occupation of Port 
Hamilton, he addressed the note to Kim, Yun-sik, the President of 
the Korean Foreign Office on 24 April;-
Her Britannic Majesty's Charg6 d'Affaires has the honour, in accordance with 
instructions which he has received from Her Majesty's Government, to state 
to his Excellency the President of the Korean Foreign Office, for the 
confidencial information of the Korean Government, that Her Majesty's 
Government have found it necessary in view of certain eventualities, to 
authorize the British Naval commanders to occupy temporarily Port 
Hamilton, a small island off the south coast of Korea.1
Meantime, O'Conor thought that the news of the 
occupation of Port Hamilton would have come to the knowledge of 
the Korean Government, who would possibly feel some annoyance
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that no intimation had been made to them on behalf of the British 
Government. Moreover, communication with Korea was very 
uncertain, and some three weeks would probably elapse before 
this communication reached its destination.
Therefore, he thought it desirable to send Mr. C a rle s , the 
British Acting Consul at Seoul, the telegraphic message, of which 
he inclosed a copy. In the telegram, O'Conor told Carles that he 
was not to mention it to the Korean Government until he heard the 
occupation had been carried out, and then only in case he deemed it 
necessary to allay irritation or prevent protest. O'Conor added that 
when the Korean Government seemed likely to make any complaint 
or lodge any formal objection to the occupation of the islands, 
Carles should be in a position to explain that the British 
Government had already addressed the Korean Government on the 
subject, and that the occupation was intended to be a temporary 
one.
On 6 May, Carles met Kim at the Korean Foreign Office to 
introduce Mr. Parker, the Acting Vice-Consul at Chemulpo. In the 
conversation with him, Kim inquired what was the ground of 
offence between Russia and Great Britain. Carles explained that 
Russia had encroached on Afghanistan, with whose Ruler Great 
Britain was on intimate turns, and that Great Britain had resented 
the invasion of the territory of her friendly neighbour. Kim asked 
again whether Great Britain had then come forward for 
Afganistan's protection, to which Carles assented.
In connection with above-mentioned conversations, Carles 
thought that by that time the Korean Government had not made any 
allusion to the presence of the British fleet in Port Hamilton, of 
which, however, it was aware. Carles also inferred that a member
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of the Korean Foreign Office would advocate and expect that in 
case the British flag was flown at Port Hamilton, the Korean 
Government would require the instant withdrawal of the British 
Consular staff from Korea.3
When the British Navy hoisted the British flag on the 
islands on 10 May, the Korean Government dispatched officers to 
Port Hamilton to see whether it was true or not. On 16 May, the 
Senior Officer of the British ships, Captain Maclear, of the "Flying 
Fish", received a visit from the Korean Officers, Om S i-vounq. 
Chief Secretary of the Council of State, and Von Mollendorff, 
Vice-president of the Korean Foreign Office, in order to ascertain 
the truth of reports that the British had taken possession of these 
islands; On arrival, they saw the British flag was hoisted and the 
place in British occupation, and they requested from Maclear an 
explanation. Maclear, therefore, informed them that, acting under 
orders from Dowell, he was in military occupation of the place. 
The Korean Officers then said they would proceed to Nagasaki to 
com m unicate w ith Dowell.(Appendix I) M ollendorff informed 
Maclear that the Korean Officers came in the Chinese cruisers, 
'Chao Yung' and 'Yung Wei' because they had no vessel of their own, 
and when the Chinese Admiral Ting Zu-ch'ang, placed his ships at 
their disposal they had felt bound to accept.4
The Korean Officers arrived at Nagasaki in a Chinese 
vessel on 18 May, and sent a letter to Dowell regarding the 
occupation of Port Hamilton.(Appendix II) In the letter, first they 
explained why they wanted to communicate with him in Nagasaki. 
Secondly, they requested that Dowell should inform Maclear by 
whose authority and on what grounds this military occupation of a
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portion of the territory of a friendly power had been undertaken by 
the naval forces of Great Britain under Dowell's command, and 
that Dowell should take such immediate steps as would make it 
apparent to all the Treaty Powers concerned that Port Hamilton 
was an integral portion of the Korean king's dominions.5 In his 
reply of 19 May, Dowell stated that Port Hamilton had been 
occupied temporarily by the squadron under his command, in 
accordance with instructions received by him from the British 
Government, but that he would refer home.6
On the same day, Carles, having received O'Conor's 
despatch of 24 April, wrote at once to Kim asking for an 
interview. Mr. S co tt. 2nd Class Assistant in China (1881-1886), at 
Carles' request, called upon Kim and delivered O'Conor's despatch 
to him in person. Kim received it without further remark than a 
question as to whether an arrangement of the difficulties between 
Great Britain and Russia had not been come to. 7
On 20 May, Kim sent a letter to Carles regarding O'Conor's 
despatch. He stated that the Korean Government had dispatched 
officers to the islands to ascertain that the British had taken 
possession of the islands. Before, however, the return of these 
officers, the Korean Government had received from Carles the 
despatch from the British Legation in Peking, so that he believed 
that the rumours about Port Hamilton were not unfounded. If it 
was true, Great Britain should withdraw her ships at once because 
the islands, being Korean, could not be taken possession of by 
foreign powers; otherwise the Korean Government would appeal to 
the Treaty Powers.8
On the next day, when Carles called at the Korean Foreign
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Office, Kim returned to the subject of Port Hamilton. Kim said 
that a messenger had arrived who reported that seven vessels of 
war were lying there, that the British flag was flying on the hill 
and on the beach, and that it seemed that buildings were being 
erected on the islands. At the same time, he asked whether such a 
proceeding was not a violation of international law, and whether 
the British occupation of Port Hamilton was not sure to involve 
Korea in trouble with other powers. Carles then replied that the 
occupation of Port Hamilton was only temporary, and suggested 
that Korea should wait until she heard that objection was taken to 
the British occupation by any other power. Kim said that no 
objection had been raised, but that if the British took one island, 
other countries would follow her example on other parts of the 
coast.
Carles pointed out to Kim the importance of Port Hamilton 
to Great Britain at this juncture, Korea's powerlessness to protect 
it against seizure by other Powers, and the probability of Russia 
occupying it the moment Great Britain left. Kim granted all these 
statements, urging, however, that if Russia or any other Power 
were to occupy Port Hamilton, Korea would appeal to Treaty 
Powers against such a proceeding. Consequently, Kim hoped that 
Great Britain would withdraw her fleet from Port Hamilton at 
once; if not, Korea would appeal to the Treaty Powers.9
In effect, the Korean Government stressing that Port 
Hamilton was an integral portion of the Korean king's dominions, 
reacted more strongly than any neighbours interested in the 
islands.
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4.4. RUSSIA.
The British Government considered whether the occupation of 
Port Hamilton had previously been discussed with the Russian 
Government. According to a Memorandum by Hertslet of 14 May, in 
1861 the British Government had objected to the Russians 
occupying Tsushima Island lying to the northeast of Port 
Hamilton, and had offered to sign a Treaty with Russia and other 
Powers which had engagements with Japan to make no 
acquisitions in the Chinese seas. At that time, however, the 
Russian Government insisted there was no necessity for a Treaty 
because they had no designs for territorial acquisitions in Japan, 
or on Tsushima. To judge from Hertslet's Memorandum, agreement 
on the occupation of Port Hamilton could only with difficulty be 
arranged with Russia diplomatically.1 Consequently, the British 
G overnm ent reacted sensitive ly to whatever the Russian 
Government did.
The Russian Government did not react directly to Great 
Britain's occupation of Port Hamilton because they were in the 
midst of negotiations with Great Britain respecting the Afghan 
problem . However, they reacted ind irectly  through the ir 
neighbours. On 8 May, the Prince and ministers of Yamen said that 
the Russian-Minister in Peking had been very strongly urging them 
to protest, and had threatened, if the Chinese Government did not 
do so, to take the same liberty of action with regard to some other 
Korean islands.2
Later on the afternoon of 20 May, the Russian iron-clad 
'Vladimir Monomach* had suddenly left Yokohama, and Plunkett also 
received from the British Consul at Kobe, J. Enslie. a telegram,
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stating that the two Russian cruisers 'Opritchnik' and 'Razboinik', 
had suddenly departed. Plunkett at once sent to Dowell the 
following Telegram:-
Russian flag-ship has suddenly left Yokohama destination unknown. The two
Russian ships at Kobe have also started this afternoon; I suspect they may
3
possibly intend to visit Port Hamilton
Early in the morning of 21 May, Plunkett received from 
Dowell a telegram, asking whether he had any special reason for 
believing that the Russians had gone to Port Hamilton. To this 
Plunkett had just sent the following telegraphic reply:-
Russia is putting up China and Korea to protest against our occupation. 
Russian Admiral is, I believe, disgusted with his mistake here, and will 
certainly try to play us some trick. The sly way in which his flag-ship and 
the two Kobe ships started at the same time, while the two he had with him 
are left here, confirms my previous suspicion that he will visit Port 
Hamilton. If not admitted there, he might either make formal protest, or, 
perhaps, in view of reckless nature of Russian Commanders might try to 
force an entrance, on the ground that he has as much right there as Great
4Britain has, Korea being a neutral and independent State.
Plunkett added that , since he telegraphed last night, it had been 
given out that the destination of the flag-ship was 'Vladivostock'.
On 23 May, Plunkett told Dowell that his argument 
respecting the Russian vessel's surreptitious v is it to Port 
Hamilton had so far been disproved because the two Russian men- 
of-war, from Kobe had arrived at Yokohama. Plunkett, however, 
still suspected the Russian ships' movements at least for the time 
being; Japanese local papers reported that three other Russian
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ships had for some time been in hiding in one of the little-visited 
anchorages of Japan. Plunkett also told Dowell, that "the last 
telegraphic accounts received here would seem to show that the 
danger of collision between Great Britain and Russia in the Afghan 
problems is averted."5
Even though the Russian Government had not yet reacted 
directly to Great Britain over the occupation of Port Hamilton by 
British forces, the British Government realized the need to keep 
watch on the possibility of direct Russian action.
5. THE FIRST STAGE OF NEGOTIATION
5.1. A BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR CHINESE MEDIATION.
Even though the British Government was ready to come to an 
arrangem ent w ith the Korean Governm ent respecting the 
temporary occupation of Port Hamilton, any proposal of this kind 
made directly to Korea, would be likely to meet with considerable 
d i f f ic u lty .1
Under the circumstances, O'Conor suggested to Granville 
that it might be desirable to endeavour to arrange the question of 
Port Hamilton through the Chinese Government because the 
Chinese Government were not at all opposed to the British 
occupation, which they believed would be temporary. O'Conor 
added that the Chinese Government promised to use their influence 
with the Korean Government in the matter, and he had no doubt 
that they would be flattered by the British reference to them, and 
likely to take the British side by a wish to restore their prestige 
with regard to Korea.2
O'Conor explaned to Granville in other words that the
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Chinese term "shu pang"; could be best translated as "dependent 
state" or "subordinate state": It was extremely difficult to fit the
traditional relations between China, during the Ch'ing Dynasty, and 
the small states surrounding her -Korea, Liuchiu, Burma. 
Indochina, etc.- into a pattern conforming to contemporary 
international law. Although many commentators during the 1880's 
or 1890's regarded these states either as vassals to the Ch'ing 
Dynasty or as completely independent, it seemed that neither of 
these two extremes quite described the actual s ituation. 
According to the legal works most widely quoted at the time, the 
relations between a suzerain and a vassal or a protectorate 
required certain obligations on the part of the suzerain power. 
These feudal duties included, inter alia, the management of the 
foreign and military affairs of the vassal state by the suzerain 
nation. Korea's regular payment of tributes to and acceptance of 
investiture from China did not suggest that she was completely 
independent.3
In the light of this, the British Government proposed to the 
Chinese Government a mediation between the British and the 
Korean Government.
5.2. RENT-AN-ISLAND.
Granville suggested to the Chinese Government the renting of Port 
Hamilton through the Draft Agreement of 28 April;-
The British Government should annually pay to the Korean Government the 
whole of the revenue that may have been received by them from Port 
Hamilton during the occupation, and pay to China any portion of that revenue
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which had hitherto been paid to China by Korea as tribute in regard to these 
islands.1
The Draft Agreement was, however, rejected by the Chinese 
Government at that time.
In early May, O'Conor mentioned the subject again: "the 
Korean Government may protest the occupation of Port Hamilton. 
It might avoid difficulty to propose to rent island from the Korean 
G overnm ent."2 O'Conor's idea was suggested by Carles' despatch 
regarding the pecuniary difficulties of Korea. According to his 
despatch, first, the extreme poverty of Korea was revealed in its 
inability to meet a debt to a British firm of 8,000 taels odd, on 
account of its being hampered by the Japanese and the Chinese 
indemnity. Secondly, the Korean king declared that he was unable 
to find funds for half the expense of constructing an overland 
telegraph line from Port Arthur to Seoul. Thirdly, the President of 
the Foreign Office said that the Korean Government could not pay 
the salaries of more than one or two foreign officers to drill 
Korean troops, though the effectiveness of the army was a 
question of pressing necessity.3
On 28 May, Mr. Aston. Consul-General at Seoul, suggested 
once again to Granville the rental scheme through some pecuniary 
arrangement with the Korean Government because money was so 
badly needed in Korea at the time. Moreover it was important to 
settle this quickly, as a new Russian Consul-General in Korea was 
expected shortly. So far, the Korean Government denied having 
made any arrangement with Russia.4
On 29 May, Granville telegraphed O'Conor as follows:-
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The British Government are prepared to pay to Korea a sum not exceeding
5,000 L. a-year as rent for Port Hamilton while it is occupied as a coaling-
station by this country. You are authorized to come to an arrangement with
the Korean Government on this subject, latitude being left to you to make the
arrangement within the limit of the above-mentioned sum, and you should, if
5
possible, make the offer to Korea through the Chinese Government.
Subsequently, Granville instructed O'Conor that he should 
act on his telegram of 29 May.6
6. THE NECESSITY FOR PROMPT INFORMATION;
THE FIRST STAGE OF LANDING A CABLE.
To secure more prompt information between London and Port 
Hamilton, on 27 April Granville requested O'Conor to ask the 
Chinese Government's permission for the Telegraph Construction 
Company to land a cable, establish a cable house, at North Saddle 
Island, at the entrance of the Yangtze River, and lay the cable 
between that point and Port Hamilton for the use of the British 
Government.1
In connection with Granville's telegram of 27 April, 
O'Conor raised the subject of landing a cable with the Prince and 
Ministers of the Yamen. They replied that the general direction of 
telegraph administration was under the superintendence of the 
Grand Secretary, Li Hung-Chang, to whom the proposal would be 
referred. They were unable, therefore, at the moment to give any 
promise, but if the proposed arrangement was not contrary to 
existing rules and regulations every endeavour would be made to 
comply with the request. They said that in any case an answer
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would be sent with as little delay as possible. Judging from their 
manner, O'Conor thought that the request did not find much favour 
with them, opposed as they invariably were to any scheme 
involving a concession of this kind.2
O'Conor told Granville that in requesting the Chinese
Government to allow a cable to be landed at North Saddle Island,
he thought it better to refrain from mentioning that it was 
intended to lay the cable between that point and Port Hamilton. 
The reason was that the Chinese Government would most likely
refuse permission on the grounds that by consenting they would
possibly implicate themselves with Russia. However, O 'Conor 
added that if the more limited request met with compliance, the 
Chinese Government would feel clear from any responsibility as 
regards Russia and would be less likely to offer any objection 
later on to laying the cable in the desired direction.3
On 9 May, O'Conor spoke to the Prince and Ministers of the 
Yamen again on the subject of landing a cable end on North Saddle 
Island, and inquired whether an answer had yet been received from 
the Viceroy. They replied that an answer had just been received 
from the Viceroy, and the Yamen had decided to comply as far as 
possible with the wishes of the British Government. They 
emphasized, however, the strong objections to the cable being 
landed for more than a temporary and special purpose. O'conor 
pointed out to Yamen that the cable would be of advantage to the 
Chinese Government, and that even commercially it would not be 
without benefit to China, but, they denied that it would be of use 
to China in any way. Therefore, O'Conor could only suggest that if 
the cable was laid temporarily it might be possible to persuade 
them to allow it to remain for a more extended period.4
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Consequently, O'Conor suggested to Granville that the Chinese 
Government would probably consent if he could assure them that 
cable would be landed temporarily and removed afterwards.5
On 11 May, Granville replied respecting O'Conor’s 
suggestion, "You may give assurance if absolutely necessary, but 
endeavour to avoid pledging us more than you can help as to its 
being temporary or removable." He also pointed out that such 
conditions were unusual, and that the cable would be of great 
advantage to China, in affording her a means of communication 
with Korea: and that all the facilities would be given to the 
Chinese Government which were usually accorded to countries 
granting landing privileges.6
O’Conor called on the Prince and Ministers of the Yamen on 
14 May, and spoke to them again about the matter. They replied 
that the cable might be landed temporarily at North Saddle Island 
to connect directly with Port Hamilton, on the understanding that 
it would be removed when its necessity ceased to exist. When 
this happened, they would give permission to establish the cable- 
end permanently at Woosung, and allow it to be moved again to 
North Saddle Island should circumstances necessitate it.
O'Conor was not inclined to attach very much importance 
to the refusal, at the moment, of a permanent cable, which he 
thought was likely to follow the temporary landing of the cable- 
end; if the cable should prove to be useful to the Chinese 
Government as a means of communication with Korea, it would 
strong ly favour the British request for its perm anent 
establishment on North Saddle Island. Moreover, although China 
still disliked the occupation of Port Hamilton, the idea of its
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being taken possession of, as she feared might happen, by Russia 
meant that Great Britain might be able to obtain her consent both 
to the British occupation and to the natural result of a cable at 
North Saddle. On the other hand, owing to the anxiety of the 
Prince and Ministers as to the interpretation likely to be put on 
the ir action by the Russian Government, it was understood 
between them and O'Conor that his note asking permission to land 
the cable at the North Saddle Island be worded in the following 
sense:-
That, in view of the comparatively large maritime traffic which now exists 
between Hong Kong and different places in the China Seas, the British 
Government propose to lay a cable-end at North Saddle Island, and that as soon 
as the British maritime traffic is reduced the cable laid temporarily will be 
removed. I am, accordingly, requested to obtain the permission of the 
Chinese Government, & c.7
The Prince and Ministers assured O'Conor that as soon as they 
received this note, orders would at once be given to allow the 
cable-end to be landed at North Saddle Island. O'Conor pointed out 
to them that the fact of the British Government having a cable 
house at Port Hamilton would be the best protection against the 
future annexation of Port Hamilton by any other country. They 
conceded that the protection which a cable would afford against 
the annexation of Port Hamilton by another power and the 
advantage of being in direct communication with Korea were 
important considerations.8
On 16 May, Granville requested O'Conor to inform the 
Chinese Government that the British Government especially
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wanted the connection of Port Hamilton with North Saddle Island 
by cable "in view of increased maritime traffic in Chinese Seas."
He accepted that the cable would be landed as a temporary 
measure, but its removal would be a matter for consideration at a 
future time because of the heavy expense entailed in laying down 
the cable.9 O'Conor questioned the wisdom of raising the latter 
p o in t:-
As the Chinese Government have consented to cable being landed temporarily, 
to press matter further at present will certainly risk withdrawal from 
previous understanding. Direct communication between Saddle Island and 
Korea will make them less likely to insist on removal, at any rate, the danger 
is remote.10
In this way, the British Government successfully executed 
the first stage for landing a cable end on North Saddle Island.
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Appendices to Chapter IV
Appendix I .
Memorandum of a Conversation on board the English Gun-boat
'Flying Fish', between the Captain and Messrs, Von Mollendorff and 
1
Om.
(Translation.)
M. VON MOLLENDORFF -Having heard that English
vessels of war at this island, and flying the English flag, a wish 
had been felt to send officers here to make inquiries, and as it 
happened that Chinese gun-boats had come to Masoupho on a 
cruise, the Chinese Admiral Ting placed them at our disposal, on 
our Sovereign consulting him on the matter. We have just seen
that it is true that the English flag is being flown, but we are not
acquainted of the reason.
Captain Maclear-The flag is being flown by the Admiral's
instructions, in consequence of Her Majesty's Government having 
learnt that Russia desired to take this island. As the relations 
Russia and England are strained, we have anticipated Russia's 
move by temporarily guarding the island as a measure of defence.
M. von Mollendorff.-Korea has a Treaty and is on friendly
relations with England, and also has a Treaty and is on friendly 
relations with Russia. The action of English vessels in flying a 
Sovereign's flag on Korean soil cannot be justified. It is our duty 
on our return to the capital it will be our duty to communicate it
1 Memorandum of a Conversation on the 16th May, on board the English Gun­
boat "Flying Fish," between the Captain and Messrs, Von Mollendorff and 
Om, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 3 in No. 126.
183
to the foreign Representatives.
Captain Maclear-I am fully aware of the difficulties in which 
Korea is placed by this act, and I shall not fail to inform my 
government at once, but my government's intentions are not 
clearly expressed; I am acting, Sir, in accordance with my 
Admiral's instructions in lying here, and it is in your power, Sir, 
to discuss the matter with my Admiral at Nagasaki, the visit of a 
Russian vessel of war to this place on the 11th instant gave rise 
to considerable suspicion in England.
M. von Mollendorff.-England, in flying her flag on Korean soil, 
has undoubtedly acted improperly. We have received instructions 
to come here and inquire into the matter, and it is our duty to 
return and report to our Sovereign. It is at the same time, Sir, 
your duty to consult with your Admiral on this important matter, 
and report it speedily to your government in order that they may 
take prompt action.
Captain Maclear-A telegram arrived on the 11th instant 
reporting that Her Majesty's government had come to an 
arrangement with the Russian Ambassador in London regarding 
the Afghan question, and on my next visit I shall doubtless bring 
news that war has been averted.
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Appendix II.
Memorandum of Discussion with the British Admiral at 
Nagasaki2
(Translation.)
M. VON MOLLENDORFF & C /Y esterday, on our
arrival at Port Hamilton, we found that eight British ships- 
consisting of men-of-war and merchant-vessels-had been at 
anchor there for some considerable time, and that the British flag 
had been flying on the top of the hill. What is the meaning?
Admiral Dowell.- The present m ilitary occupation of the 
island is by instructions of my government. According to what I 
understand it is only a temporary measure.
M. von Mollendorff, & c.-Seeing tha t your E xce llency 
understands that the order of your government to anchor men-of- 
war at Port Hamilton is only a temporary measure, why this 
hoisting of the British colours on the hill?
Admiral Dowell.-Unless the flag was hoisted, outsiders 
seeing [us here] would certainly fancy that we and you, &c., had 
come to some definite arrangement, [thereby] involving your 
government in many difficulties.
M. von Mollendorff, & c.-What answer are we to give, and how 
are we to act if inquires are put to us by any other Power 
regarding the hoisting of the British flag? Will your Excellency 
clearly answer this, so that we may be able to return to Korea and 
report?
2. Memorandum of Discussion with the British Admiral at Nagasaki, May 18,
1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 4 in No.126.
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Admiral Dowell.-I have telegraphed to my government, and on 
receipt of their telegram in reply I will at once send It to your 
Excellencies.
M. von Mollendorff, & c.-Our best course will be to await the 
telegraphic reply of your government, when we can return and 
report.
Admiral Dowell.-This telegram having been dispatched to my 
government, they will require to consider the matter carefully 
before they can telegraph their reply. I fear, therefore, that I 
cannot state when this reply will arrive.
M. von Mollendorff, & c.-Your Excellency states that you 
cannot tell when this telegraphic reply will arrive; we have come 
specially instructed as regards this affair, and it will not do for 
us to return if the matter is left in this unsatisfactory state. We 
accordingly propose to address a letter to your Excellency, to 
which we request your consideration, and that you will, in reply, 
favour us with a clear statement of your view, so that we may 
take it back and report [to our government].
Admiral Dowell.-I shall await the arrival of your letter, when 
it will be my duty to give an immediate and explicit reply.
At 6:30 P.M. of the 18th May, having anchored at Nagasaki, 
called on the British Admiral; the following day a letter was sent 
on board the British man-of-war, copy of which is appended:-
Sir,
Our Sovereign heard that the eastern division of the British 
squadron on the Asiatic Station had, as it happened, come to Port 
Hamilton, belonging to our country. His Majesty had also heard 
that your Excellency had occupied the island. Knowing that
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Admiral Ting, with two Chinese gun-boats, had arrived on a cruize 
at Masoupho, our Sovereign accordingly asked Admiral Ting to 
take with him the officers specially appointed by our government 
to visit the island and see what had occurred. On reaching the 
island we saw six British vessels of war and two merchant-ships 
at anchor in the port, and the British flag flying on the top of a 
high hill on the island. We accordingly made inquires on board Her 
Majesty's ship 'Flying Fish' as to the reason of this, when the 
Captain stated that it was done in compliance with your orders. 
He added that your Excellency was at present at Nagasaki. We 
consulted with Admiral Ting as to whether he could proceed here, 
and thus we have been able to meet your Excellency. The various 
points on which we have spoken are those prescribed by His 
Majesty's instructions. It is our duty to ask your Excellency to 
state clearly by what instructions, and for what cause, you have 
occupied the territory of a friendly Power, seeing that relations 
of friendship exist between the two countries. We respectfully 
beg Your Excellency to take immediate action, that all Treaty 
Powers may know that the island is Korean territory. We have to 
ask that you will give this despatch your careful consideration, 
and favour us with a reply.
Compliments
(Signed) OM, an Officer of the 3rd Rank in the Grand Council 
Mollendorff, A Vice-President of the Foreign Office.
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CHAPTER V: THE SECOND PHASE OF THE PORT HAMILTON AFFAIR, 
SALISBURY'S TERM OF OFFICE; JUNE, 1885-FEBRUARY.1886
1, THE SETTLEMENT OF THE AFGHAN BORDER CRISIS.
THE British Government, in spite of its fiery pronouncements 
and m ilitary measures, hoped to surmount the crisis without 
going to war; in other words, the British were anxious to avoid 
hostilities, and they struggled for a compromise settlement. To 
go to war "for Panjdeh or for any other Russo-Afghan contention 
short of Herat itself" would have been, as T.H. Holdich in his 
book, The Gates o f India, being an Historical Narrative, rightly 
points out, an "extremity of foolishness". British hands at the 
time were too full and she could not afford a full-scale war with 
a European Power. Moreover, such a war might well have 
precipitated a European crisis.1
On 4 May 1885, Gladstone reached an agreement with 
Russia to submit the Panjdeh issue to arbitration, and on 8 May, 
he transmitted to S taa l. the Russian Ambassador, a proposal for 
the Afghan frontier which had been previously agreed upon with 
him. A draft of the proposal for the Afghan Frontier was:-
The line will start from a point on the Heri-Rud a little to the north of 
Zulficar, fixed so as to leave the pass of Zulficar to the Afghans. There it will 
pass between Akrobat and Souma-Karaz, and will run to Islim, where it will 
pass to the right bank of the Egri-Geuk, leaving Islim outside the Afghan 
territory. Thence it will follow the crests of the hills bordering the right 
bank of the Egri-Geuk, and leaving Chemine Beed outside the Afghan frontier, 
it will follow in the same manner the crests of the hills bordering the right 
bank of the Kushk as far as Hanzi Khan. Thence the frontier will follow
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almost a straight line to a point on the Murghab a little above the Bund Nadir, 
which will remain to Russia.2
Staal said that he hoped the Russian Government would 
accept it, but that there was a certain margin as to which he was 
not sure. In reply to an inquiry from Granville, he said that his 
government agreed to the principle of a Convention on the 
subject, but that, in their opinion, it should not be signed until 
the frontier was completely settled. He proposed that the 
agreement should be recorded in a Protocol.3
On 12 May, M. Lessar. Russian charge in London, stated that 
the Russian Government had raised some points on the draft 
Agreement which Staal had transmitted to St. Petersburgh. With 
the British Government's agreement, they would be prepared to 
agree to the following modifications in the project drawn up with 
Lessar:-
1. As regards Zulfikar, "the frontier will start from the 
Heri-Rud a little to the north of the point marked "Zulfikar Pass", 
and will follow the crests of the heights bordering on the north 
the pass which runs from the Heri-Rud eastwards,so as to leave 
to Afghanistan the command of both ends of the pass in question."
2. With regard to the point at which the frontier was to 
cross the Murghab, the British Government were ready to agree 
that it should be defined as a point north of Maruchak, fixed so as 
to leave to Russia the lands cultivated by the Saryks and their 
pastures.4
On 25 June, Giers expressed to Salisbury,the consevative 
successor to Granville in the change of government on 24 June 
1885, his hope that, "Your Lordship will agree to continue the 
negotiation on the Afghan boundary question from the point at
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which it is left by the late Cabinet, and that the Emperor 
sincerely wishes that it may be brought to an amicable 
conclusion."5
On 21 July, Salisbury wrote to his ambassador in St. 
Petersburg:-
. . . the Russian negotiation seems as if it had arrived at an impasse. I don't 
think that at present they mean war-but I fear they have pledged themselves 
too strongly not to grant the whole pass, and that they cannot retract. Of
g
course we cannot retract, for we are bound to the Ameer.
A fortnight later, he continued:
I do not apprehend any change in Afghanistan so long as the heat continues, but 
I do not feel at all secure against an incident facheux as soon as October 
begins. However the defences of Herat are going forward, and barring 
treachery I do not believe that they will be open to a Coup de main.7
Thornton who agreed with Salisbury's opinion, did not think that 
the Russians intended to go to war in the immediate future, nor 
over the Afghan boundary.
On 10 September,! indeed, the Russians did sign a 
preliminary protocol which defined in general terms over three 
hundred miles of boundary from Zulfikar on the Heri-Rud to 
Khwaja Salar on the Oxus.8
With this, the Afghan border crisis in Anglo-Russian 
rivalry was settled, and it meant that Britain should reconsider 
the necessity of retaining possession of Port Hamilton because 
the Port Hamilton occupation was due to the Anglo-Russian
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struggle over the Afghan crisis.
2. RECONSIDERATION OF THE COMMERCIAL VIEW.
The commercial value of Port Hamilton had already been assessed 
by some people in April 1885, but it was not considered specially 
by the British Government. In early July, at the British
Government's request, the Board of Trade had examined the value 
of Port Hamilton to the trade of Britain. During the examination, it 
was considered whether, supposing British trade carried on in the 
neighbourhood of Port Hamilton to be or likely to become in future 
an important branch of British commerce, the annexation and 
occupation of that port would afford commercial advantages.
First consideration was given to trade carried on between 
the United Kingdom or its dependencies with the countries in the 
Northern Pacific, or trade carried on by British vessels in that 
part of the world. In the mid-1880s, even though the British 
Government which backed an 'Open Door' policy and the territorial 
integrity of China, actively promoted trade with her, Sino-British 
trade was not yet enough to be measured by the available official 
figures as to imports and exports.1 Moreover, the whole trade of 
the Russian ports on the Pacific was ins ign ifican t, so 
insignificant that it found no place in the Russian official volumes 
of statistics relating to imports and exports, shipping, and 
customs revenue, which the Board of Trade received regularly 
from the Russian statistical authorities. In addition, the trade of 
Korea at the time was as yet entirely undeveloped, and gave no 
material employment to British shipping. Consequently, only the 
trade of the United Kingdom with Japan, which opened the door to
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western countries in the mid-1850s, and the employment of 
British shipping in the trade of that country could be considered in 
the examination. Referring to Plunkett's report of 22 July 1884, 
the Board of Trade reported as follows:-
From Table 1 below it appeared that the whole imports 
of Japan, according to the Japanese official Returns, were about
6,000,000 L. per annum, and one-half of this was British trade. 
The exports of Japan again were about 7,235,000 L. annually, only 
one-seventh of this amount being exported to Great Britain, and 
Colonies. The annual tonnage of shipping entered at Japanese ports 
amounted to about 1,400,000 tons, of which 981,000 tons 
appeared to be British, the tonnage employed being of course less, 
as the same vessels were entered more than once. (Table 2) In 
effect, very little of the shipping trade appeared to be directly 
with Great Britain (except her colonies).
R e t u r n  s h o w in g  t h e  V a lu e  o f  t h e  I m p o r t  a n d  E x p o r t  T r a d e  o f  J a p a n  
d u r in g  1 8 8 3 .  (Table 1)
C o u n tries T o ta l T ra d e  
Im p o rts E x p o rts
£ £
G re a t  B r ita in  an d  C o lo n ie s 3 ,1 8 4 ,4 5 7 1 ,1 8 3 ,0 6 0
U n ite d  S tates 6 6 3 ,9 8 2 2 ,7 5 9 ,9 6 6
F ra n c e 3 8 8 ,6 7 9 2 ,0 2 3 ,5 8 7
G e rm a n y 2 9 5 ,1 0 6 .
C h in a 1 ,1 3 0 ,3 0 0 1 ,1 4 2 ,2 7 8
O th e r  co u ntries 1 6 4 , 3 3 6 1 2 6 , 6 4 8
T o ta l 5 .8 2 6 .8 6 0 7 .2 3 5 .5 3 7
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R e t u r n  o f  F o r e ig n  S h ip p in g  e n t e r e d  a t  th e  v a r io u s  o p e n  P o r t s  o f  J a p a n  
d u r in g  1883.(Table 2)
C o u n try  (1 N a t io n a lity ) I T o n n a g e
G re a t B r ita in  
U n ite d  States  
F ra n c e  
G e rm a n y  
A l l  o th e r countries
T o ta l
9 8 1 ,2 0 0  
2 0 0 , 7 2 9  
3 8 ,9 8 0  
1 1 1 ,7 2 3  
7 6 ,7 4 6  
1 .4 0 9 .3 7 8
N o te -  N O  R e tu rn s  w e re  g iv e n  s h o w in g  th e  to n n a g e  o f  V e s s e ls  c le a re d  f r o m  Japan  
d u rin g  th e  y e a r  1 8 8 3 .
From the trade Returns of the United Kingdom, as will be seen 
by reference to Table 3 below it appeared that the imports from 
Japan into the United Kingdom in 1883 were 633,000 L., and the 
exports were 2,602,000 L., figures which corresponded fairly well 
with those above derived from Japanese Returns. The entries and 
clearances of British shipping in this trade in 1883 were: entries, 
13,600 tons; clearance, 15,300 tons. (Table 4) The Trade was 
undoubtedly of some importance, though it was not one of the 
great branches of British foreign trade.
S ta t e m e n t  s h o w in g  th e  v a lu e  o f  t h e  I m p o r t s  in t o  a n d  E x p o r t s  f r o m  th e  
U n i t e d  K in g d o m  f r o m  a n d  to  J a p a n  d u r in g  th e  y e a r  1 8 8 3  (Table 3)
(U n ite d  K in g d o m  O f f ic ia l  R e tu rn s !
T o ta l v a lu e  o f  im p o rts  f ro m  Japan
V a lu e  o f  exp o rts  o f  B r it is h  and  Ir is h  p ro d u ce  to  Japan
D it to  o f  fo re ig n  an d  c o lo n ia l p ro d u ce
T o ta l v a lu e  o f  expo rts  to  Japan
£
6 6 3 ,0 9 2
2 ,2 7 6 ,5 7 3
3 2 4 ,6 9 9
2 .6 0 1 .2 7 2
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S ta t e m e n t  s h o w in g  th e  T o n n a g e  o f  S h ip p in g  E n t e r e d  a n d  C le a r e d  a t  P o r ts  
in  th e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  f r o m  a n d  to  J a p a n  d u r in g  1 8 8 3 . (Table 4)
T o n s
T o n n a g e  o f  vessels en tered  f ro m  Japan w ith  cargos an d  in  b a llas t 1 3 ,6 0 4
T o n n a g e  o f  vessels c lea red  to  Japan w ith  cargos an d  in  b a llas t 1 5 ,3 2 3
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ T o ta l  2 8 .9 2 7
No other British dependency except Hong Kong appeared to 
do trade of any importance with Japan. With regard to Hong Kong, 
no o ffic ia l figu res  as to im ports and exports  were 
a v a ila b le .(Table 5) The entries of shipping from Japan were 
185,000 tons annually, and the clearances to Japan 236,000 tons. 
(Table 6)
T o t a l  v a lu e  o f  I m p o r t s  in t o  a n d  E x p o r t s  f r o m  t h e  u n d e r m e n t io n e d  
C o u n t r ie s  f r o m  a n d  to  J a p a n  in  1 8 8 3  (Table 5)
(A c c o rd in g  to  th e  O f f ic ia l  R e tu rn s  o f  each  c o u n try )
Im p o r ts  f r o m  Japan E x p o rts  to  Jap an
£ £
H o n g  K o n g * *
N e w  S ou th  W a le s 5 ,9 0 0 2 ,9 7 6
V ic to r ia 4 0 ,9 5 6 4
In d ia 1 9 .1 9 6 2 3 1 .9 9 4
*  T h e re  b e in g  n o  custom -house, i t  w as  im p o ss ib le  to  g iv e  th e  in fo rm a tio n  req u ired .
T o t a l  T o n n a g e  o f  v esse ls  t h a t  E n t e r e d  a n d  C le a r e d  w i t h  C a r g o e s  a n d  in  
B a l la s t  f r o m  a n d  to  J a p a n  a t  P o r ts  in  th e  u n d e r m e n t io n e d  C o u n t r ie s  in  
l$$3.(Table 6)
V e s s e ls  e n te re d  f ro m  Japan V e s s e ls  c le a re d  to  Japan
T o n s T o n s
H o n g  K o n g 1 8 5 ,0 4 3 2 3 6 ,3 8 8
N e w  S ou th  W a le s 6 3 2 3 ,4 9 8
V ic to r ia 3 ,5 5 2 •
In d ia 3 .9 0 4 1 .4 0 6
Consequently, the Board of Trade understood from all these
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figures that while the British share of Japanese foreign trade and 
shipping was undoubtedly the largest of any country, the trade 
itself, though valuable, was not one of the great branches of 
British foreign commerce. Furthermore, the trade with Japan, 
though of sensible importance to British commerce, was not 
extensive; a country inhabited by a population like that of Japan 
could not develop a large foreign trade quickly because the people 
were mainly occupied in producing scanty supplies of food on 
which they lived, and they had no large surplus to exchange with 
foreign countries. This remark was equally true of the population 
of Korea, which was not very large, while the population of the 
Russian Pacific possessions was inconsiderable.
with China and India by the way of Japan when the Canadian 
Pacific Railway was constructed. However, the Board of Trade 
doubted whether any trade of this sort would amount to much for a 
long time. The trade of the United States with Japan, as appeared 
from Tables 7, 8, below employed very little shipping, and the 
Canadian Pacific route would only be a competitor with the 
railway routes then existing through the United States 
terminating at San Francisco.
F ig u r e s  t a k e n  f r o m  " T h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s "  T r a d e  V o lu m e  f o r  t h e  Y e a r  
e n d e d  3 0  J u n e  1 8 8 4  (Table 7)
The second consideration was how trade would develop
$
T o ta l v a lu e  o f  im p o rts  in to  U n ite d  States f ro m  Japan
V a lu e  o f  expo rts  o f  d o m estic  p ro d u ce f ro m  U n ite d  States to  Japan
D it to  o f  fo re ig n  p ro d u ce
3 ,1 4 5 ,6 0 2
7 0 3 ,3 0 9
T o ta l v a lu e  o f  expo rts
1 14
7 0 3 .4 2 3
s h ip p in g  (Table 8) 
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T o n s
T o ta l to n n ag e  o f  vessels en tered  f ro m  Japan 3 7 ,9 6 1
D it to  c lea red  to  Japan_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 6 4 .8 8 2 _ _ _ _ _ _ _
The shipping between the United States and China (Table 9) was 
also inconsiderable:-
s h ip p in g  (Table 9)
T o n s
T o ta l to nn ag e o f  vessels en tered  fro m  C h in a  4 0 ,6 5 0
D it to  c leared  to  C h in a _ _ _ _ _ _ ;_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   2 8 .6 9 8
The Board of Trade reported, therefore, that it was
unlikely that any new trade via Japan created in the near future
by opening the Canadian Pacific Railway would be very large.
The third consideration was in respect of the suggestion 
in Plunkett's despatch that Port Hamilton by being a free port in 
the vicinity of China, Japan and Korea, would be resorted to by 
native traders, and thereby in some way evade the apprehended 
high tariffs of China, Japan , and Korea.2 This could hardly be so 
with respect to China, to which Hong Kong was more accessible, 
while it was also more conveniently placed with regard to the 
United Kingdom and its dependencies than Port Hamilton would be. 
But even as regards Japan and Korea, Port Hamilton would only be 
a depot and as the goods would be liable to tariff duties when they 
came from Port Hamilton just as much as when they came from 
any other place, the Board of Trade failed to see any inducement 
whatever to traders to take goods to Port Hamilton at all for 
distribution in the adjacent countries. In addition, it was 
considered by them that even if Port Hamilton were to become, in 
British hands, a successful commercial depot, the benefit of it as
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a free trade port would secure as much to the British rivals, the 
Germans and Americans, as to themselves, whilst the expense 
would be theirs alone.
The last consideration was as to how Port Hamilton might 
be used as a coaling station. It was doubted by the Board of Trade 
whether it was expedient to adapt the principle that particular 
branches of British foreign trade of such an amount as that shown 
to exist in the North Pacific should all be protected by coaling- 
stations and naval depots in their immediate neighbourhood. There 
were British dependencies and possessions scattered all over the 
world, so that as to many parts of British foreign trade the 
question did not arise; but there were various trades more 
important than that with Japan without the special protection of a 
British coaling-station and trade depot. There was a large trade 
with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the northern ports of Russia, 
not to speak of Germany, unprotected by any 'station'. Another 
large trade, viz., that with Chile, Peru, and the western coast of 
South America, was sim ilarly unprotected; the trade of Great 
Britain with Romania and with Russian ports in the Black Sea was 
equally w ithout the protection of a special station in the 
immediate neighbourhood of those ports.3
Under these circumstances, the Board of Trade failed to 
see in what manner the occupation of Port Hamilton would tend to 
any large extension or improvement of British trade in these 
regions.
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3. PROTEST.
3.1. CHINA.
While the British Government had found Korea and her neighbours 
reacting sensitively to their occupation of Port Hamilton, they had 
already anticipated those nations' protests except for that of the 
Chinese because of a good relationship with the Chinese 
Government. Nevertheless, the British Government watched 
carefully the Chinese moves because the Chinese Admiral Ting 
had left Taku for Korea in order to carry a protest of the King of 
Korea to the British Admiral against the occupation of Port 
Hamilton.
O'Conor tried to find out whether Ting had formally 
protested against occupation of Port Hamilton. In the course of 
conversation with the Prince and Ministers of the Yamen, O'Conor 
found no intimation of any intention to protest formally against 
the British occupation of Port Hamilton, and from the language of 
the Ministers he had reason to believe that China would not 
herself move in the matter, though it was less certain that the 
Korean Government would remain passive.1 O'Conor inquired of 
Dowell, therefore, whether Ting had actually handed in a formal 
protest to him. Dowell said that Ting merely conveyed the Korean 
officials to the islands, not finding him at Port Hamilton, although 
the protest against the British occupation of Port Hamilton came 
from Korea.2 Therefore, O'Conor reported to London that, "Chinese 
Government profess ignorance of protest, and have assured me 
confidentia lly that they are not personally opposed to our 
temporary occupation."3
Taking this view of the putitive Chinese protest, O'Conor
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challenged Plunkett's view that the Chinese Government had been 
active in remonstrating against the occupation of Port Hamilton 
by Great Britain. First, what might happen in the future would be 
difficult to predict, especially in a country like China, but O'Conor 
said he felt pretty sure that unless they yielded to the pressure of 
foreign governments, they would not of their own accord offer 
opposition to the action of the British Government in this matter. 
Secondly, in Plunkett's despatch to Dowell of 31 May, Plunkett 
said that "there seems to be at present considerable friction 
between the Central Government at Peking and the Viceroy in 
connection with the French negotiations and which of these two 
Chinese influences it is which is now so active against Britain. I 
have not yet been able to discover." O'Conor said, however, that 
neither during his experience in Peking, nor during the longer and 
for more valuable experience of the late Sir Harry Parkes, the 
former British Minister in China, had anything tended to show that 
there was any considerable friction between the Viceroy and 
Ministers of the Yamen, either in the matter of the French 
negotiations or other matters. Lastly, he pointed out that the 
Viceroy had not been active against Great Britain. This could be 
assumed from the fact of his having written to the King of Korea 
to offer no further objection to the British occupation, and of his 
having sent this letter through the British Consul.4
However, two developments changed O'Conor's view: one 
was that O'Conor had received news from Korea of an Agreement 
between Mollendorff and the Russian Legation at Tokyo. This 
Agreement dated from a period certainly prior to any question of 
the occupation of Port Hamilton by Britain, but it put at rest the
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complaint so often repeated by the Yamen that Russian activity in 
Korea had been instigated by the action of the British Government. 
The other was that the Chinese Government had very strong 
objection to entering into any formal agreement with a view to 
recognizing the occupation of Port Hamilton, unless the British 
Government consented to join with China in a guarantee of the 
integrity of Korea. These facts showed that the occupation of 
Port Hamilton, while bestowing advantages on Great Britain, 
brought trouble and difficulty for China. Moreover, the facts 
showed clearly that they had not dismissed the contingency of 
hostilities breaking out between them and Russia, either in 
respect of the Manchurian and Kashgarian frontiers, or of the 
policy of Russia in Korea.5 Consequently, on 8 July, O'Conor 
reported the Chinese protest to Salisbury, especially, the Chinese 
Government's strong objections to entering into any formal 
agreement with a view to recognizing the occupation of Port 
H a m ilto n .6 Subsequently, O'Conor mentioned to Salisbury the 
report of Mr. C o lq u h o u n . the 'Times' correspondent at the time. 
Colquhoun reported China as making positive and specific 
overtures for an alliance with the British Government; the 
attitude of the Chinese Government was however extremely 
cautious, and the most that could be said was that there were 
signs that, if war broke out between Great Britain and Russia, the 
Chinese Government might seriously consider the advantages of an 
alliance with Britain against Russia. O'Conor had derived from an 
entirely reliable source, under date of 10 May, the following 
in fo rm a tion :-
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Mr.Colquhoun advised the Viceroy Li to protest against the occupation of Port 
Hamilton, and told him that Japan should protest too. These countries should 
not allow themselves to be made a cat's-paw of by Great Britain. Britain was 
always ready to accept substantial assistance, but when other countries were 
in trouble, all she had to give in return was sympathy and fine phrases.7
In a conversation between O'Conor and the Viceroy of 13 
October, the Viceroy proposed that the British should take down 
their flag, remove the ostentatious military shanties which had 
been erected and extend the cable to Chemulpo, where it could be 
connected with the Korean land-line, thus rendering it useful to 
both governments.8
Hence, in spite of anticipating only a passive protest by the 
Chinese Government, the British Government found it to be a very 
active one.
3.2. JAPAN.
The British Government had already anticipated a Japanese protest 
because the Japanese Government had reacted strongly to the 
British occupation of Port Hamilton. However, the British 
Government was confused by contradictory reports respecting the 
Japanese protest from the British Ministers in China and Japan.
O'Conor’s recent dispatches described that the Japanese 
Minister in Peking, Admiral E nom otto . as being very active in his 
opposition to the occupation of Port Hamilton by the British fleet; 
he could be taking so strong a line only on instructions from his 
government. On 5 July, O'Conor reported to the government again 
that the Viceroy had repeated his statement that the Japanese 
Government had been urgent in their request for China to join with
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them in protesting against the British occupation and that 
Enomotto was still much disturbed by it. By the Viceroy's 
s ta tem ent:-
Japanese Minister had suggested to me that Korea should be advised to apply to 
the Powers who had Treaties with her to summon an International Conference 
on the subject. I, in reply, had represented the inutility of such a step. Of 
the Powers having Treaties with Korea, Russia, from the nature of the case, 
could not be heard. The United States would not interfere. Germany had been 
so active in appropriating territory of late that she would find it difficult to 
raise her voice, and Japan's remonstrances would be of little avail.1
And this was derived from the British consul at Tien-tsin, 
Mr. B renan who had an interview on 10 July with the Viceroy. 
Brenan heard from the Viceroy that Enomotto had informed the 
Viceroy that he had come to Tien-tsin under instructions from his 
government to consult the Viceroy as to the possibility of joint 
action on the part of China and Japan in the event of Russian 
encroachments in Korea, or the refusal of the British Government 
to evacuate Port Hamilton. The Viceroy, in reply, said that while 
encroachment on the part of Russia would be forcibly resisted by 
China, it was not the intention of the Chinese Government to allow 
the British occupation of Port Hamilton to be an occasion for 
quarrel with the British Government, and that if Korea refused to 
give her consent to the British occupation, the action of China 
would be limited to friendly representations on the subject to the 
British Government.2
On 14 July, however, Plunkett reported to Salisbury that 
Count Inouye had assured him that day that he had never 
authorized action against Great Britain either in China or Korea,
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and invoked the frequent occasions on which he had given Plunkett 
private information about Russian movements as proof of his 
good-will towards Britain. But, Inouye said, his only object was 
to prevent as far as possible the British temporary occupation of 
Port Hamilton serving as a pretext elsewhere, and he had sent 
Enomotto to Tien-tsin to urge the Viceroy to exercise in future a 
more strict and direct control over the King of Korea, and to take 
steps immediately to prevent him from accepting Russian officers 
as military instructors to the Korean forces. In Plunkett's view, 
nothing could be more emphatic and categorical than the denials 
which Inouye gave to his insinuations that fear of Russia might 
have made Japan work against Great Britain.3
According to O'Conor's report of 20 July, since Inouye 
had denied the Viceroy's statement that Enomotto had been 
authorized by his government, the Viceroy stated again that 
Enomotto had read out to him the instructions of his government. 
These were to the effect "that the British occupation of Port 
Hamilton was a source of danger to China and Japan. Enomotto was 
therefore to endeavour, in consultation with the Viceroy, to bring 
about the British evacuation of the place."4
In effect, British confusion respecting the Japanese 
protest, under these circumstances, was due to the Japanese 
Government's passive form of protest, in spite of British 
anticipation from Chinese sources of a more active protest .
3.3. KOREA.
When the Korean Government grasped the situation at Port 
Hamilton, they began to protest officially. On 24 May, O'Conor
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received a message, through Carles, from the president of the 
Korean Foreign O ffice, for com m unication to the British 
Government, protesting against the British occupation of the 
Island of Port Hamilton. The message was to the following 
e ffe c t:-
That as Port Hamilton is an island belonging to Korea, no foreign power has a 
right to take possession of it. The Korean Government therefore trust that out 
of regard for the friendly relations that exist between the two countries the 
British Government will abandon their previous intention, and will at once 
withdraw their fleet. If this is not done, it will be impossible for Korea to 
remain silent, or to avoid an appeal to the Treaty Powers.1
O'Conor thought it desirable that Mr. A s to n . Consul at 
Seoul, should return to Korea immediately because of Aston's 
intimate acquaintance with the Korean language and people. At 
the time, owing to a serious pulmonary disease, Aston had been 
residing at Kobe for the benefit of his health because Kobe has a 
milder climate in the winter.2 Consequently, O 'Conor informed 
Aston by telegram directly that Korea had protested against the 
occupation of Port Hamilton, and requested him to return and use, 
on his return, his best efforts to prevent any further action being 
taken by Korea in the matter. O'Conor also suggested that if 
Korea remained quiet, and did not complicate the situation by any 
proceedings on her part, the British Government might possibly be 
ready to come to an agreement in respect of the temporary 
occupation of Port Hamilton.3 Subsequently, O'Conor telegraphed 
Dowell to send a ship to convey Aston directly to Chemulpo. Aston 
started from Kobe for Chemulpo on 28 May by 'Sapphire'.4 On 19 
June, Aston had an interview with all the members of the Korean
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Foreign Office, with the exception of Mollendorff, who was absent. 
From the interview, Aston felt that nothing was to be effected by 
open negotiations at that moment.5
On 27 June, Kim insisted there was no justification for the 
temporary occupation of Port Hamilton by Great Britain:-
On examination, I found that the Article VIII of the Treaty with Britain 
provided that depots for stores, ammunition, & c. for the use of the British 
navy may be erected at the open ports, and be kept under the supervision of a
British official. Coal is, no doubt, included under the designation of naval
£
stores, but it is not to be stored elsewhere than at the open ports.
Kim also said that Korea would maintain neutrality in the event of 
hostilities between foreign states, and could not lend to them its 
te r r ito r ie s .
On the same day, the Korean Government had addressed the 
Foreign Representatives at Seoul, asking for the good offices of 
their governments in order to settle the difficulty arising out of 
the occupation of Port Hamilton, in accordance with the terms of 
the 1st Article of the British Treaty, which provided that: "in case 
of differences arising between one of the High Contracting Parties 
and a third Power, the other High Contracting Party, if requested 
to do so, shall exert its good offices to bring about an amicable 
arrangement."7
On 8 July, the British Government obtained information 
that the German consul in Korea, Mr. Zem bsch. had reported to his 
government, by telegraph, that the Korean Government were 
preparing a protest to the Powers against the British occupation 
of Port Ham ilton. This was de livered after the Korean
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Government's request of 27 June. Under these circumstances, 
Salisbury instructed O'Conor that he should try at Peking and 
through the Consul-General to prevent the protest being sent, and 
that he might suggest to the Yamen that a protest such as this, 
made without the concurrence of China, ignored her suzerainty; 
and that it would, moreover, be an unfriendly act on the part of the 
Chinese Government, if after the communications which had taken 
place between Granville and the Chinese Ministers, the Chinese 
Government did not exert their authority to prevent a proceeding 
which would be embarrassing to the British G overnm ent.8 
Salisbury also told Plunkett that the information had been 
obtained from the German consul in Korea, and that the British 
Government was very desirous of preventing the presentation of 
this protest, which they suspected to be the result of a Japanese 
in tr ig u e .9
On 13 July, O'Conor telegraphed to Salisbury that the 
Korean protest had been withdrawn for the time being after 
representations by Aston.10 Even though Salisbury received 
O'Conor's telegram, he sent to him the instructions, fearing the 
question of its occupation should be revived by Korea through a 
protest to the Powers. According to Salisbury's instructions, 
O'Conor might ask the Yamen to press the King of Korea to leave 
the occupation alone, and not to allow his foreign advisers to push 
the Korean King too far.11
In reporting his conversation with Kim on 12 August, Aston 
told O'Conor that the President's language had been much more 
friendly than on any previous occasions, and that he had 
acquiesced in the view that the occupation of Port Hamilton was
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not intended as a menace to Korea, while, at the same time, he 
admitted the inability of his government to defend the island 
against other Power. Aston added that the influence of China at 
last seemed to be having some effect, and that the Korean 
Government was anxious to postpone the renewal of its appeal to 
the Treaty Powers. Moreover, Scott's Report of 31 August showed 
the friendly relations which existed between the British naval 
authorities and the inhabitants of Port Hamilton. (Appendix) 
O'Conor reported to Salisbury as follows:-
I believe the Korean Government do not really care very much about Port 
Hamilton, and would prefer to getting it back to maintain the ground of 
complaint against Britain, which is very useful to them in replying to Russia. 
They know the British Government will not take any more of their territory, 
and generally that they have nothing to fear from Great Britain. On the other 
hand, they are justly alarmed at what Russia may do when she finds that 
Korea is unwilling to keep M. von Mollendorff's promises. Chinese influence 
is tolerably strong at Seoul, but she does not wish to press it too much for 
fear of alienating the Koreans, and possibly making them turn towards 
12Russia.
In effect, the Korean Government had changed to a passive protest, 
although they had begun it so actively.
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3.4. RUSSIA.
Owing to their quarrel with Britain over Afghanistan, the Russian 
Government made an indirect protest about the British occupation 
of Port Hamilton; in other words, they tried to protest to Britain 
through their neighbours; China, Japan, and Korea. First, in late 
June, the Russian Minister at Peking called at the Yamen, and took 
them severely to task for the partiality China had shown in 
consenting to the occupation of Port Hamilton by Britain. The 
Ministers of the Yamen told him that the Chinese Government had 
neither consented nor given their permission for the simple reason 
that Port Hamilton did not belong to China but to Korea. However, 
the Russian Minister refused to believed their statement. O'Conor 
thought that the protests of the Russian Minister were the result 
of disappointment caused as much, perhaps, by the British 
occupation as by regret that the Russian Government had been 
forestalled by the British Government, and no doubt the Yamen 
knew what weight to attach to them.1
Secondly, the secretary of the Russian legation in Tokyo, 
Alexis de Spever. secretly departed from the Japanese capital and 
took up residence as "agent provisoire" in Seoul in the middle of 
June. His purpose in Korea had been to sign a contract for the 
employment of Russian military training officers for the Korean 
army, a contract he had negotiated with von Mollendorff in Japan 
earlier that year. This was de Speyer's idea of how to protest 
about the occupation of Korean territory by Great Britain. 
However, as the Russian found out, von Mollendorff had acted 
wholly w ithout authority, and the Korean Government knew 
nothing about such a deal, De Speyer dramatized his "strong 
feelings of deep embarassment" with the veiled threat that Russia
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might force Korea to accept Russian officers. But von 
Mollendorff's expulsion from the Foreign Office in July, and the
arrival of the Russian charge d'affairs. Karl I. Waeber. who
exchanged the ratifications of the Korean-Russian treaty, cleared 
the air in the Korean capital to some extent.2
Thirdly, on 11 July, the Russian Minister in Japan, D avvdov. 
had called on Inouye to stop favouring Britain, which, the Minister 
said, Japan was unfairly doing by allowing the British naval
authorities at Port Hamilton to draw stores, labourers, etc. from 
Nagasaki. Inouye said that Japan had no right, in time of peace, to 
prevent such trade. The Russian Minister would not admit the 
excuse, and went away asserting that Japan was favouring the
British occupation.3
In addition to these representations, the Russian 
Government commented on the British occupation of Port 
Hamilton through the "Novoe Vremya" newspaper of 8 (20) August. 
The newspaper made the following observations on the reported 
occupation of Port Hamilton by some British vessels of war;-
The meaning of this occupation is so clear, and the presence of the British at 
Port Hamilton is so opposed to Russian interests in the Pacific, that it is 
hardly possible that the Russian Government has regarded the event with 
indifference. As under Lord Salisbury's Ministry all ordinary diplomatic 
process on our side would be as waste paper, there is nothing, in our opinion, 
incongruous in the report of the Russian annexation of Quelpart Island. This 
would be the simplest and most natural answer to the occupation of Port 
Hamilton by Great Britain. From the point of view of international law, both 
occupations belong to the same category of events, and if the Island of Quelpart 
has really been occupied by us , the British can only obtain our withdrawal 
from it by retiring from Port Hamilton themselves.
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As regards the alleged Protectorate of Russia over Korea, if the 
rumoured efforts of Lord Salisbury's Ministry to form an alliance with China 
with objects hostile to Russia be true, in such case the Russian Government 
possesses on its own part the undoubted moral right of taking measures of 
precaution against the consequences of such an alliance by endeavouring to 
strengthen its influence in Korea.
We consider that all this is simpler and more logical than the reports
about the influence of our diplomatists to the occupation of Port Hamilton by
4
the British, and the rumoured alliance between Britain and China.
On 10 September, Russia signed a preliminary protocol 
which defined the boundary with Afghanistan. Hereby the Afghan 
crisis in Anglo-Russian rivalry was term inated. However, the 
Russian Government still maintained their protest indirectly over 
Port Hamilton. The President of the Korean Foreign Office paid a 
visit to Aston on the evening of 20 October. In the meeting, Kim 
requested Aston to represent to the British Government the 
difficulty in which the British occupation of the island had placed 
Korea with regard to other Powers, and stated that Waeber, on the 
previous day, had pressed him somewhat closely on the matter, 
asserting that he had learnt that a project was on foot by which 
Korea was to sell Port Hamilton to Great Britain. A fter the 
meeting, Aston mentioned that Kim’s language was of a more or 
less perfunctory character, but there was no doubt that Waeber's 
inquiries had been in some degree disquieting to the Korean 
Government.5
It indicated that the Russian Government would avoid direct 
conflict with the British Government over Port Hamilton.
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3.5. THE OTHERS: GERMANY & AMERICA.
The British Government observed closely the possibility of a 
German protest against the British occupation of Port Hamilton. 
The reason was that the British Government was being challenged 
in the mid-1880s by rising foreign competition and by a new code 
of foreign diplomatic behaviour, and these problems related 
particularly to the industrialization of Germany.1 Moreover, 
Germany was as much as Great Britain interested in Korea , and 
she entered in the same year as Britain into a treaty of Amity and 
Commerce with Korea .
On 23 May 1885, Carles had a conversation with 
Zem bsch. German consul, regarding the subject of Port Hamilton. 
When Carles said that Korea seemed to be more uneasy than the 
occasion called for regarding Port Hamilton, Zembsch spoke at 
some lengh as follows:-
I thought the Korean is a very hard case. Britain, in occupying Port Hamilton,
gave Russia just the opportunity which Russia was suspected of desiring.
Korea, in self-defence, had no alternative but to protest; otherwise; Japan,
Russia, and other Powers would all be taking their share of the country. If
Great Britain were willing to protect Korea from the consequences of the
occupation, or were to offer a Treaty of Alliance against Russia, the case
would be altered: but otherwise, though Korea might indeed suffer the
occupation, as she had not power to resist it, it could not be upheld by any
2
European government as just.
Zembsch spoke thus w ithout instructions from  his 
government as to the course he should pursue; he 
acknowledged that Korea was unable to prevent Russia
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occupying Port Hamilton if England left it, but if all that 
Britain desired was to shut Russia out, it was in the British 
power to obtain a guarantee from all the Powers to respect 
its neutrarity if she withdrew. Otherwise Russia possessed
a casus be lli against Korea. Zembsch granted, however,
that the strength of the British fleet at Port Hamilton was 
likely to prevent her making a descent on any part of the 
coast, and that an advance by land would be useless. He 
added that this was what he would tell the Korean
Government, who had asked for his advice.3
On 17 June, O'Conor commented to M. von Brandt, the 
German M inister in China, on the unfriendly attitude
assumed by Zembsch. Brandt informed him, in reply, that 
Zembsch had no authority to offer such advice to the Korean 
Government, his functions being stric tly  lim ited to a 
general surveillance over the commetcial relations between 
Germany and Korea: and Brandt felt confident that his action 
in this instance would not be approved by the German 
Government. However, the Chinese Government appeared to 
be under the impression that Zembsch, in advising the 
Korean Government to remonstrate against the occupation 
of Port Ham ilton, was acting in accordance w ith 
instructions from Berlin.4
On the other hand, Sir E. M a le t. the British 
ambassador at Berlin, summarized a translation of an 
article which appeared in the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine- 
Zeitung" of 14 October concerning the continued British 
occupation of Port Hamilton as follows:-
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It says that It Is Intended to convert Port Hamilton Into a Malta or Gibraltar,
that great works are In progress there, on which thousands of Koreans and
Japanese are engaged: that of the three entrances to the Island two are closed,
and the third barred with torpedoes: that while the great works are being
energetically pushed forward, three or four powerful ships of war remain
permanently at anchor, and that Admiral Dowell cruises in the neighbourhood
with the 'Agamemnon' and the 'Audacious'. Finally, it states that a
considerable force is on the way from Hong Kong to garrison the island, and
5that guns of the heaviest calibre are mounted in its horbour batteries.
These facts made it clear that the British occupation of Port 
Hamilton could not be viewed without concern at Berlin once the 
Afghan crisis was over.
In the case of America, even though America had by the 
treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Korea of 1882 agreed that 
"if other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either 
government, the other will exert their good offices on being 
informed of the case to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus 
showing their friendly feeling", she did not protest against the 
British occupation of Port Hamilton like others.
The keynote of America foreign policy at the time was 
Monroeism- the Monroe Doctrine. Its principle was that America 
should not meddle in any diplomatic problems except those which 
involve the States in the Americas. However, as regards the 
problems of East Asia, it was difficult for America to adhere to 
this principle because of her own economic interests. Especially, 
America had taken the lead in opening Japan and Korea to the 
world and as a natural result of this, she could not be indifferent 
to the problems which arose in this area.6 Nevertheless, America 
did not extend the same degree of diplomatic protection to its
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citizens in the Far East as it had done in every other country in the 
world because she was too preoccupied with internal affairs at 
the time.
The conception of the American nation as merely a frontier 
influence in its effect upon Great Britain, at least, up to the World 
War, was near enough to the truth.7 In the 1880's, American 
diplomacy in the Far East had directly and indirectly to rely upon 
British policy; for example, both Britain and America in 1880 
warned Korea that Russia might seize the northeastern part of her 
te r r ito ry .8 It was natural, therefore, America did not protest 
against British occupation of the island.9
4. THE HOSTILITY OF MOLLENDORFF TO GREAT BRITAIN.
In January 1883, Granville received from China, rumours which 
had for some little time past been current that Paul Georg von 
Mollendorff, a German, had entered into an arrangement with the 
Korean Envoys, lately in China, to serve the Korean Government as 
a foreign adviser. These rumours had now received confirmation.
Brenan informed Granville of M. von Mollendorff's career 
in China, first as an employee of the Foreign Customs Service, 
then, after he had left that Service in 1874, as Interpreter to the 
German Consulate, and currently as one of the many foreign 
employees in the suite of Li Hung-chang. The gist of the 
agreement in Chinese that had been drawn up between M.von 
Mollendorff and the Korean Government was as follows:-
M. von Mollendorff agrees to go to Korea to assist the Government in its 
foreign relations. His former experience in the Chinese Customs will enable 
him to assist the Koreans in establishing a foreign Customs system. If the 
Korean Government, or any Chinese Deputy sent to assist the Korean
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Government, gives him orders with regard to Customs matters or directs him 
to proceed to any port, he must obey. He will at first find it necessary to 
employ foreign subordinates, but they must only be employed from year to 
year, so that they may gradually make way for Koreans, as these learn the 
work. At first the Customs revenue will be insufficient to pay expenses, so a 
certain sum will be allowed from some other source to carry on the service.
M. von Mollendorff must not, however, incur any expense without the 
sanction of the Korean Government. When the Customs revenue, after a year 
or two, becomes considerable, a certain sum out of this will be set aside for 
the purpose of these expenses. M. von MSIIendorff is to receive 300 tales 
(80L) a-month. He will, besides, be allowed quarters. His agreement is 
terminable at three months notice on either side.1
In 1884, M. von Mollendorff had been sent to Seoul by 
the Viceroy to further Chinese interests, and in particular, to 
assist them in establishing a Foreign Customs Service, but he had 
come to think increasingly in terms of Korea's need as the result 
of his service as Vice- President of the newly established Korean 
Foreign Office, inspector general of customs, Vice-President of 
the Ministry of Public Works, and member of the Privy Council; in 
other words, Mollendorff who was called "Mok Champan" by a 
Korean intrigued to secure the independence of Korea from China 
as well as from the other powers.2
Mollendorff thought Korea's interests could best be 
protected by drawing Russia into the Korean Peninsula. Even 
before the emeute of 1884 at Seoul, in which some of his friends 
had been butchered, Mollendorff had regarded Japan as the "natural 
enemy" of Korea, in spite of the fact that he had been on good 
personal terms with T a k e z o e . the Japanese Minister in Korea, 
whom he knew from T ien -ts in . D oubtfu l tha t China,
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notwithstanding her apparent dominance, would be able to defend 
Korea against a serious Japanese onslaught, Mollendorff had 
believed from the outset of his service in Seoul that Korea would 
have to lean on some other power. As things stood this could be 
only Russia. This power had normal relations with China, was 
herself, since her advance to the Pacific Ocean, an opponent of 
Japan and thus most interested in seeing an independent Korea 
maintained as sort of a buffer state between herself and Japan. 
None of the other great powers could have undertaken this role. 
America might have liked to have done so, but she was too distant 
and not strong enough militarily; France's expansionist drive into 
Indo-China had brought her into opposition to China, which in 1885 
led even to war. Germany did not yet play a role in world politics, 
and Britain as the opponent of Russia in Near Eastern questions 
was a natural ally of Japan.4
The Emeute of 1884 and the ensuing Sino-Japanese 
conflicts were directly responsible for the Korean King's decision 
to ask Russia for protection. While the Chinese troops were 
restoring peace and the Chinese and Japanese troops were in 
conflict, von Mollendorff seized the opportunity to warn the King 
that Korea could rely on neither China nor Japan. Korea needed to 
adopt a new course in international affairs, and von Mollendorff 
suggested that the King turn to his northern neighbour-Russia. 
Accordingly von Mollendorff contacted the Russian Legation in 
Tokyo, and Alexis de Speyer, Secretary of the Legation, was sent 
by Minister Davydow to Korea in the spring of 1885.5
On 20 May 1885, O'Conor referred to the influence of 
Mollendorff who had contacted the Russian Legation in Tokyo:-
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When lately in Japan he was reported as being on especially intimate terms 
with the Russian Legation, and from various quarters I have heard that his 
influence is given to serving the interests of that country. The reputation 
which he enjoys for integrity and honesty leaves much to be desired, but 
makes him a more unscrupulous agent in any matter in which he can serve 
his own personal aims. Some short time ago I heard privately that he had 
suggested to the Russian Government to buy Port Hamilton from Korea, and 
had offered to act as intermediary in the purchase. It may well be that the 
occupation of the island by the British Government has deprived him of a 
promising business, and induced him to exert his influence in urging the
g
Korean Government to its present action.
O'Conor also learnt from the Viceroy on 7 June that Russia had 
already applied to the Korean Government for permission to occupy 
Port Lazareff. If true, O'Conor believed, it was probably the
outcome of the negotiations that had been going on between the
Russian Legation at Tokyo and Mollendorff.7 Therefore, it was 
natural for the British, who since the defeat of Napoleon had 
regarded Russia as a major possible threat to their empire, to be 
openly hostile to Mollendorff when he sought Russian support for 
Korea.
On 26 June, Carles mentioned the anti-British feeling of 
Mollendorff and the part taken by him in opposition to the
occupation of Port Hamilton by the British fleet. When Carles 
discussed some business with the President and Ministers of the 
Korean Foreign Office on 27 May, he had thought that, they were 
very courteous and made no allusion to any weakening of friendly 
relations between Korea and Britain. At the conclusion of the
discussion Carles expressed his hope that the settlem ent 
proposed, viz, an extension of a concession previously granted to
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Messrs Jardine, Matheson and Co., would work favourably for both 
the Korean Government and the firm. Mollendorff, who had 
participated in the meeting, shortly afterward said that if Britain 
disregarded Korea's request to evacuate Port Hamilton, it would be 
impossible to grant British subjects a concession to work mines 
in Korea. On the other hand, Mollendorff had kept the President 
waiting for an hour and a half, though the President had sent 
several messengers to tell him that Carles was at the Foreign 
Office, and made no apology when he came for the delay in keeping 
his appointment. Therefore, as Carles did not, as he pointed out, 
accept M ollendorff as the Representative of the Korean 
Government in business matters, the same rule it, seemed to him
should apply to political matters.8
During de Speyer's second trip in June 1885, he assumed
unwarranted authority by conducting direct negotiations with von 
Mollendorff and the Korean King. The main aim that de Speyer 
wished to achieve was the employment of Russian m ilitary 
advisers by the Korean Government. In this connection he had the 
whole hearted support of von Mollendorff, who was said to have 
prepared an agreement, without consulting the Korean Foreign 
Office, that he had submitted to the King. Somehow, the President 
of the Foreign Office, Kim Yun-sik, got wind of it, and he strongly 
urged the King not to grant his approval. Apparently, by this time 
the King had again changed his mind on the matter of advisers, and 
turned the question of negotiations over to the Foreign office.9
The Korean Government did not agree to de Speyer's 
proposals. On 2 July, when de Speyer came to the Foreign Office, 
he was informed that Korea would stick to her promise to the
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American Government, and that he could take any matter up with 
the Russian Minister, should the latter come. De Speyer, defeated 
and disillusioned, intimated that there would be no minister 
coming, and that the Korean Government should be prepared for a 
serious outcome. De Speyer returned to Tokyo a few days later. 
Von Mollendorff, sharing the same feeling, warned his superior, 
Kim Yun-sik, that "Ten Chinas cannot be compared with Russia. 
Why should you depend on the undependable, and not rely on the 
re lia b le ? "10
The secret dealings between Korea and Russia were known 
to the Treaty Powers. Japan and Britain as well as China were 
worried about a Russo-Korean alliance. In particular, the hostility 
of Mollendorff to Britain prompted the British Government to 
demand his recall by China. The Chinese Foreign Office and the 
Viceroy themselves also viewed Mollendorff's approach to Russia 
with great dissatisfaction. At the begining of July, Li sent a 
telegram to Chen Shu-t'ing. the Chinese Commercial Comissioner 
in Seoul: the secret agreements should not be ratified and von 
Mollendorff should be dismissed.11 Furthermore, feeling ran high 
among Korean, Japanese, and Chinese officials in Seoul who 
believed that M ollendorff had acted w ithout knowledge or 
authorization of the King or Government of Korea.
Towards the end of July, Mollendorff was dismissed as vice 
president and adviser of the Korean Foreign Office. In September, 
Mollendorff lost his position as vice commissioner of Korean 
Customs. To soften the blow to Mollendorff's ego and to forestall 
his search for Russian employment, the Korean Government 
proposed that the Viceroy who had originally sent him to Korea,
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recall him for duty in China. This was done, and in December a 
Chinese warship carried Mollendorff back to China, where he 
reentered the services of Li as his private secretary.12
In effect, the intrigues of Mollendorff to draw Russia into 
Korea had not achieved the desired effect, and only provided an 
excuse for British inroads.
5. THE SECOND STAGE OF NEGOTIATION.
5.1. THE CHINESE CONSENT TO MEDIATION.
The Viceroy at Tien-tsin proposed on 27 June , through the British 
consul there, the following arrangement;- "that Britain should 
hold Port Hamilton if she undertakes never to use it against 
C h ina."1 O'Conor suggested to London that the proposal, though 
unofficial, deserved consideration, as the Viceroy directed Korean 
affairs. O'Conor had already tried to make various suggestions to 
the Viceroy for an arrangement regarding Port Hamilton because 
he believed that Korean affairs were entrusted almost entirely to 
the direction of the Viceroy, and that in the difference between 
China and Japan in respect of Korea the negotiations were 
confided almost exclusively into his hand.2
On the following day, Salisbury instructed O'Conor to 
encourage the Viceroy's proposal which he should endeavour, if 
possible, to have made to him by the Chinese Government at 
P e k i n g . 3 O'Conor replied on 30 June to Salisbury that the 
instruction presented one difficulty. The arguments of the Prince 
and Ministers at the Yamen were in effect: "do not ask us to 
consent officially or to acquiesce openly in any arrangement for 
the occupation of Port Hamilton. We are not opposed to the action
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of the British Government, in fact, we are even in favour of it, but 
in view of the difficulties in which open acquiescence would place 
us vis-a-vis to other Powers, we should be obliged, if officially 
asked to support you, to say that we could not do so, and even 
perhaps, to say more."4
However, O'Conor learned from Tien-tsin on 17 July that 
the Viceroy had received orders from the Yamen to try to prevent 
the King of Korea from raising any further objection to the British 
occupation, and was told to allay his anxiety in respect to it.5
Consequently, Chinese mediation which was proposed by 
the British Government was agreed to without difficulty by the 
Chinese Government.
5.2. RENT, LEASE OR PURCHASE.
The British Government were prepared to pay Korea a sum not 
exceeding 5,000 L. a-year rent for Port Hamilton and the cession 
to Britain of Korea's rights of sovereignty over the island as long 
as it may be used by Britain as a coaling-station. However, 
O'Conor had another idea: the Korean Government might be tempted 
to comply with the British proposal if, instead of a yearly rent, 
they could count on receiving a round sum because they were in 
very great pecuniary straits, and the King of Korea was especially 
in want of money.1
O'Conor asked the British Government, therefore, whether 
a lump sum could be substituted for yearly rent on account of the 
occupation of Port Hamilton, and, if so, how much it should be.2 
The British Government in return, asked him, what would be the 
amount of the lump sum which would be required to be paid to the
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Korean Government on account of the occupation of Port Hamilton 
instead of the proposed yearly rental.3 O'Conor replied that until 
he heard from Aston he could not state, even approximately, the 
sum necessary.4
On 18 June, Aston reported to O'Conor that the financial
difficulties of the Korean Government were very great, and that
they were trying to negotiate a small loan of 38,000 dollars with 
a Japanese bank at Chemulpo. Therefore, the Korean Government's 
necessities might induce them to make or accept a pecuniary offer 
respecting Port Hamilton, though a lump sum would seem to be 
more effective than a yearly rent.5 In view of Aston's report, 
O'Conor ventured to name 50,000 L as what seemed the outside 
figure for a lump sum, and he added that some portion of this
given direct to the King might be effective in inducing a
settlement, but that delay was likely to increase the difficulties.6 
However, on 10 July, when Aston had an opportunity of 
approaching the subject of lease of the islands privately with the 
President of the Korean Foreign Office, he heard from him that 
there was no other way in which the matter could be settled than 
w ith d ra w a l.7
On 26 September, Aston sent a telegram to O'Conor, " Port 
Hamilton may perhaps be purchased for 500,000 dollars net 
lodged with Jardine and Co. who can pay to Korean Government as a 
loan. Secrecy indispensable." O'Conor reported to Salisbury, in 
sending this telegram that it might be doubted whether the sum 
named was the lowest that would be accepted, but that it showed 
the disposition of Korea to negotiation.8
On 14 October, O'Conor reported to Salisbury that the
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President Kim had never taken any notice of his suggestion for a 
lease of the islands. The only inducement to the Korean 
Government to cede them would be a sum sufficient to release 
them from their financial difficulties, and for this purpose the 
amount named as annual rental would be of little service.9
Consequently, under these circumstances , the British 
Government could not yet conclude any arrangement for renting 
Port Hamilton while it was occupied as a coaling-station by Great 
Britain on terms authorized in Granville's telegram of 29 May, or 
even an arrangement for lease or purchase.
6. THE SECOND STAGE OF LANDING THE CABLE.
The British Government gave O'Conor the information that a ship 
with the cable on board would arrive at North Saddle Island on 28 
May, and requested him to use his own discretion as to informing 
the Chinese Government of this fact.1 O'Conor was aware that 
much opposition had been raised in various quarters to the consent 
of the Yamen being given to landing a cable on North Saddle Island. 
Therefore, he took the necessary steps to deal with this situation: 
one was that O'Conor thought it better not to mention that the ship 
with cable on board would arrive there on 28 May, lest it should 
give rise to further discussion respecting the whole question. The 
other was that in order to guard against any likelihood of 
opposition from the natives of the island, he had asked the 
Inspector-General of Customs to warn the Customs officials in 
the North Saddle Lighthouse that the British ship would land, with 
the permission of the Chinese Government, a cable on the island on 
28 May, and he had secured a promise that a room in the lighthouse 
should be temporarily placed at the disposal of the party landing
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the cable.2
On 2 June, at last, the telegraph cable which the British 
Government had ordered the Telegraph Construction Company to 
lay between Saddle Island and Port Hamilton was temporarily 
completed and in operation.3 On the following day, according to 
the extract of Dowell's letter to the Secretary to the Admiralty, 
the two telegraphists stationed there to work the instruments 
were living on board the 'Merlin1, which vessel was anchored close 
off the position chosen for landing the cable. The wooden building 
sent from Hong Kong as a residence and office for these gentlemen 
had been erected by the carpenters of the squadron, and was then 
nearly completed. In the meantime, the telegraphic operations 
were carried on in a temporary shed.4
O'Conor had received an official note of 3 June from the 
Prince and Ministers of the Yamen in respect to the cable on North 
Saddle Island. In the note, the Yamen employed the wording, "that 
as soon as there is a comparative dim inution of important 
te legraphic communication, the cable-end must at once be 
removed from the place in question," in lieu of the words, " the 
removal would have to be considered in agreement with the 
Chinese Government," used in O'Conor's note.5 On the other hand, 
in replying on 6 June to the Yamen, O'Conor had put on record the 
official promise of the Prince and Ministers to allow the cable to 
be permanently established at Woosung, should its removal from 
the North Saddle be insisted on, and as the fulfillment of this 
promise would not be agreeable to the Chinese Government, the 
North Saddle Cable would probably not be disturbed.6 However, 
the Yamen denied any promise to allow the cable to be landed at
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Woosung, should it be removed from North Saddle Island. Then, 
O'Conor asked if the connection to the Eastern company's cable at 
Woosung could be effected without the permission of the Chinese 
Government. This the Ministers admitted, but explained that no 
promise was given, and that their remarks were only intended to 
show how the cable might still be made use of after its removal 
from North Saddle Island.7
In effect, while the problems of removing the cable from 
North Saddle Island were still under review, the problem of 
landing the cable was completely solved.
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Appendix to Chapter V
The Report of Mr. Scott after His visit to Port Hamilton.1
Sir,
IN obedience to your instructions, I have now the honour to 
submit a Report of my visit to Port Hamilton. On my arrival there 
on the 21st instant, I immediately reported myself, as directed, 
to Admiral Sir William Dowell. His Excellency recapitulated the 
difficulties which he had encountered owing to the absence of a 
competent Korean interpreter; he had, however, secured a lease of 
eleven plots of land on Observatory Island, at an annual rental of 
124 dollars; but that two more plots, at least, were urgently 
required to provide a site for the erection of a hospital, &c., for 
100 marines now encamped on the island. His Excellency 
specially desired me to ascertain the position of affairs vis-a- 
vis of the native inhabitants.
In execution of these instruction, I placed myself under the 
direction of Captain Long, of Her Majesty's ship 'Agamemnon' and 
early next day visited Observatory Island-known locally as "Ai- 
to," or "Japanese lsland"-the smallest of the three forming the 
Nan-how Groups, and guarding and dividing the two entrances to 
Port Hamilton. The island consists of a rising hill some 300 feet 
high, with about sixty patches of cultivated land scattered over 
its south and west faces, owned by nearly forty d ifficu lt 
proprietors. These are no Koreans living on it, and at the time of
1. Mr. J. Scott to Consul-General Aston, August 31, 1885, F.O. 405/35,
Inclosure 2 in No. 201.
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the occupation only a few straw huts-supposed to belong to 
Japanese fishermen-were found near the landing-peace. After 
some time and inquiry, I succeeded in collecting the land-owners 
or their representatives, and explaining to them Captain Long's 
wishes regarding renting certain plots; the owner of each field 
was called out, and the boundaries of his property publicly walked 
over in the presence of the other land-owners and village 
Headmen. Captain Long's object was to ascertain at what rate it 
was possible to obtain a lease. If necessary hereafter, of the 
whole of the island; and the result of that day's inquires showed 
clearly that the cultivated land could be secured for about 1,000 
dollars annually; the remainder is government property, and lying 
waste.
Two lots, Nos. 12 and 24 (according to the Admiralty plan of 
the island), being urgently required for a marine hospital and 
other purposes, a lease was at once arranged at an annual rental 
of 24 dollars and 26 dollars respectively. As regards the other 
lots, some twelve in number, the owner's name, the price, and 
other particulars were duly noted, and the proprietors informed 
that the land would be taken up from time to time as hereafter 
required. This decision caused some disappointment. I had been 
led to anticipate no small d ifficulty in negotiating a lease of 
their lands, but, contrary to my expectation, the people were 
exceedingly friendly, and ready to close with a good bargain.
So far my work for the first day was chiefly conducted 
through what the Admiral understood to be the principal Headmen 
of the islands; the existence or presence of any Korean official 
was unknown to the naval authorities. During my negotiations
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with the land-owners, however, I found out, that this man was 
only one of the Headmen belonging to Tek-tsun ("Merlin village"), 
one of the four villages into which the inhabitants are divided; 
and that the three islands were under the jurisdiction of a Korean 
official of the rank of Pyl-chong, or Police Magistrate, named Kim 
Kil-so. Deeming it highly advisable to procure, if possible, the 
consent and presence of a properly constituted Korean authority 
to the transfer of these two lots, I called early next day upon this 
officer at Chang-tsun ("Pegasus Village"), only to find that he had 
gone to look for me on Observatory Island. The village Elders, 
however, received me with great courtesy and kindness. There is 
no official Yamen, but at each village a large tent is erected near 
the beach, which serves the double purpose of Hall of Assembly
and Court of Justice. I left after a little, intimating that I would
call again as soon as the Pyel-chong returned. Early that
afternoon, however, this officer, accompanied by the village 
Elders, came on board Her Majesty's ship 'Swift,' and went with 
me to call on Captain Long of Her Majesty's ship 'Agamemnon.'
In answer to Pyel-chong's inquiries, Captain Long assured him 
that there was no intention on the part of Her Majesty's
Government to deprive the people of their land or property, or 
injure them in any way; and that as regards the land-tax for land 
already leased, or now about to be leased, it would continue to be 
paid as formerly by the native lessors. These assurances, and 
especially as regards the payment of land-tax, appeared to 
relieve him considerably, and in subsequent meetings with the 
village Elders and land-owners I explained, at his request, to the 
lessors, that the Korean Government taxes were to be paid to
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the ir authorities as heretofore. This intim ation did not 
altogether suit the Headmen of "Merlin village," but I carefully 
pointed out to him that the high rate which Her Majesty's 
Government was now giving for the lease of the land was intended 
to cover the payment of all dues hitherto paid to the Korean 
Government. It appears that this Headman looked to British 
protection, and wished to repudiate all liability for taxes to his 
own authorities. It is due to him to say that he has rendered 
considerable assistance to the naval authorities, both in leasing 
land and in procuring workmen. He has made himself useful in 
many ways, and deserves all support and countenance; but, under 
the circumstances, I felt it my duty to advise him to cooperate 
with the Pyel-chong and pay Korean taxes, adding that if he was 
molested by the authorities from the mainland, as he said he 
anticipated, he might rely upon English assistance against unjust 
exactions.
On the 24th instant the Pyel-chong, accompanied by the 
village Elders and the owners of lots Nos.12 and 24, again called 
on board Her Majesty's ship 'Agamemnon' to complete the lease of 
these two fields. Among the party was a Korean, whom, from his 
manner and speech, I took to be an outsider. The Pyel-chong 
showed him great deference, evidently dreading his power, and 
did nothing without first consulting him. I understand that he is 
a Yamen runner of the better class, sent over from the mainland 
to watch and report proceedings. In all my negotiations with the 
villagers he took a leading part, and I learn that on previous 
occasions he has proved obstructive to the naval authorities. In 
the present instance, however, he threw no difficulties in my 
way; on the contrary, he actually assisted me, and, at my request,
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drew up the deeds of lease for lots. 12 and 24. These documents 
are in the form usually adopted for such transfers In Korea; but in 
order to mark the boundaries, &c. (the owners could give no 
measurements; all they could do was to walk over the 
boundaries), I succeeded in inducing him to insert a clause 
accepting the plan of survey drawn up by the naval authorities. 
Accordingly, the deeds for lease of these two lots were duly 
signed and executed before the Pyel-chong and the village Elders.
A request was now preferred on behalf of the lessors of the 
first eleven lots for duplicate deeds of lease, as in the case of 
these lots Nos. 12 and 24. It appears that the deeds of lease for
these eleven lots were signed by the owners and handed to
Captain Long, and Senior Naval Officers; but no corresponding 
documents had been supplied to the owners by the naval 
authorities. It was urged that the want of such documents might 
lead to difficulties in claiming payment of the annual rent.
Captain Long readily undertook to rectify this omission, and 
that afternoon the duplicate deeds were made out and handed, as 
arranged by the Pyel-chong, to the Headman of "Merlin village," 
for distribution among the owners.
The Pyel-chong further requested that all future leases might 
only be executed in his presence, and to this Captain Long at once 
assented; and two days after, when lot No. 25, which was required 
to complete lots Nos. 12 and 24, so as to admit of full access to 
the top of the hill on that part of the island, was being leased, the
deeds were duly executed before him and village Elders.
The land now leased by the naval authorities consists of lots 
Nos. 1 to 12 and lots Nos. 24 and 25 (as per Admiralty survey) on
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Observatory Island, measuring about 10 acres in extent, and held 
at an annual rental of 174 dollars.
Application was next made by the village Elders for the 
payment of wages in cash instead of rice. On the arrival of our 
flee t in April last the villagers were in a most destitute 
condition, their supplies of food being almost exhausted. Labour 
was therefore paid for in rice, 6 1 bs. being allowed to each 
workman. The result has been that they have now such a stock on 
hand that its value is fast depreciating, especially as they have 
no means of exporting any of it.
The settlement of this wages question was one of no little 
difficulty. The villagers are keen at driving a bargain, and 
pleaded that they deserved generous treatment, as the presence 
of our men-of-war in the harbour had driven away the fish on 
which they usually depended at this season of the year for their 
living. Eventually, Admiral Dowell fixed the rate at 75 Korean 
cash (about 6 L.) per man per day; an amount which, in my 
experience of Korean labour and wages, is not only ample, but 
libera l.
The Pyel-chong also desired to know whether Korean traders 
and pedlars might come and go as formerly. I assured him, and 
this language I reported to the Admiral that England had no wish 
to injure Korea or Koreans in any way, and that, so far as Korean 
subjects were concerned, things were to go on exactly as they had 
been doing previous to the arrival of our ships.
I may here add that the Pyel-chong and village Elders showed 
considerable knowledge of political affairs affecting Korea, and 
they declared that they fully understood that the presence of our
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fleet in these waters was in no way directed against their 
country.
Captain Long next directed me to proceed to Pusan to procure 
Korean cash to pay the workmen now employed on Observatory 
Island. He also instructed me to sound the Korean authorities at 
that place regarding the export of cattle for the use of Her 
Majesty's fleet at Port Hamilton. The few hours at my disposal in 
Pusan prevented me from calling on the Prefect, who acts as 
Superintendent of Customs. He lives some 8 or 10 miles inland, 
but the Deputy-Superintendent assured me that there would be no 
difficulty or objections raised by the authorities to such export; 
in fact, he appeared to consider it a good thing for the people and 
district. Arrangements are now being discussed with the local 
merchants and the Mitsu-Bishi Mail Company to call twice a 
month with cattle, as their vessels pass Port Hamilton en route 
to Chemulpo.
So far the occupation of Port Hamilton may be said to be 
practically confined to Observatory Island, where 100 marines 
are encamped, and on which no Koreans have hitherto resided. The 
works in progress consist of a boat harbour, pier and praya, 
roadmaking, two wooden godowns, gun-cotton magazine, huts for 
the marines and an hospital. A small wooden shed has also been 
erected as a telegraph office and dwelling-house, all within the 
limits of land acquired by lease. On the other two islands no land 
has been touched beyond the erection of flagstaffs on each; one, 
however, of these poles has been removed and erected on 
Observatory Island, and the other, I understand, will shortly be 
taken down.
I beg to inclose copy of Admiral Sir W. Dowell's notice
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regarding the payment of wages, and defining the action he 
intends to take in cases of that or other crimes. This document I 
translated, at his request, into Chinese and Korean; one copy was 
posted on Observatory Island, and one I left with Korean Police 
Magistrate.
I have, &c.
(signed) JAMES SCOTT.
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CHAPTER VI: THE LAST PHASE OF THE PORT HAMILTON AFFAIR,
FEBRUARY 1886- FEBRUARY 1887.
1. ROSEBERY'S TERM OF OFFICE; FEBRUARY - AUGUST, 1886.
1.1. RECONSIDERATION OF THE STRATEGIC VALUE.
| |S| the light of recent reports including that of the late 
Com m ander-in-ch ief on the China Station, the Adm ira lty 
examined the strategic value of Port Hamilton from early 1886. 
The substance of the reports was that it was not desirable to 
hold Port Hamilton as a naval station, unless the island was to be 
a first-class fortress, and that there were considerable expenses 
connected with the temporary retention of Port Hamilton.
At first, the inexpediencies of the naval station were 
analyzed as follows:-
1. Captain Maclear, of the 'Flying Fish', in a very able 
Memorandum on the defences of Port Hamilton, observed: "To 
defend it against the attack of two corvettes, three sloops and a 
gun-boat would be required." It meant the island was not easily 
defendable.1
2. The Port Hamilton force at that time consisted of six 
vessels, three of which were always to be there. On the other 
hand, Hong Kong and Singapore, with their immense trade, were at 
the time defenceless, as far as the War Office was concerned. It 
meant that Port Hamilton hampered the disposal of the Eastern 
squadron to guard "the British ocean highway" and protect these 
important ports.2
3. In recommending that Port Hamilton be placed on the
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same footing as Ascension, it was pointed out that this would 
place an additional force at the disposal of the Commander- 
in-chief for an attack on Vladivostock; being equally responsible 
for the defence of Port Hamilton, he would be sure not to unduly 
weaken its garrison until well assured no hostile attack was 
probable. As a base of operations against Vladivostock, however, 
it was useless on account of its distance. In the war against 
China in 1860, Hope Sound, about 100 miles from the mouth of 
the Peiho, was seized on as the rendezvous for the British 
transports, colliers, and victuallers. Vladivostock is 660 miles 
from Port Hamilton: the British gun-boats would exhaust all 
their coal in steaming to and fro to replenish. Moreover, the 
facilities of moving ships, and stores from Hong Kong would then 
be as great or greater to Vladivostock as it was in 1860 to Hope 
Sound, the distance being 1,700 miles against 1,300 then, and 
there were good harbours, easily defended, within a short 
distance of Vladivostock that could be seized on as a base, and 
given up when no longer of use.3
4. If the navy were to be employed doing military duty by 
garrisoning the island, it would be a great source of weakness to 
the Naval Commander-in-chief in war time, as at least six ships 
should have to be diverted from their proper duty of protecting 
commerce at sea, and the Naval Commander-in-chief, instead of 
devoting his sole attention to that most important duty, would 
find Port Hamilton a serious addition to his responsibilities.4
5. Port Hamilton was not a good typhoon harbour, which 
must be a very important consideration for a naval station; for 
example., two or three large vessels might find shelter in a 
typhoon by anchoring to the north-east of the island; but any one
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going there for shelter from a typhoon would have to make up his 
mind to give his ship plenty of cable at once, so that with the 
wind in the northeast, which was probably the quarter from 
which typhoon winds began in this neighbourhood, she should not 
start her anchor, as if she did so she would be dragged out of the 
safe part of the anchorage, and expose herself to the wind and sea 
when the shift to the south-east took place.5
6 . The want of water was a serious objection also to 
forming a settlement. There were many small streams of water 
that found their way into the sea, and several springs inland that 
were used by the natives, but such of these as were analyzed 
were all more or less impure, and the supply of water from those 
running into the harbour failed after two or three weeks of dry 
w eather.6
Next, to fortify Port Hamilton efficiently great expense 
would have to be incurred, or if defended by the navy still greater. 
It had already cost 300,000 L. or 400,000 L., if in that sum was 
included, as ought to be the case, the expense of the large 
squadron constantly kept there to protect the ninety-five marines 
forming the garrison.7 Concretely, the expense which it would be 
absolutely necessary to incur if Port Hamilton was retained 
through another winter would be as follows:-
1 . The men's huts were clean and well kept, and comfortable 
as long as there was fine weather : but it would not be advisable, 
nor would it be right, to allow either officers or men to be 
exposed to another winter, especially the officers, whose huts 
were on a higher level and consequently colder, without means 
being taken to make all the huts both air-tight and water-tight.
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Therefore, some expense would be necessary to make the huts 
warm and comfortable.8
2 . The hospital was clean and of sufficient size for the 
number of men, but the same applied to it as to the officers' and 
men's huts.9
3. The cooking-house was a temporary building, and a new 
stove large enough to cook for 100 men was required, as the 
present one was too small and really belonged to the telegraph 
operators who left it behind. Therefore, some expense would 
necessary to produce a suitable stove, together with thirty of 
Hinx's paraffin lamps for lighting the huts, the Service lanterns 
being of no use.10
4. The means of supplying water were bad; a gun-boat 
stationed off Observatory Island had to be continually condensing 
it, as the water on the island, although plentiful, was condemned 
by the medical officers of the fleet, as unsafe for drinking 
purposes. Several large tanks were brought up in the 'Audacious' 
that time, and would be set up and filled, in case it should be
necessary for the gun-boat to be withdrawn for any length of
time; but the great difficulty was getting the water from the
landing-place to the huts; the elevation and state of the road 
rendering it impossible to drag the water-cart (supplied from 
Hong Kong, which was much too heavy and large) up the incline. 
Therefore, some expense would be necessary to set up new 
condensers to solve this problem.11
A base for the navy must be one in which they would be 
secure when unable, from any cause, to stay at sea which was 
their proper zone of activity, and to protect commerce by driving
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the enemy's ships from the sea; this could not be done if the navy 
was condemned to be on the defensive, remaining in port, and 
guarding its own base. Consequently, the Admiralty told the 
government on 19 March, that, unless it was the intention of the 
British Government to fortify and garrison the island, so as to 
place it in a proper condition of defence to resist the attack of 
iron-clads, they were decidedly of the opinion that it was not 
advisable to retain possession of Port Hamilton. 12
1.2. A RENEWAL OF THE KOREAN PROTEST.
O'Conor had received a note from the President, Kim Yun-sik, 
respecting the subject of Port Hamilton on 23 January. In the 
note, Kim at first referred to previous correspondence with 
O'Conor in regard to Port Hamilton. In his despatch dated 21 July 
1885, in reply to Kim's note demanding the withdrawal of British 
forces from Port Hamilton, O 'conor had said that it was 
unnecessary to refer to the reasons for the temporary occupation 
of Port Hamilton,-they had already been clearly set forth-the 
action was not prompted by any unfriendly feeling towards Korea, 
far less from any desire to injure her interests or dignity. O'Conor 
further stated that a request of that important character was one 
to which he was in no way competent to reply. O'Conor had
therefore sent a copy of Kim's note to London. Some delay,
O'Conor continued, would necessarily and unavoidably occur 
before an answer could be received, even by telegraph, and 
O'Conor expressed a hope that the receipt of that answer would be 
awaited in the expectation of some mutual arrangement between 
the two governments.
Kim now pointed out in his note that nine months had already
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elapsed, in sp ite of his urgent le tters and personal
representations on the matter, and he stated that a new year was 
approaching with no prospect of a reply; the King of Korea, who 
valued every inch of his territory, could not permit the case to 
hang over unsettled into another year. He continued that in
consideration of the amicable spirit of the British Government, he 
could not well appeal to the Powers, but the King of Korea had 
specially directed him to come to a speedy settlement and not 
incur further delay.1
On 28 February, O'Conor, in reply, repeated to Kim that the 
occupation of Port Hamilton was not connected with any desire 
for territorial aggrandizement, or to act in a manner prejudicial 
to the dignity and welfare of the King or the British Government. 
He stated that it was difficult to understand why, under these 
circumstances, an arrangement was not possible which would 
combine and satisfy the common interests of both countries, and 
by a mutual understanding remove any ground of complaint on the 
part of the Korean Government, while tending to increase the 
friendly relations which it had always been the desire of the
British Government to maintain with that of the King of Korea.
Therefore, O’Conor stressed that the British Governm ent 
continued to desire a settlement of this question which would 
duly respect the sovereign rights and interests of Korea, and at 
the same time be satisfactory to the general interests of both 
countries .2
On 4 July, So Svana-vou. the new President of the Korean 
Foreign Office sent a note to Sir J. Walsham. O'Conor's successor, 
respecting the question of Port Hamilton again. So said that he
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remained quietly awaiting a favourable reply, which had not as 
yet been forthcoming, although O'Conor's note of 28 February had 
received Kim's careful consideration. In particular, So pointed to 
three grounds on which the British Government could not claim 
justification and four points which he failed to comprehend, and 
which had caused the Korean Government great anxiety.
The three grounds on which the British Government could 
not claim justification were:-
First, the British Government had occupied Port Hamilton 
w ithout giving any notification beforehand, and w ithout the 
sanction of the Korean Government. In taking such action the 
British Government could not claim that it was justified . 
Secondly, for many centuries Korea had maintained the integrity 
of Port Hamilton's territory; but then, when no real emergency 
existed, the British Government continued to occupy (Korean soil) 
in violation of international law, and in complete opposition to 
the interests of the friendly and commercial relations existing 
with the Korean Government. Again the British Government could 
not claim that this was justified.
Thirdly, of Sate years, during repeated negotiations with 
other Powers, it had been represented that, when occasion arose, 
both countries should co-operate in assisting and supporting each 
other. That language the Korean Government fully accepted, and 
in the assurance of future advantages, it threw the country open, 
entered into reciprocal commercial relations with the British 
Government and other Powers, and concluded Treaties containing 
a stipulation that, in the case of differences arising, "the other 
High Contracting Party should exert its good offices to bring
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about an amicable arrangement." When, therefore, before the ink 
of that solemn covenant had lost its freshness, a strong Power 
had ignored its Treaty engagements, forcibly seized an island, and 
continued to occupy it, the whole Korean population would protest 
and declare that it was the British Government which had been
the firs t to adopt such a line of conduct. All feeling of
confidence must inevitably be destroyed and injury ensue to 
commercial intercourse. In this action the British Government 
could not claim that it was justified.
The four points which the President failed to comprehend
w ere :-
First, the question of lending or not lending the islands rested 
with the owner. The President said he had never heard of such a
rule as occupying the place first, and agreeing to a loan of it
afterwards. Secondly a previous note which the Korean Foreign 
Office had had the honour to receive spoke of temporary 
occupation. A year or more had then elapsed, that could not be 
considered temporary.
Thirdly, O'Conor, in his reply of 28 February had written 
that the occupation of Port Hamilton was not connected with any 
desire for territorial aggression nor founded on any intention to 
act in a manner prejudicial to the dignity and welfare of the 
Korean Government. The British Government, which hitherto had 
maintained amicable relations with the Korean Government, ought 
not on account of these insignificant islets to act so as to induce 
loss of self-respect on the part of both countries. The President 
had long been conscious of the feelings of the British Government, 
but in the eyes of other Treaty Powers did not that action of the 
British Government evince a desire for territorial aggression, and
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did it not prejudice the dignity and welfare of the Korean 
Government?
Fourthly, O'Conor, in his reply of 28 February, had further 
stated that it was d ifficu lt to understand why under these 
circumstances no arrangement was possible which would 
combine and satisfy the common interests of both countries. The 
President enquired on what occasion had the Korean Government 
shown itself reluctant to enter upon any arrangement with the 
British Government consistent with honour; how much more then 
in regard to a arrangement affecting their common interests 
about which the Korean Government was earnestly desirous of 
hearing? The British Government, however, did not know what 
that satisfactory arrangement could be, or how it could combine 
their common interests. If every Power were in future to advance 
such pretexts, th Korean Government would be left without a plea 
in exculpation of itself; what benefit, then would accrue to it 
from an arrangement combining and satisfying common interests? 
Finally, the President So requested Walsham to lay the note 
before the British Government, urging a speedy and satisfactory 
se ttle m e n t.3
With reference to the Korean Foreign Minister's criticism 
of the continued British occupation of Port Hamilton, Walsham 
reported to Rosebery, Salisbury's successor, that the President's 
note was more or less a counterpart of the previous protests that 
had been raised by the Korean Government against the British 
remaining at Port Hamilton in spite of the repeated declaration 
that the occupation was to be only temporary, and a renewal of 
this protest was probably due more to Russian insistence and
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intrigue than to any genuine irritation on the side of the Koreans 
themselves. The reason was that there was unquestionably a 
strong Russian party in Korea, whose aspirations the Russian 
Agent, Waeber, was only too inclined to foster; and, although 
possibly neither the Chinese nor the Korean Government would, if 
left to themselves, treat the prolonged British occupation of Port 
Hamilton as a matter of serious import, they were at the time 
beginning to find their position in respect of Russia extremely 
embarrassing.
At all events, Walsham thought the moment had arrived 
when a defin ite decision should be taken by the British 
Government as to the occupation, and he added that it was too 
late then, in his opinion, to make an offer for purchasing or 
renting the group of islands as a preventive measure against a 
Russian imitation of the British proceedings, and Britain must be 
prepared to see Russia follow the British example, whatever 
might be the British plan for retaining possession of Port 
Ham ilton.4
1.3. PORT LAZAREFF AND A TREATY PORT.
That the Russian Government contemplated seizing a Korean Port 
further south than Vladivostock had, since the British fleet had 
occupied Port Hamilton, been rumoured even more frequently than 
in past years, and Port Lazareff was generally regarded as the 
objective of Russian ambition. Russian interest in Port Lazareff 
was clarified by Hertslet's Memorandum of 4 February 1886. In 
his Memorandum, Hertslet reminisced that Port Lazareff had been 
visited among other places by Mr. Spence when he accompanied
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the Duke of Genoa to Korea in 1880, and in his description of it 
Spence said it was one of the points which the Russians were 
supposed to have designs upon, as a base for operations against 
China; that it was one of the finest harbours in the world, 
perfectly land-locked, with waters as unruffled as a lake, and 
with a practically infinite space of good holding-ground in from 8 
to 10 fathoms of water; and that, though fringed with ice round 
the shores, the harbour was open in winter. In the Report to Sir T. 
W ade , the Chif Superintendent for British Trade in China, of 
August 1882, Spence also said the well-known harbour of Port 
Lazareff was only a few miles off Gensan (Wonsan).1 
"The Times" explained the Russians' interest in the island as 
fo llo w s :-
Port Lazareff, named after the Russian General who so much distinguished 
himself at the capture of Kars, and who died during the progress of the 
Turcoman campaign, is situated on the northern, or more strictly the eastern 
side of the peninsula of Korea. It lies in Y6ng-hung or Broughton's Bay, 
which was discovered by Captain Broughton in 1797, and which contains, 
perhaps, more fine harbours than all the rest of the Korean coasts together.
The bay is filled with numerous islets, of which Chotoku is considered the 
most important, and the flourishing port of Gensan (W6nsan), open to 
external commerce in May 1880, furnishes practical evidences that the 
advantages claimed for the whole of this gulf or bay by navigators are not 
fanciful or based on insufficient information. Port Lazareff itself is situated 
opposite to Gensan, and is east of the Korean town of Y6ng-hung. It is also 
near the mouth of the Dungan river and west of Virginie Bay. Navigation is 
open at all seasons of the year, and the depth of the water as well as highness 
of the tides furnishes additional facilities for making Port Lazareff, at the 
present moment only a geographical term, the headquarters of Russia's 
Pacific squadron. In many of these particulars Vladivostock could not be 
excelled, but its insuperable drawback is that for several of the winter
p
months navigation is closed by the ice.
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In early 1886. Admiral Hamilton reported to London that 
Captain Long of the 'Agamemnon' had been told by a Russian naval 
official that it was not the interest or Policy of Russia to annex 
Port Lazare ff, ow ing to the grea t d ifficu lty  of land 
communication between it and Russian territory, over the rugged 
mountain-range to the north of that port, by which it was 
separated from Russia. As to the d ifficu lty  of land 
communication, it appeared to Hamilton that the harbour of 
Gensan, which, like Port Lazareff, was in Broughton Bay, having 
been declared one of the Treaty Ports, would further embarrass 
Russia in the annexation of Port Lazareff. The trade there, which 
was nil in 1879, had increased to 225,000 L. in 1881, according 
to Spence.3
On 14 April, O'Conor reported to Rosebery respecting the 
rumour about Port Lazareff. O'Conor was inclined to think that 
the rumour about Port Lazareff was a mere echo of a scheme to 
the same effect which Mollendorff had certainly attempted to 
carry out a year or more ago, but which had resulted in nothing 
more important than his ultimate dismissal from the Korean 
se rv ice .4 O'Conor, however, was not inclined to attribute much 
importance to the opinion of Captain Long's informant that it was 
not the interest or policy of Russia to annex this place. If such 
annexation was not effected, it would surely be from more 
serious and valid objections than those given by the Russian naval 
officer to Captain Long , which would scarcely prevail in face of 
the unanimous opinion that the harbour of Port Lazareff was one
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of almost unequalled value for the object Russia had in view.
O'Conor did not think China would tolerate such an act of 
aggression against a country which at that time she was trying to 
reduce further into vassalage. Very probably she would resist it 
by force of arms. However, a civil outbreak in Korea might alter 
matters and give Russia an opportunity of which she would not be 
slow to avail herself. Assuming that such opportunity did occur, 
it would be admitted that Port Lazareff in Russia hands would, in 
the event of war, be a nasty thorn in the British side, and that, 
accordingly, it was the British interest to frustrate any designs 
Russia might entertain in this quarter.
Under the circumstances, O'Conor suggested that if the 
Korean Government could be induced to declare Port Lazareff a 
Treaty port, the danger of its falling into Russia possession 
would be very much lessened, if not altogether removed. He 
pointed out that an opportunity for establishing the status of Port 
Lazareff as a Treaty port would be offered to the Korean 
Government by the Treaty they were about to negotiate with the 
French Minister, who was not unlikely to view with favour the 
chance of inserting in his Treaty an open port which had not been 
given to Britain, Germany, or the United States. But if on further 
consideration it should appear like ly that the vo lun tary 
concession offered by Korea would create suspicion in the mind of 
the French Minister, the British object might still be effected in 
a Treaty between Belgium and Korea. It would not be difficult to 
suggest the advantages of such an instrument between the two 
countries to the President of the Korean Foreign Office, or to the 
Viceroy Li.5
258
Henceforth the British Government began to think of the 
Treaty Port as an idea to solve the problem of Port Hamilton.
1.4. THE FIRST STAGE OF WITHDRAWAL.
With reference to some reports of the Commander-in-chief on the 
China Station which advocated withdrawal from Port Hamilton, 
the British Government began to search for a way of satisfactory 
w ithdrawal in early 1886. When the British Government 
withdrew from the island, they would have to take steps to 
prevent Russia from following their example. The British 
Government hoped to offer some advantage to the Chinese 
Government because the Chinese Government were so hampered by 
the continuous appeals from Russian quarters, and so much in 
dread of what their apparent leaning towards Britain might 
entail, though Chinese mediation between the British and Korean 
Government, proposed by Britain had been agreed to without 
difficulty by the Chinese Government in 1885.
When the British Government asked O'Conor about the 
prospects, he replied to Rosebery on 6 March that it appeared that 
the influence of Waeber had been supported by very strong 
Russian remonstrances to the Viceroy against the partiality 
shown by China in consenting to the British occupation without 
demur or protest, and he also heard that the Russian consul at 
Tien-tsin had told the Viceroy that it was impossible for Russia 
to allow herself to be shut out from the China Seas by the 
occupation by Great Britain of islands which, in case of war, 
would virtually bar the passage south to her ships of war and 
commerce, and that if China and Korea would not insist on the 
evacuation of Port Hamilton, Russia would occupy Port Lazareff,
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or some other station, as a counterbalance to the British 
occupation. The Chinese Government seemed determined to resist 
the execution of these threats by force of arms if necessary, but, 
at the same time, they were watching with considerable 
uneasiness the extensive build-up of armaments reported at 
Vladivostock. They perfectly understood and silently approved 
the reasons for the occupation of Port Hamilton, and in their 
language to him during the late Russian difficulty he had found no 
trace of suspicion in regard to the British action. It was even 
evident that they would have recognized the British occupation 
officially, had it not involved the risk of a serious difference 
with Russia.
Under the circumstances, China would not be likely to 
recognize in a formal manner the British occupation, except on 
the condition of the British Government joining her in a guarantee 
to protect Korean territory against any act of Russian aggression 
arising out of this question. She would certainly be unwilling to 
bear alone the responsibility of the British occupation if Russia 
persisted in her policy of opposition, or to involve herself in 
difficulties which she believed to be mainly due to the British 
ac tion .1
On 11 March, the British Government made to China a 
proposal respecting Port Hamilton:-
Her Majesty's Government have no desire to prolong the occupation of 
Port Hamilton in opposition to the wishes of the Chinese Government, but 
it appears to them that it would be against the interests both of China and 
Britain if it were to be occupied by another European Power. If the 
Chinese Government are prepared to guarantee that no such occupation 
should take place, one of the chief objects which Her Majesty's
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Government had in view in taking possession of Port Hamilton would be 
accomplished. Should the Chinese Government be unwilling to undertake 
such a responsibility, Her Majesty's Government would suggest that 
China should propose to Russia and to the other Powers interested to enter 
into an international arrangement guaranteeing the integrity of Korea. If 
this proposal is accepted, Her Majesty's Government would be ready to 
become parties to the arrangement, and to retire at once from Port 
Hamilton on the understanding that it should be recognized as forming
p
part of the guaranteed territory of Korea.
On 27 March, O'Conor reported to Rosebery on the 
Chinese response to the proposal of 11 March. In conversation 
that morning, the Viceroy inquired whether the British 
Government had come to any decision about Port Hamilton, or 
fixed a time for the British occupation to cease, and he said that 
he had been harassed and worried in the matter by Russia, and 
would be again, but if he could ask Russia whether she would 
give a written engagement not to take Port Hamilton if the 
British Government abandoned the islands, he would be able to 
stop further annoyance. The Viceroy said , however, he could not 
do this, unless he was sure beforehand that on his getting the 
engagement from Russia Britain would give up. In any case, it was 
clear that if the Vicero got the undertaking from Russia, China 
would have no excuse for not formally requesting Britain to leave. 
O'Conor thought that the Viceroy was also, no doubt, aiming at a 
jo in t guarantee for the protection and integrity of Korean 
territory as against Russia, and he added that the Yamen had been 
particularly reticent in this matter for some months.3
In effect, the British Government found a further clue to 
a solution for satisfactory withdrawal from the island in their
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proposal by which China should propose that Russia enter into an 
arrangement guaranteeing the protection of Port Hamilton.
2. IDDESLEIGH'S TERM OF OFFICE; AUGUST.1886- JANUARY, 1887
2.1. RECONSIDERATION OF THE POLITICAL VALUE.
After the British Government occupied Port Hamilton, they heard 
rumours more frequently than in past years respecting Russian 
movements in the Far East, especially in relation to Korea and in 
particular to the occupied islands. (Appendix)
One rumour was contained in a hint which Count Inouye 
gave to the British Government in early July. The mail had brought 
him a despatch from Hanabusa M the Japanese Minister at St. 
Petersburg. The Russian Admiral C h e s ta ko ff had spoken to 
Hanabusa confidentially of his intention, when he arrived in 
Tokyo, of combining with the Japanese Government for jo in t 
measures to procure the removal of the British from Port 
Hamilton. In the announcement by the Russian Government, 
however, the Russian Emperor had confided to him a mission to 
inspect the Russian settlements on the Siberian coasts; the 
mission was not, in fact, a serious one, and health was the real 
reason for his coming.1
In a report from the Commander-in-Chief on the China 
station on 15 July, the truth behind the Russian announcement 
became clear:-
On 3 July Admiral Chestakoff, the Russian Minister of Marine, arrived 
here(Port Hamilton) from Hong Kong and Europe in the transport 'Moskova' 
on the pretence that he could not sleep owing to the throbbing of the screw. I 
visited him in the forenoon, and he returned it shortly after, and then
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proceeded to Observatory Island with me and visited the Marine Camp. He left 
again soon after noon for Vladivostock.
* A further indication was in a report by the minister in 
Russia, to the Foreign Secretary, Iddesleigh, on 15 August, that 
Tseng, then in St. Petersburg had heard that the King of Korea had 
requested a Protectorate over Korea by Russia. China would 
consider this as a first step towards annexation.3 Iddesleigh 
thought that the request would probably be granted by Russia.4
On the other hand, on 11 August, Mr. B abe r, the British 
Acting Consul-General in Korea, to whom Walsham telegraphed in 
order to ascertain what amount of truth was to be attached to the 
rumour had replied to the following effect:-" That Mr. Danny, who, 
is an American and at the time legal adviser of the Korean 
Government, has reported by telegraph to the Viceroy that the 
report is untrue, and has been invented by Britain to damage 
Russia: On the other hand, the Chinese Commissioner in Korea, 
Yuan Shih-k'ai. has assured Baber that he maintains the story to 
be correct."5
Walsham reported to Iddesleigh on 25 August that he was 
inclined to regard the news of 15 August as being exaggerated. 
He said that Tseng, if not an intimate friend of the Viceroy, was 
known to be in constant communication with him: and Walsham 
did not think it at all improbable that the news about the 
Protectorate, which Tseng would give the impression of having 
obtained on the spot, was in reality sent by the Viceroy, and not 
procured in Russia. Walsham added that the Viceroy professed to 
credit the report that the King of Korea had Russian proclivities,
263
and might have been expressing himself in favour of the Russian 
Protectorate: Yuan also professed a short time ago to take a
similar view of the matter, and Tseng who might have had his 
personal reasons for doing so, was not likely to have underrated 
the importance of this political movement in his communications 
with the Viceroy, so that it was not absolutely necessary to place 
im p lic it fa ith in the detailed statem ent made to Morier. 
Moreover, from information which he had received from Korea at 
the time, Walsham believed that although the rumour about the 
Protectorate scheme was not positively without foundation, there 
was good ground for assuming that no great importance need be 
attached to the plan. Although Yuan was still professing anxiety, 
it was probably an invention fabricated to undermine influence of 
certain subordinate Korean Officials, of whose influence with the 
King the Chinese Commissioner was jealous.6
On 7 September, Walsham summarized for Iddesleigh what 
he knew o f the rumour of a Russian Protectorate over Korea as 
follows:-
the probability is that the King, who is supposed to be easily persuaded, may have 
been only too ready to listen to the advice of persons unfavourably disposed towards 
the Chinese commissioner in Korea, and to have looked about for some means of 
escape from the irritating supervision which that official has been attempting to 
exercise over him. The most natural quarter from which to expect aid would be 
Russia, and as there is a Russian party in Korea their influence would have been 
exerted in the direction of the King's views, and might possibly have encouraged him 
to take some step for ascertaining whether the Russian Government would be inclined 
to listen to an appeal for a Protectorate.
The Russian Agent at Seoul, M. Waeber, is credited with having expressed his
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willingness to submit such an appeal to St. Petersburg if it were formally consigned 
to writing; and the Grand Secretary Li, who superintends the relations between 
China and Korea, is equally credited with having instructed the Chinese 
Commissioner to prevent, at all costs, the appeal to Russia being made in a written 
form. Now it is more than probable that the Commissioner would have only too 
willingly shown zeal in the execution of his orders, and this energy on his part may 
have had the effect of strengthening rather than weakening the King's desire to free 
himself from Chinese interference; or it may be that, in spite of his efforts, the King 
was beforehand with him, and got his letter off to St. Petersburgh, in which case the 
Grand Secretary Li would have naturally telegraphed the circumstance to the 
Marquis Ts6ng, whom he knew to be there.7
On 27 September, Walsham had in his possession a copy of 
the letter alleged to have been addressed by these same officials 
to the Russian Agent at Seoul, asking for the protection of Russia, 
but there did not then seem to be any doubt that this document 
was a forgery. Under these circumstances it could scarcely be 
wondered that Russia might have felt irritated at the accusation 
brought against her Representative of having been party to a 
Russian Protectorate intrigue, and she might, of course, be
insisting on some kind of satisfaction.8
On 6 October, as Walsham had anticipated, the Russian 
Charge d 'A ffa ires, M. Lodvzhensk ii came to Tien-tsin in
accordance with instructions from his Government, and solemnly 
declared that Russia had neither addressed overtures to Korea nor
received overtures from Korea with respect to a Russian
pro tec to ra te .9
"Novoye Vremya" of 4 (16) August contained an
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article, translated by Mr. F a irh o lm e . which referred to the 
rumours of Russian designs upon Korea and to Russian Eastern 
policy at the moment:-
Fears are again beginning to be entertained in the west of Europe for the 
integrity of Korea, which is said to be threatened by Russia, and an alliance 
between China and Britain is suggested as the only means of averting this 
danger. Some of the Western Powers evidently attach importance to these 
rumours, and even connect the presence of Admiral Shestakoff in the Far East 
with the Korean question. All these rumours we may safely consign to the 
region of inventions, partly malicious, and partly emanating from excessive 
susceptibility. Nevertheless, in principle, it cannot denied that sooner or 
later Russia must have a thoroughly satisfactory exit on the Pacific, none 
such being afforded by Nikolayevsk or Vladivostock. But this new Eastern 
question will not arise till we have strengthened our position in the Far East, 
and accordingly all rumours of intentions on our part, at the present moment 
deserve no attention whatever, and for the following reasons: in the first 
place, we have not as yet gained any footing in Korea, or established political 
relations at Seoul sufficiently definite to insure our designs on Port Lazareff 
being received with favour by the Korean Government; secondly, Korea is at 
the moment so weak, that the occupation of any part of it by us would 
certainly entail a Chinese occupation, and might bring us in conflict with the 
Celestials. But any such conflict, however, successful we might be, would 
assuredly not be in the interest of Russia. . . . .  .All dispassionate persons, as 
well in Europe as in China, must understand that we have at present no 
intentions whatever in the Far East, and that any aggressive action on our 
part would be a distinct political mistake.10
If true, the British Government would lose the political 
justification of Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Far East as grounds 
for occupying Port Hamilton.
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2.2 THE SECOND STAGE OF WITHDRAWAL.
2.2.A. THE TREATY PORT.
In the latter half of 1886, the British Government frequently 
considered quitting Port Hamilton: at once, if any suitable 
arrangement could be made to prevent Port Hamilton passing into 
hostile hands.
On 5 August, Walsham reported to the British Government 
that he could not suggest any simpler solution of the difficulty 
than the one he ventured to submit of converting Port Lazareff 
and Port Hamilton into Treaty ports.1 The scheme was, he argued, 
unpretending enough, nor had it any special merit beyond, perhaps, 
that of being fairly easy of execution, while it would have 
enabled the British Government to return some kind of definite 
reply to the Korean protests, and would have afforded a slightly 
greater if not positive security against either of the two ports 
being occupied by another Power after the British departure from 
Port Hamilton.2
On 12 August, Iddesleigh told Walsham that the British 
Government approved the suggestion for making Port Lazareff and 
Port Hamilton Treaty ports. He asked Walsham to discuss the 
proposal confidentially with the Yamen as the basis for an 
arrangement by which the occupation of Port Hamilton might be 
term inated. Iddesle igh added, for W alsham 's con fidentia l 
information, that as it appeared from the Admirals' Reports that 
Port Hamilton was of no value to Britain, the British Government 
would be willing to order its immediate evacuation if any 
suitable arrangement could be made which would insure that
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neither it nor Port Lazareff should pass into hostile hands.3
On 27 September, Walsham reported to Iddesleigh that he 
had explained to the Ministers at the Yamen the plan of making 
Ports Hamilton and Lazareff Treaty or open ports. The Ministers 
seemed then disposed to look upon it with favour, but said that 
they would like to think over it before giving a decided opinion. 
Even though Walsham had not yet heard from them again, he 
thought it not improbable that the Ministers might be disinclined 
to compromise themselves by giving any very decided opinion on 
the merits of the projects; and so long as they did not seek to 
minimize the sense of their qualified approval, it would be 
sufficient for all Britain's purposes.4
According to Brenan's Report of 6 October, the Viceroy 
said that he understood that the object of opening two ports was 
merely to afford some guarantee that neither of these places 
should fall into the hands of Russia. As China had since obtained 
satisfactory assurances from Russia that she had no designs 
whatever on Korea, the future security of Port Lazareff and Port 
Hamilton was guaranteed, and there was no necessity to attain 
that end by other measures.5 In Walsham's Report of 8 October, 
too, the Viceroy's modified views in respect of the Treaty port 
scheme which he had previously favoured, arose from Russian 
assurances which would, he considered, effect all that such a 
project was intended to insure, and that, consequently, it was no 
longer necessary. Therefore, Walsham suggested to Iddesleigh 
the propriety of his withdrawing altogether the plan for opening 
Port Lazareff and Hamilton.6
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2.2.B. A SECRET TREATY.
In early October, the Viceroy had expressed himself as ready to 
invite the Yamen to communicate with Walsham, in an official 
note, the assurances which had been formally given to the 
Viceroy by the Russian Charge'd Affaires, M. Lodvzhenskii. to the 
effect that, in the event of the British withdrawing their naval 
force from Port Hamilton, Russia would undertake not to occupy 
Korean territory under any circumstances. The Viceroy had, at the 
same time, given to Walsham to understand that he would not be 
able to take this step for a few days, as, with a view to obtaining 
from the Russian Representative something more substantial, in 
the shape of a guarantee, than mere verbal assurances, he was 
then occupied with Lodyzhenskii in drafting what he called a 
"Secret Treaty," in virtue of which China and Russia would pledge 
themselves to respect the integrity of Korea, and to protect her 
from aggression on the part of any other Power. As soon as these 
negotiations had been concluded, the Viceroy would, he said, be 
prepared to arrange with the Yamen about the note to Walsham.1
On 9 October, Walsham reported to Iddesleigh that it 
seemed clear that the Viceroy's Plan for obtaining a written 
guarantee from Russia was based on the principle indicated in the 
Memorandum submitted to Macartney,2 and that so long as what 
the Viceory called a "Secret Treaty" was restricted to an 
engagement on the part of the two Signatories to respect the 
integrity of Korea, Walsham did not suppose that the British 
Government would see anything objectionable in this modification 
of their own proposals. Walsham added that he doubted very much 
whether the more comprehensive scheme, which would have
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included other Powers besides China and Russia, could be carried 
out at that time. Walsham thought that one of those Powers 
would necessarily have been Japan, but he found that for the time 
being Japan could not be one of the guarantors because there was 
unfortunately a certain amount of unpleasantness apparent in the 
relations between Japan and China, due to serious occurrences at 
Nagasaki which originated in a squabble between some sailors 
from Chinese men-of-war and the Japanese police.3
The British Government told China on 12 October that they 
were awaiting the result of the negotiations for a Secret Treaty 
embodying Russian assurances of non-intervention in Korea in 
the event of the withdrawal of the British Government from Port 
Hamilton. On the following day, the Viceroy stated, in reply, that 
he had already sent a translation of a draft note, which mentioned 
the Russian and the Chinese guarantee of the integrity of Korea, 
to the Yamen, but he thought that it might be supplemented with a 
copy of the joint Agreement when the conditions had been settled. 
The Viceroy further mentioned that the Agreement would be in 
the form of an exchange of notes between him self and 
Lodyzhenskii, but at the time there was a slight difficulty in the 
way of the settlement: Lodyzhenskii had pointed out that self- 
respect alone would make it impossible for Russia to give a bare 
undertaking to keep her hands off Korea. Therefore, Lodyzhenskii 
said, it had been necessary to introduce other matters so that the 
self-denying Clause might be decently included. Finally, the 
Viceroy stated that it was the discussion of these other matters 
that caused delay about the Secret Treaty; namely., there was one 
point which Lodyzhenskii refused to yield, and he was awaiting
270
the instructions of his government.4
On 5 November, Walsham reported to Iddesleigh that the 
Viceroy was trying to obtain from Lodyzhenskii a written 
statement of Russia's promise to respect the integrity of 
Korean territory in the event of the British retiring from Port 
Hamilton. He stated, however, that negotiations for a Secret 
Treaty had terminated without any agreement having been signed, 
and reciprocal verbal assurances had only been given. Walsham 
referred to the formal letter from the Yamen which it was 
proposed to exchange. A note which he had received from the 
Ministers of the Yamen referred in courteous terms to the 
em barrassing position created by the British continuous 
occupation of Port Hamilton, and it at the same time notified the 
denial which had been offic ia lly  given by the Russian 
Government of the recent rumour of a scheme for a Russian 
Protectorate in Korea, as well as their distinct promise that 
Russia would not occupy Korean te rr ito ry  under any 
circumstances after the British evacuation of Port Hamilton. The 
note also mentioned that the Chinese Government insisted upon 
the guarantee during the negotiations and that, on the strength of 
it, they were able, for their part, to give a guarantee to the 
British Government, who, it was therefore hoped, would shortly 
be able to arrange for the ending of the temporary occupation of 
Port Hamilton. Walsham said no mention had been made in the 
note of China having, equally with Russia, pledged herself to 
abstain from seizing territory belonging to Korea, but he could 
not help th inking that th is  om ission would not prove 
d isadvantageous for Britain and China in any possib le
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eventualities, and he doubted whether a more favourable occasion 
for the British withdrawal from Port Hamilton was likely to 
present itse lf.5
Iddesleigh informed Walsham on 19 November that he might 
read the following to the Yamen as the reply of the British 
Government to their note:-
Her Majesty's Government have learnt from your telegram of 5 November 
that the Chinese Government have informed you officially that they are 
prepared, in the event of Her Majesty's Government terminating the 
occupation of Port Hamilton, to guarantee that no part of the territory of 
Korea, including Port Hamilton, will be occupied by a foreign Power. Her 
Majesty's Government are prepared, on the faith of this guarantee, to comply 
with the wishes of the Chinese Government, which have now been officially 
form ulated.6
In early December, the Japanese press criticized 
severely the reported British cession of Port Hamilton to China by 
the announcement of 19 November. They argued that Britain 
should return it to its rightful owner, Korea, and that the creation 
of a Chinese fortress there would be serious danger for Japan as 
well as breach of the Tien-tsin convention of 1885.7 According 
to Plunkett's Report of 18 December, the Japanese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs said that if Britain abandoned it she should return 
it to Korea, but he would otherwise prefer to see Britain remain 
there, and that cession to China would cause a great outcry there, 
and further complicate the Chinese question. The Japanese 
Minister said confidentially, on the other hand, that the Russian 
Minister had made private advances, and suggested co-operation 
with Russia in case of trouble with China. This suggested that
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the Minister for Foreign Affairs might be won over by Russia.8 
On 20 December, the British Government replied to Japan that 
there was no question of a cession of Port Hamilton by Britain to 
China, and the British Government were sincerely anxious for the 
maintenance of a good understanding between Japan and China, 
which was, they were convinced, essential to the interests of 
both countries.9
2.3. THE WITHDRAWAL.
On 29 November, Walsham communicated the contents of 
Iddesleigh's telegram of 19 November to the President and the 
Ministers of the Yamen, all of whom expressed their satisfaction 
at learning that the British Government would be prepared to 
terminate the temporary occupation of Port Hamilton on the 
strength of the formal guarantee which the Chinese Government 
had been able to give officially that, in the event of such 
termination, neither Port Hamilton nor any other part of Korean 
territory would be occupied by a foreign Power. During discussion 
with the Yamen, Walsham asked how this decision could best be 
carried into effect in the interests of Britain and China, which 
the British Government regarded as identical in this matter, and 
he suggested to them that the note respecting the guarantee in 
the terms of its acceptance by Britain should be communicated 
to the Korean Government, with reference to the several notes 
addressed by them to the British Legation on the subject of the 
occupation. Thus, the exceptional c ircum stances which 
necessitated it having happily ceased to exist, the British 
Government would have brought the epesode to a close.
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The Ministers unanimously approved of this suggestion, 
but enquired as to whether there would be any objection to 
acquainting the Korean Government with the fact that China had 
guaranteed the in tegrity of Korean territo ry once British 
occupation had ceased, and that the decision of the British 
Government had been strengthened by this pledge. Walsham said 
that, personally, he could see but one objection, namely, that the 
mention of the guarantee might entail some direct allusion to 
Russia, which possibly the Chinese Government would wish to 
avoid. The ministers considered it would be sufficient to let the 
Korean Government understood that the guarantee which 
circumstances enabled China to offer to Britain had helped to 
influence the British Government in their decision to withdraw 
from Port Hamilton.1 Then, the Yamen proposed to Walsham that 
he should officially inform Korea that the British Government 
were prepared to te rm ina te  occupa tion  because the 
circumstances which led to it were happily over, and because 
their decision had been strengthened by the formal guarantee 
given by China.2
On 4 December, Iddesleigh informed the Admiralty that the 
negotiations between the Chinese and Russian Governments had 
not led to any written Agreement on the part of Russia to respect 
the integrity of Korea, but the Chinese Government had on their 
own behalf offered the required guarantee that no part of Korea, 
including Port Hamilton, should be occupied by any foreign Power 
because they placed on record the distinct promise by Russia not 
to occupy Korean territory under any circumstances if the British 
forces were w ithdrawn from Port Ham ilton. The British
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Government had expressed their readiness, on the guarantee thus 
given by the Government of China, to put an end to the British 
occupation of Port Hamilton. Iddesleigh asked what instructions 
the Admiralty wished to send to Admiral Hamilton with regard to 
the withdrawal of the British force, so that directions could be 
given to Walsham to communicate with the Admiral regarding the 
arrangements to be made with the Korean authorities.3
On 7 December, the Admiralty sent a telegram to the 
Commander-in-chief on the China station:- " Her Majesty's 
Government has decided to withdraw from Port Hamilton. Consult 
with British M inister Peking, and arrange for w ithdrawal of 
garrison, stores, & c., and term inate leases. A separate 
communication will be made as to submarine cable."4
On 10 December, Iddesleigh informed Walsham that he 
was authorized to address an official note on the subject of Port 
Hamilton to the Government of Korea, but before doing so, he 
should obtain from the Yamen a note, suitable for publication in 
case of need, guaranteeing that no part of the territory of Korea 
would be occupied by any foreign Power.5 Walsham, however, 
thought it would be more satisfactory if, instead of merely 
obtaining from the Yamen a note suitable for publication in case 
of need, he could obtain the consent of the Ministers to the 
publication, if deemed necessary by the British Government in 
which the formal guarantee of China for the integrity of Korea 
was recorded. Walsham explained to the Yamen on 24 December 
that the British Government wished him to ascertain whether, 
should any necessity arise for making the correspondence public, 
there would be any objection to such a course on the Part of the
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Chinese Government. The Ministers said that they left the matter 
entirely in British hands, being perfectly willing to sanction the 
publication should it be requisite or advisable in the opinion on 
the British Government.6
Walsham reported to Iddesleigh on 27 December that he 
had addressed a note to the Korean Government, which should 
reach its destination in about three weeks. Walsham added that he 
had arranged with the Admiral that he could prepare to withdraw 
about that date, and had asked him to notify the act itself to the 
Korean Government through the Consul-General.7 On the same 
day, Hamilton reported to the Admiralty, "Have communicated 
w ith British M in ister at Peking, who inform ed me that 
negotiations with Government of Korea would take some time. 
Propose to withdraw detachment of Royal Marines and stores 
before w inter sets in, leaving a ship till negotiations are 
complete, as we merely hoisted flag. Think it unlooked-for 
term ination haul flag down and withdraw, leaving place in 
possession of Korea Chief."8 After two days, Hamilton reported 
again, "Submit sending 'H imalaya' Port Hamilton to bring 
detachment of Royal Marines and stores to Hong Kong. Would 
occupy her about a fortnight."9
On 18 January, 1887, Hamilton reported to the Admiralty 
as follows:-
Captain Dacres, of the 'Constance', has, in pursuance of my order, had all 
stores, & c., surveyed and trailed at Port Hamilton, and placed everything in 
perfect readiness for the immediate withdrawal of the marines, and all stores 
on the 'Himalaya's' arrival there. He calculates it will take three days to get 
the stores on board her, one day to embark the marines, and one day to take
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down the huts, so that in one week after her arrival she will be able to start 
on her return voyage to Hong Kong. Advertisements have been entered in the 
Japanese papers at Nagasaki relative to the huts and logs of timber for sale at 
Port Hamilton. Should no reasonable offer be made, the huts and as much 
timber as can be stowed will be brought down to Hong Kong in the 'Himalaya', 
and what she cannot take the 'Constance' will ship and sell at Nagasaki for 
what it will fetch.19
On the other hand, in view of Britain's withdrawing from 
Port Hamilton, the question of parting with the cable (which was 
Admiralty property) to the Great Eastern Telegraph Company, as 
suggested by Walsham, would be a matter for future negotiation; 
but the interest of the Admiralty in the sites temporarily leased 
for naval purposes would lapse on the term ination of the 
occupation of the island.11 The Admiralty made suggestions to 
the Government, therefore, for the ultimate disposal of the 
telegraph cable to Port Hamilton.12 On 27 December, Iddesleigh 
telegraphed Walsham, "Admiralty wish to sell cable to Port 
Hamilton for 30,000 L., being less than half its cost. Would the 
Chinese Government like to purchase with the view  of 
establishing telegraphic communication with Korea?"13 Walsham 
reported on 5 January, 1887, "the Chinese Government thank the 
British Government for opportunity given of purchasing cable, but 
do not want it, having land line with Korea. This decision is taken 
after reference to the Viceroy Li, Superintendent of Telegraph. 
No allusion made to conditions on which landing of cable on 
Saddle Island was allowed, but I venture to call attention to 
correspondence during 1885, in order to prevent questions 
respecting its removal from Chinese territory."14
In the House of Commons, on 2 February 1887, Mr. B rvce
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m . p  asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
whether it was the fact that Port Hamilton was to be shortly 
evacuated by the British forces, and, if so, what arrangements 
had been made with the Chinese or any other Government 
regarding its future custody. Sir J. Fergusson answered, " No 
arrangements have been made respecting its future custody; but 
it is understood that a Korean official will be present at the time 
of the departure of the British ships. No conditions have been 
made with the Korean Government, but the British Government did 
not determine to retire from Port Hamilton till they had received 
a guarantee from the Chinese Government that no part of Korea, 
including Port Hamilton, will be occupied by any foreign Power. 
The British Government acted under naval advice when they 
decided to leave Port Hamilton."15
In the House of Commons, 3 February 1887, Captain 
Colomb asked whether the government had acted upon naval 
advice; and if, so, what had been the expenditure from Imperial 
funds incurred from the date of occupation down to that time at 
Port Hamilton. Lord G. Hamilton answered as follows:-
Sir William Dowell, the Naval Commander-in-chief, was directed by the 
Admiralty to occupy Port Hamilton in May 1885. A change of government 
took place, and shortly afterwards a Report was received from Sir W. Dowell 
in which he pointed out that it was unsuitable for the purposes for which it 
had been temporarily occupied, and he advocated its abandonment. I was then 
at the Admiralty, and I found that both the Naval Members of the Board and 
Sir George Wills, who had preceded Sir W. Dowell were strongly of the same 
opinion. Admiral Hamilton, who succeeded Dowell in the autumn of 1885, 
was specially instructed to report upon the whole matter, and he has sent in a 
series of Reports to the effect that the retention of the place is a waste of
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money in time of peace and a source of weakness in time of war. The main
civil cost of occupation has been the laying down of a cable between Port
Hamilton and Hong Kong, and a certain sum has been spent in building huts for
stores and Marines. The total direct expenditure has not yet been brought to
1 fiaccount; I cannot, therefore, state the approximate amount."
On 28 February 1887, Hamilton reported to the Admiralty, 
"Flag hauled down Port Hamilton 27th. Cable under charge of 
C hief."17 Walsham reported to the government on 2 March that he 
had just received the reply of the Korean Government to his 
notification of withdrawal. In the reply, it recorded its belief 
that the British Government did not originally intend to occupy 
the place, and testified to their good faith and friendship in 
evacuating it altogether, and it held that relations between the 
two countries would therefore be stronger than ever, and that the 
action of the British Government was highly appreciated.18
Thereby, the British mission to Port Hamilton was 
completely over.
279
ENDNOTES OF CHAPTER VI
<Reconsideration of the Strategic View>
1. Vice-Admiral Hamilton to the Secretary to the Admiralty, 7 
December 1885, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure 1 in No. 2.
2. I bid.
3. Hamilton to the Secretary to the Admiralty, 1 June 1886,
F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No.45.
4. Hamilton to Macgregor, 6 August 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure
in No. 106.
5. Report on Port Hamilton by Captain Powlett, R. N., Her
Majesty's ship 'Champion', 7 April 1886, F.O. 405/36,
Inclosure in No. 36.
6. I bid.
7. Hamilton to the Sacretary to the Admiralty, 1 June 1886,
F.O. 405/36, Inclosure 4 in No. 46.
8. Hamilton to the Secretary to the Admiralty, 2 June 1886,
F.O. 405/36, Inclosure 5 in No. 46.
9. I bid .
10. I bid.
1 1 . 1 bid.
12. The Secretary to the Admiralty to Currie, 19 March 1886,
(rec'd 20 March), F.O. 405/36, No.19.
< A Renewal of the Korean Protest>
1. Kim to O'Conor, Translation. 23 January 1886, F.O. 405/36, 
Inclosure in No. 25.
280
2. O'Conor to Kim, 28 February 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in 
No.27.
3. So Syang-you to Walsham, Translation. 4 July 1886, F.O. 
405/36, Inclosure in No.84.
4. Walsham to Rosebery, No. 245, 1 August 1886, F.O. 405/36, 
No.84.
< Port Lazareff and a Treaty Port>
1. Memorandum by Hertslet, 4 February 1886, F.O. 405/36, No.9.
2. Port Lazareff, "The Times" 22 July 1886, p.6.
3. Hamilton to the Secretary to the Admiralty, 14 December 
1885, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No.3.
4. O'Conor to Rosebery, No.148, 3 May 1886 (Rec'd 26 June),
F.O. 405/36, No.41.
5. O'Conor to Rosebery, No. 125, 14 April 1886 (rec'd 14 June),
F.O. 405/36, No.39.
< The first stage of w ithdraw al
1. O'Conor to Rosebery, No.74, 6 March 1886 (rec'd 3 May),
F.O. 405/36, No. 27.
2. Memorandum on proposed Answer to the Communication made 
by Sir H. Macartney on 11 March with regard to Port Hamilton. 
14 April 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No.23.
3. O.Conor to Rosebery, No. 109, 27 March 1886 (rec'd 17 May),
F.O. 405/36, No 31.
< The Reconsideration of the Political Value>
1. Plunkett to Rosebery, No. 116 secret. 9 July 1886 (rec'd 16 
August), F.O. 405/36, No 60.
281
2. Awdry to Currie, 11 September 1886, (rec'd 14 September),
F.O. 405/36, No. 77.
3. Morier to Iddesleigh, telegraph, 15 August 1886, (rec'd 15 
August), F.O. 405/36, No. 59.
4. Iddesleigh to Walsham, No. 233, Ext. 51, 16 August 1886,
F.O. 405/36, No. 61.
5. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 255, 11 August 1886, (rec'd 1 
October), F.O. 405/36, No. 85.
6. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 261, Ext. 58, 25 August 1886,
(rec'd 19 October), F.O. 405/36, No. 99.
7. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 268, 7 September 1886
(rec'd 1 November), F.O. 405/36, No. 100.
8. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 279, Ext. 62, 27 September 1886
(rec'd 18 November), F.O. 405/36, No. 107.
9. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 284, Ext. 63, 6 October 1886
(rec'd 30 November), F.O. 405/36, No. 110.
10. Extract from the "Novoye Vremya" of 4 August(16), 1886,
F.O. 405/36, inclosure in No. 70.
< The second stage of withdrawal; the Treaty Port>
1. Walsham to Rosebery, F.O. 405/36, No. 84.
2. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 287, 9 October 1886 (rec'd 30 
November), F.O. 405/36, No. 113.
3. Iddesleigh to Walsham, No. 226, Ext. 49, 12 August 1886, F.O. 
405/36, No. 56.
4. Walsham to Iddesleigh, F.O. 403/36, No. 107.
5. Walsham to Iddesleigh, F.O. 405/36, No. 113.
282
6. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 286, Ext. 64. 8 October 1886,
(rec'd 30 November), F.O. 405/36, No. 112.
< A Secret Treaty >
1. Walsham to Iddesleigh, F.O. 405/36, No. 112.
2. Memorandum of proposed Answer to the Communication made 
by Sir H. Macartney on 11 March with regard to Port Hamilton. 
F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No.23.
3. Walsham to Iddesleigh, F.O. 405/36, No.113.
4. Brenan to Walsham, 13 October 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure 
in No.123
5. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 297, Ext. 65, 5 November 1886
(rec'd 5 November), F.O. 405/36, No. 102.
6. Iddesleigh to Walsham, No. 57, telegraph, 19 November 1886, 
F.O. 405/36, No. 108.
7. Plunkett to Iddesleigh, No. 21, telegraph, 17 December 1886,
(rec'd 17 December), F.O. 405/36, No.125; After the defeat
of the Coup of 1884, the agreement, signed on 18 April 1885, 
called for troops of both China and Japan in Korea to be 
withdrawn within four months of its signing, stipulated that 
neither signatory send military instructors to Korea, and
provided for prior notification to the other party if troops
were to be dispatched to Korea in the future; Lee, A New 
History of Korea, p. 279.
8. Plunkett to Iddesleigh, No. 22, telegraph, 18 December 1886,
(rec'd 18 December). F.O. 405/36, No. 126.
9. Iddesleigh to Plunkett, No. 80. Ext. 21, 20 December 1886 ,
F.O. 405/36, No. 128.
283
<The W ith d raw a l
1. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 307, 1 December 1886 (rec'd 28 
January 1887), F.O. 405/37, No. 6.
2. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 69, telegraph, 1 December 1886,
(rec'd 3 December), F.O. 405/36, No.114.
3. Currie to Macgregor, 4 December 1886, F.O. 405/36, No.116.
4. Draft Telegram to the Commander-in-chief on the China 
Station, 7 December 1886, F.O. 405/36, Inclosure in No.118.
5. Iddesleigh to Walsham, No. 318. Ext. 60, 10 December 1886,
F.O. 405/36, No. 120.
6. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 319, 25 December 1886
(rec'd 21 February 1887), F.O. 405/37, No.15.
7. Walsham to Iddsleigh, No. 73. telegraph, 27 December 1886
(rec'd 28 December), F.O. 405/36, No. 138.
8. Hamilton to Admiralty, telegraph, 27 December 1886, F.O.
405/37, Inclosure 1 in No. 1.
9. Hamilton to Admiralty, telegraph, 29 December 1886, F.O.
405/37, Inclosure 2 in No. 1.
10. Hamilton to Admiralty, 18 January 1887, F.O. 405/37, 
Inclosure in No.16.
11. The secretary to the Admiralty to Currie, 18 August 1886,
(rec'd 20 August), F.O. 405/36, No. 67.
12. Macgregor to Currie, 21 December 1886 (rec'd 23 December),
F.O. 405/36, No. 132.
13. Iddesleigh to Walsham No. 62. telegraph, 27 December 1886, 
F.O. 405/36, No. 136.
284
14. Walsham to Iddesleigh, No.2, telegraph, 5 January 1887 (rec'd 
5 January), F.O. 405/37, No.2.
15. Question asked in the House of Commons, 2 February 1887; 
and Answer, F.O. 405/37, No. 10..
16. Question asked in the House of Commons, 3 February 1887; 
and Answer, F.O. 405/37, No.11
17. Hamilton to Admiralty, telegraph, 28 February 1887, F.O. 
405/37, Inclosure in No. 18. These seems to be discrepancy 
here:- recording Flag hauled down Port Hamilton on 23 March 
1887, In the Despatch Box Port Hamilton-Loo o f Senior 
Office: Enclose in China le tter No. 200 o f 1887. Adm. 
116/71, case 231, part 3.
18. Walsham to Salisbury, No. 8, telegraph, 2 March 1887, (rec'd 2 
March), F.O. 405/37, No. 20.
285
Appendix to Chapter VI
Russian Cruizer off the North-East Coast of Korea.1
Report by the Governor of Ham-gy6ng Province.
(T ra n s la tio n .)
THE Governor of Ham-gyong Province refers to the 
arrival on the 6th May of a vessel of peculiar construction at the 
Shin Po anchorage, below Puk Chhon. He now further reports that 
on 20 June, about noon, a three-masted vessel, of peculiar 
construction, arrived off the Shin Po anchorage; that two boats 
crews, consisting of some twenty men, armed with rifles, landed 
as they chose, and went through the villages in separate parties. 
The Prefect, being unable to ignore such a proceeding on the sea-
coast, went off to the Russian vessel, on board of which he was
received by the Captain, and his Interpreter, Kim Tek-ou. Some 
conversation took place, and when the Captain mentioned that his 
vessel was returning next day, the Prefect, conscious of his duty
as the host, presented them with a living pig eight fowls, and 200
eggs. Towards 4 O'clock of that afternoon the vessel left, 
steaming northwards.
It is very strange and suspicious that the document which 
the Captain said had been issued by the Korean Government has 
never been received at the Governor's residence. Nor does the 
Governor comprehend what the Captain meant when he spoke, in
1 Extract from the Korean "Weekly Gazette" of 16 July 1886, F.O. 405/36,
Inclosure 3 in No. 84
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connection with this survey work, of finding a good anchorage for 
vessels, in view of the strained relations between his country and 
England, as also his wish for the opening of a port to trade.
A copy of the interview between the Prefect and the 
Captain is herewith submitted for the consideration of the 
government and of the Home Department.
Orders have been issued by the Governor to the seaboard 
officials, enjoining on them to maintain a careful watch over any 
further movements.
Translation of Minutes o f Conversation between the Prefect of
Puk Chhon, on Ham-gyong Province, North-east Korea, and the 
Captain of the Russian man-of-war.
The Prefect.-Of what nationality is your vessel, and why have 
you come here?
The Captain.-My vessel is a Russian man-of-war. I suppose you 
know all about my previous visit to the Shin Po anchorage.
P.-Shin Po and Puk Chhon are both under my jurisdiction; they 
face each on the sea-side. Why have you come back?
C.-Owing to the great difference between our respective 
language and literature, I was, to my great regret, unable to
communicate with you on the occasion o f my last visit. I have 
now returned, accompanied with an Interpreter.
P.-ls there any Captain on board?
(He wrote on a slip of red paper the six words: "A sa teu la paik
pok.")
P.-How many persons are there on board? have you had a 
pleasant journey during your long voyage?
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C.-Some 200 persons. The voyage was unattended with any 
incident. How far is it from here to the capital, and have you 
reported our arrival to the Central Government?
P.-The sea and the hills lie between this and Seoul; the road is 
long and dangerous. Your arrival is first reported to the Governor 
of the Province, who reports to the government. In coming here 
with your vessel, of course you are provided with a document 
from the Korean Government?
C.-When in Seoul some time ago I petitioned your government 
for a document; it was sent, however, from Seoul to the Governor 
of the Province.
P.-After your vessel came to anchor, why did your men go 
about in boats surveying? Was this also permitted according to 
the terms of the documents?
C.-England and Russia being always at feud, a future naval 
conflict is to be apprehended. We must therefore make 
preparations, and ascertain the depth of the water along the sea- 
coast, and find out where there is any good anchoring-ground. 
Hence our going about surveying. What do you say to opening a 
port here to trade?
P.-This is an important question, but without the orders of my 
government I am not empowered to agree to anything.
C.-The number of your countrymen who come and settle in our 
territories is far from small; why is Korea so conservative and 
exclusive?
P.-The laws of my government are very strict; we need not 
discuss this.
C.-ls there much agriculture in this district?
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P.“The country is hilly, very little plain, and scarcely any rich 
land.
C.-ls they any coal in this region? If there is any, how about 
disposing of it for gold or silver?
P.-There is no coal produced, so we may save ourselves 
discussing the question of trading in it.
C.-Where does your government get its powder and shot?
P.-Powder is manufactured;shot is cast.
C.-Why are the women of the place never seen walking about?
P.- Men and women have their respective spheres. Our law is, 
let women stay in and men go out. I hope you will forbid your men 
from landing as they like, and causing difficulties.
C.-Your wishes will be carefully attended to. Next morning I 
intend leaving for the north. When I come back what can I bring?
P.-Rice is what we value, but it would be well if you imported 
it at Wonsan.
C.-What commodities can be given in exchange?
P.-As a matter of course, a large price will be given.
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CHAPTER VII: ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN THE FAR EAST AFTER
THE PORT HAMILTON AFFAIR, 1887-1898.
1. THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR (1894-1895)
THE Port Hamilton Affair had a profound influence on the 
Russians. In terms of naval policy, the British occupation of 
Port Hamilton showed how easily the Russian Far Eastern 
squadron could be blocked in the Sea of Japan. In time of war, 
Russian warships would not be able to use neutral ports; the 
Russian squadron would therefore be forced into a defensive role 
for lack of coaling stations. Yet although the fleet would be 
useless against Britain, since it was not strong enough to defeat 
the China squadron of the British, the fo rtifica tions  of 
Vladivostock and its garrison secured it against any coup de 
m a i n  that might be attempted by the British fleet. In 1887 
Russia therefore, adopted a new defensive policy for her Far 
Eastern possessions. This depended on land forces rather than 
naval strength; Russia planned to build the Trans-Siberian 
Railway.
There seem to have been three main considerations in the 
Russian decision to build the railroad. Firstly, it is possible that 
the rise of Japan was a factor. The available documents do not 
indicate this to be so, but the development of Japanese sea power 
at that time might have influenced Russia to change her naval 
policy and to base the defence of the Far East on land forces 
supported by a continental railroad. In 1877, the Japanese navy 
was made up of a conglomeration of small vessels fit for little 
else except scouting or practice operations manned by 1,200 
sailors and 260 marines. Within six years from that date the
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Japanese navy underwent a remarkable transformation; modern 
second-class warships, designed and built in Britain, formed the 
nucleus of an efficient naval squadron.1 The six years from 1883 
to 1889 witnessed an even more remarkable advance of naval 
power in Japan. The ability to fulfil the programme in six years 
and to plan an even further increase of naval strength placed 
Japan well on the way to becoming the leading naval power in the 
Far East. By the late 1880's, therefore, the Japanese navy had 
gained the necessary numerical and technical strength to make 
the Russian naval position in the Sea of Japan a defensive one. By 
1889 the "era of good feeling" between Russia and Japan was at 
an end, and Japanese public opinion showed a distrust of Russia.2
Even though the two nations had as yet had no conflict, the 
Japanese flee t prepared to cut o ff Russian naval 
communications to the Far East at Tsushima Strait.3
Secondly, besides being needed for countering the menace 
of Chinese development policy into northern Manchuria, the 
railroad would be needed for transportation of men and supplies 
in the event of a Russo-Chinese conflict over Korea.
Thirdly, in view of continued Anglo-Russian tension, the 
hostility of Britain was to be expected. Russia therefore could 
not depend primarily on her Far Eastern squadron for the defence 
of her Far Eastern possessions. A Trans-Siberian railroad would 
to some extent answer the defensive requirements of Russia's Far 
East- it would bring economic benefits and also settlers who 
would build up the internal strength of the territory.4
After the Port Hamilton Affair, consequently, the Far 
Eastern squadron was reduced to a minimum; Vladivostock
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declined in importance as a naval base, and by 1888 it was 
reported to be almost deserted in comparison with its state 
during the brief period of Russian naval supremacy in the Far East 
in 1879-1880.5
During the Port Hamilton affair, a new Balkan crisis 
brought Britain and Russia face to face again over the question of 
Constantinople and its hinterland: The Bulgarian crisis of 1885-7 
allowed Salisbury to adopt what was for him the agreeable role 
of supporter of Balkan nationalism, though at firs t he had 
assumed that he would have to support the 1878 settlement. 
Since Prince A lexander of Battenberg and most of the Bulgarians 
were now conspicuously anti-Russian and since the Turks had 
failed to defend the ir Balkan mountains frontier-which the 
British in 1878 had planned that they should-there need be no 
British opposition to a personal union of Bulgaria and East 
Rumelia under Prince Alexander. This was what Salisbury 
sucessfully proposed in 1886, after the two areas showed their 
determination to unite anyway. Salisbury was becoming convinced 
that the creation of stable nation-states in the Balkans would 
produce a far more reliable barrier to Russia's southerly 
expansion than the Turkish empire had done. Russia's fierce 
opposition to the new Bulgarian developments and the kidnapping 
and deposition of A lexander by Russian agents in 1886 
strengthened the arguments for supporting Balkan nationalism. A 
big Bulgaria with anti-Russian tendencies could actually help to 
keep the vital Straits area in Turkish hands as well as denying 
Russia overland access to the Aegean. Both Britain and Russia, 
therefore, had swung round to adopt, on the Bulgarian issue,
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attitudes entirely opposite to the ones they had pressed in 1878. 
Therefore, Salisbury, in encouraging a big Bulgaria, was willing 
to make the Mediterranean agreements in 1887.
The first agreement, signed with Italy in February and 
with Austria-Hungary in March 1887, involved expressions of 
mutual support in Egypt, Tripoli, the Aegean and the Black Sea. It 
was intended as a vague gesture of warning to both France and 
Russia. With these two powers, at that particular juncture, 
Britain had no specific quarrel, though there was plenty of 
underlying distrust. The failure in May of Drummond-Wolff's 
negotiations with the Sultan over an evacuation of Egypt-a 
failure due to Russian and French pressure- and the more ominous 
Russian attitude towards Bulgaria from July onwards made an 
extension of the firs t agreement increasingly desirable. In 
December, therefore, there was a further exchange of notes 
between the three powers. This second agreement, while 
reaffirming cooperation in the areas specified in February/March, 
added more precise reference to Bulgaria and Asia Minor, where 
the three powers undertook to preserve Turkish suzerainty from 
"illegal Russian enterprises". And so, as so often before, Britain 
was using associated powers to keep the Russians away from the 
Mediterranean-though Turkey was not now allowed any say even 
in her own preservation. The safeguarding of Bulgarian freedom 
was something on which all three, Britain, Italy and Austria- 
Hungary could agree with equal fervour, but the reference to Asia 
Minor was a purely British inclusion which had to be forced on the 
other two powers. And, from the British point of view, there was 
a further advantage in the agreement. The support of Austria- 
Hungary in her anti-Russian stand over Bulgaria contributed to
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the final breakdown of that great bugbear of British foreign 
ministers, the grouping known as the Dreikaiserbund.
With the conclusion of the second Mediterranean 
agreement, the Bulgarian crisis gradually melted away. In March 
1888, the Russians, supported by Germany and France, persuaded 
the Sultan to depose Ferdinand I. The deposition was grandly 
announced, and no one took any steps to put it into effect. Their 
pride restored, and their real objects entirely defeated, the 
Russians forgot Bulgaria for a time, and turned to the Far East.6
In 1890, the refusal of Germany to renew the Reinsurance 
Treaty, which was the secret supplementary protocol promising 
German support for Russian policies relating to the Dardanelles in 
1887, placed Russia in precarious isolation. Russia, therefore, 
moved cautiously in international affairs. A cautious policy was 
even more imperative in the Far East, where Russia was 
handicapped both by her isolation in Europe and by the strategical 
weakness of her eastern possessions. Furthermore, Russian 
commercial interests in the Far East were lagging behind those of 
other European powers, and even the Russian Orthodox Church was 
carrying on no missionary work in China. In 1891 when an 
o u tb re a k 7 against foreigners occurred in China, aimed at 
m issionaries and European commercial establishments in the 
Chinese interior, the appeal of France for jo in t action in 
September of that year did not even include Russia. However, 
even on this occasion, which was of little concern to Russia, the 
Russian Minister to China acted in accord with other European 
ministers in signing the Protocol of 9 September 1891, which 
informed their governments of the situation in China and
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suggested remedial measures.
On 21 November 1891, the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Alexandre Ribot. met Giers, Russian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, in Paris and in a conversation elicited Russia's reaction 
to the protocol. Giers suggested that the missionaries should be 
persuaded to remain near the coast and that China should be 
informed that all Europe was in accord on the Chinese crisis; 
Giers felt, however, that joint action would be difficult to obtain. 
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs again appealed for joint 
action, on 2 December, this time to Russia also. In view of the 
gradual formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance, Giers found it 
difficult to refuse the French appeal. He played for time, stating 
that he had no time to study the matter. On the other hand, 
Germany and other nations refused to take action, on the grounds 
that China was strong enough to quell the disorders-which China 
soon did. This resolved the crisis and removed Giers from an 
embarrassing position.8 The Franco-Russian Alliance on which 
depended the initiation of Russian Far Eastern policies, was 
eventually concluded on 4 January 1894.
In June 1894, the second Tong-Hak rebellion in Korea 
plunged the Far East into a new era of intensive international 
rivalry. The Tong-Hak Society aimed to drive out the influence of 
westerners in Korea; but this programme manifested itself 
principally in riots against the reactionary Korean administration 
and in acts against feudal landowners.(Appendix I) The first 
rebellion of 1893 aroused only slight international interest, for 
although American, Japanese, Chinese, British, and German 
warships were assembled at Chemulpo(the port for the capital,
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Seoul), the Tong-Haks were crushed before foreign troops could 
land. But in March 1894, equipped with arms from Japan and 
backed by Japanese ronin (hired gangsters and soldiers of 
fo rtu n e ),9 the Tong-Haks quickly spread through the southern 
Korean provinces. In May, Mr. G ardner, acting consul-general in 
Korea, reported to O'Conor respecting Tong-Hak movements 
through telegrams received by the Korean Home Office from 
Chulla Do, one of the southern provinces, as follows:-
May 9-The Prefect of Puan reports as follows:-
Yesterday afternoon, at 3 o'clock, more than 1,000 Tonghak rebels 
advanced from Wanpyen with waving of swords, firing of guns, and 
blowing of trumpets. They forced their way into my office and disarmed 
me. I was overcome with fear, and was unable to do anything.
May 10-Yesterday morning the Tong-Haks assembled in crowds on the road to 
Ko-fu. Our force was not strong enough to cope with them, so we waited 
till evening forthe arrival of the troops from the capital.
May 10-the Tong-Haks, having mounted a hill and spied the Seoul contingent 
advancing, saw that it was but small, and continued to sorely harass 
our men. The Seoul men will be fatigued with their journey, and 
unable to fight today.
May 12.- General Hong Chieh-hun and Seoul troops have arrived.
The Tong-Haks fiercely attacked them, and although they fought 
valiantly, they were overcome and forced to flee, the rebels pursuing 
them for a distance of 20 li (1 //= 2.44 mile). The Seoul men did 
not know the country, and were in great straits; nor did the people, 
although they had been ordered to obstruct the progress of the rebels.
May 12.- Telegram from Chung Ching Do.
News having arrived that the Tonghak rebels had assembled in 
myriads at two places, Kungju and Chioncham, 20 // apart, the 
Governor called on the soldiers and people to go out and drive them 
away. All the merchants except about 100 have gone over to the 
rebels. It is a sad business.10
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In June Tong-Haks once again threatened the capital. British,11 
French, Japanese, and Chinese warships again assembled at 
Chemulpo, and even Russia belatedly sent a gunboat.12
On 2 June, the King of Korea made a formal request for 
Chinese intervention, and on 7 June the Yamen notified Komura. 
the Japanese charge at Peking, that China would send troops to 
Korea "to restore the peace of our tributary state."13 Japan then 
notified China that she also would send troops to Korea for the 
purpose of protecting Japanese interests there, adding that she 
had never recognized Korea as a tributary state of the Chinese 
Em pire.14 China sent two thousand troops to southern Korea, the 
heart of the rebellion, but Japan sent her numerically superior 
forces to the vicinity of the capital.15
Before many units had landed, the Korean Government had 
the rebellion in hand; the Korean Government asked both Japan and 
China to withdraw their troops from Korean territory. Japan, 
however, had set forth a new programme on 22 June which 
indicated that Japanese troops would not withdraw until Korea 
reformed her adm in is tra tion.16 According to Chinese official 
statements made to Count A.P. Cassini, the Russian Minister to 
Peking, the Japanese made the Chinese several offers which 
would have given both China and Japan control of the Korean 
Government. But China refused them, faithfully adhering to the 
Russo-Chinese understanding of O ctober 1886 (the Li- 
Lodyzhensk ii A g re e m e n t).17 Consequently, both countries 
continued to send more troops.
On 22 June , Li appealed to Russia for mediation. In a
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personal conversation, which supposedly occurred by chance, Li 
informed Cassini that Britain had offered to mediate, but that he 
had declined the offer because he felt that, on the basis of the 
Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1886, Russia, as the third party 
involved, had the exclusive right to be the mediator. Cassini saw 
in this offer an excellent opportunity to increase Russian 
prestige in the Far East and "to prevent the inevitable, and for us 
highly undesirable, open conflict in Korea."18
Cassini’s view was fully supported by Giers, who also 
wanted to forestall British mediation. On 23 June, the Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed K h itro v o . the Russian 
M inister to Tokyo, to advise the Japanese Government to 
withdraw its troops from Korea simultaneously with China. In a 
conversation with Mutsu M unem itsu. the Japanese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, on 25 June , Khitrovo expressed this Russian 
view. Mutsu, however, categorically reaffirmed that Japan would 
not evacuate Korea without some guarantee that new disorders 
would not break out as soon as Japanese troops were withdrawn. 
He asserted that Japan had no intention of establishing herself in 
Korea or of being at war with China.19
On 26 June, the Korean Government asked the ministers 
of the Russian, French, and American Representatives in Seoul to 
transmit to their governments an official request to induce a 
simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese troops.20 This 
offered Russia an opportunity to choose either an officia l 
mediation based on the Korean request or continue in the 
unofficial course initiated by Li. Russia took the unofficial 
course. For a month, in numerous representations in St. 
Petersburg, Tokyo, and Seoul, Russian diplomats tried to persuade
298
Japan to w ithdraw sim ultaneously with China, but they 
encountered the same argument: i.e., if the Chinese Government 
would propose negotiations on the basis of the independence of 
Korea, and a guarantee for the future good government of that 
country, the Japanese Government for their part would be willing 
to consider the withdrawal.21
In these circumstances, on 30 June. K im berley. Foreign 
Secretary, 1894-5, sent a telegram to O'Conor in China: " Britain 
does not know what the Japanese Government means by her 
demands, but you should ask the Chinese Government whether they 
are willing to consider proposals for a reorganization of Korean 
Administration under the joint guarantee with Japan. You should 
state to the Yamen that Britain thinks that if China manifests a 
desire to enter into negotiations the Japanese Government may be 
disposed to come to terms, and you should impress upon them the 
necessity of maintaining a conciliatory attitude in order to avoid 
a conflict with Japan, which would involve so great a danger to 
the general peace. The opportunities afforded by such a conflict 
would probably be utilized by Russia in a manner which would not 
strengthen Chinese authority in Korea."22 On the following day, 
O'Conor reported to Kimberley , "I have received a message from 
Li asking whether Britain, having equally with Russia failed to 
persuade Japan to withdraw her troops, will compel Japan to do 
so by a naval demonstration. War will otherwise be declared by
p o
China, it being useless to negotiate further."
Even though the Chinese Government refused to negotiate 
until the Japanese withdrew their troops, they were ready to
accept a jo in t guarantee of Korean in tegrity , and the
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reorganization of its administration as a basis on which to open 
n e g o tia tio n s .24 For these negotiations, Li hoped for a stronger 
Russian expression of mediation. Therefore, although Li had been 
clearly told that Russia would not interfere in Korean affairs, he 
suggested a joint Russo-Chinese-Japanese convention to consider 
reforms for Korea.25 Moreover, he tried to spur Russia to activity 
by stating that Japan had asked Britain to mediate, and that 
Britain was forcing China to accept this mediation.26 In an even 
more fantastic scheme, Li informed Cassini that the British 
Minister to China was urging that all Korea be given to Japan. On 
3 July, Russia, consequently accepted the Chinese suggestion.
Linder the circumstances, on 7 July Kimberley instructed 
O'Conor to state to the Chinese Government that Britain trusted 
that the negotiations might be begun without delay, by China and 
Japan, for a joint guarantee, as the British Government had every 
desire that the integrity of Korea might be maintained, but that if 
China should enter into any Agreement either with Russia alone, 
or with Russia and Japan together, to the exclusion of Britain, the 
British Government would be bound to consider in what way such 
an Agreement might affect their own interests, and would take 
such action as may be called for to secure them.27 Consequently, 
after assuring Russia that her participation in a three-power- 
Russian Japanese, and Chinese-solution of the Korean problem 
would be the just reward for her mediation, a few days later, 
without informing Russia, Li appealed to Britain, France, and the 
United States for their mediation. Even though Li decided to do 
this as result of British representations, he officially said that 
he took it for granted that jo in t European mediation was
n o
forthcom ing. It did not take long, therefore, for the Russians to
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discover Li's double-dealing game. Even after the Sino-Japanese 
War broke out, Giers wrote to Cassini:
we do not regret at all that we refused the offer made to us by Li Hung-chang,
through you, to intervene directly in the question of Korean reforms, and to
take upon ourselves, so to speak, an authoritative mediation in favor of the
existing status quo, i.e., as Li Hung-chang essentially understood it, in the
interest of China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly acknowledged that
[the matter of ] reforms served only as a pretext for the conflict between the
Chinese and the Japanese, and that in consequence of our unofficial mediation
we could easily have involuntarily found ourselves avowed enemies of Japan
29under the banner of China and the sly Viceroy of Pechili.
The fear that Britain would take a leading part in mediation 
was shared by both Giers and Cassini. But this fear was soon 
dispelled when Britain gave clear indication of her intention to 
organize collective mediation. The idea was broached to the 
Russian Government at St Petersburg by Sir Frank Lascelles. the
on
British Ambassador, on 9 July . After being favourably received 
in Russia, the idea was introduced in the other European capitals 
by the Earl of Kimberley on 11 July. This "intervention commune" 
plan not only had the full approval of Russia but also the support 
of France, Germany, and Italy.31 However, it envisaged these 
powers as serving only in an advisory capacity. Before the 
powers could agree on the principles of application of the plan, 
war broke out.
On 19 July 1894, Otori Keisuke. the Japanese Minister to 
Seoul, presented to the Korean Government an ultimatum which
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included a demand for the expulsion of Chinese troops from Asan 
(located in the mid-western region in Korea) and the abrogation 
of all Sino-Korean treaties. The Korean reply arrived within the 
set three-day limit, but it was rather vague. On 23 July, 
Japanese troops entered the capital and stormed the palace. A 
pro-Japanese minister was raised to power, and in the name of 
the King he abrogated all Sino-Korean treaties and formally asked 
Japan to drive the Chinese out of Asan.32 In last-minute 
preparations Li sent reinforcements by sea from Tientsin, but 
these were intercepted and scattered by Admiral Togo's squadron, 
and the leased, British-owned transport Kowshing was sunk, 
with heavy loss of life.33(Appendix 2) Open hostilities followed, 
and Japan declared on 31 July that a state of war with China 
ex is ted .34 China then declared war on 1 August 35(Appendix 3)
On the same day, the British Government immediately 
proclaimed its neutrality.36 Subsequently, Kimberley instructed 
Lascelles to ask M. de Giers whether it would be of advantage that 
the British Government and the Government of Russia should 
invite the other Powers to join in addressing to the Governments 
of China and Japan a collective remonstrance protesting against a 
resort to war to decide a question, which was obviously 
susceptible of amicable settlement by other means. Kimberley 
added that it would be agreeable to the British Government that 
the most frank communications should be maintained by the 
British Admiral with the Russian Naval Commander with regard 
to the measures by which the commerce of neutral countries 
might be protected.37 On the following day, Lascelles reported to 
Kimberley that Count Kapnist. Director of the Asiatic Dept, of the
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Foreign Ministry, thought, personally, that a joint remonstrance 
would serve no useful purpose.38 On 5 August, Giers said, with
qg
reference to the British squadron having gone to Chemulpo, that 
the Russian Commander would be instructed to communicate 
freely with the British Admiral if the Emperor should decide upon 
reinforcing the one or two Russian dispatch-boats which at 
present constituted the Russian naval force in those waters. As 
compared with Britain, Russia had only a very slight amount of 
commerce with Korea. The protection of trade was, therefore, of 
far greater interest to Britain, whereas Russia was chiefly 
interested in preventing any agitation among the numerous 
Koreans and Chinese living in Russian territory; and the Governor 
of the adjacent Russian province would receive instructions 
which, he hoped, would be sucessful.40 At the same time, Russia 
also proclaimed neutrality.
As soon as war broke out, once more Li appealed for 
international mediation and suggested that China, Japan and all 
the powers which had agreed to join in "advisory" mediation- 
Russia, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy-plan reforms for 
Korea in a conference to be held at either Tientsin or Peking.41 In 
a telegram to Cassini, Giers could only point out that Russia 
would continue to act in concert with Britain in an effort to
A O
restore peace. France, however, seemed ready to break away, 
for she said she doubted whether advice to Japan to return to the 
status quo ante would be completely impartial in view of the 
advantages already gained by that country in the first few days of 
the war.43
On 6 October, Britain proposed a joint intervention by 
Germany, France, Russia, and the United States and a settlement
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on the basis of an independent Korea and an indemnity for Japan. 
However, the United States refused to participate, and Germany 
felt that any attempt to intervene would be futile at that time.44 
Prince Kung, who at the time headed the Chinese Government, 
invited the ministers of these five powers to the Yamen on 3 
November and form ally asked them to transm it to their 
governments the Chinese official request for intervention on the 
same basis as the British demarche.45 This attempt also failed.
In Tokyo, on 21 December, Mr. T rench.the British Minister 
in Japan, reported to Kimberley as follows:-
Since the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan the Japanese papers 
have steadily urged that the war should be prosecuted until China was 
completely humiliated, and, from the time the first decided successes were 
gained by the Japanese down to the present, the vernacular papers and 
private, though influential, Japanese will discuss the possible terms upon 
which peace, if sued for by China, might be made. Some of the suggestions 
made may be dismissed as too absurd, but three have been persistently urged.
. . .All three include the payments of a very large indemnity of not less than
500,000,000 dollars, and to this is added, in some cases, the surrender to 
Japan of the whole Chinese naval and mercantile steam fleets-ail, likewise, 
include the absolute withdrawal of China from Korea, and the leaving to Japan 
of an entirely free hand there. The first suggestion adds to these terms the 
permanent cession to Japan of the Island of Formosa. That this will be 
sternly insisted upon there seems to be no doubt. Japanese of all classes seem 
to be unanimous in regard to it , even responsible officials speak openly 
about it, and the government would hardly last a day if, unless under 
pressure, it assented to peace without that condition. The second suggestion 
adds to Formosa the cession of the whole of the Liao-tung Peninsula, including 
Newchang, but without any definition as to the northern boundary. The third 
extends the ceded territory so as to include the three northern provinces
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bordering on the Pechili Gulf. This, though persistently urged in several
journals, can hardly be treated seriously, as in it would be included both 
46Peking and Mukden.
On 1 January 1895, Lascelles reported to Kimberley that 
Giers had alluded to the conflict between China and Japan, and 
although he had no positive information on the subject, had 
expressed his fear that Japan would demand very onerous 
conditions of peace, and if that should be so his Excellency 
thought that Britain and Russia, who were acting in perfect 
harmony on this subject, might be able to moderate the demands 
of Japan if they should prove to be exorbitant. Giers also said 
that Russia's one interest would be to secure the independence of 
Korea.47
On 1 February 1895, the new Russian Tsar, Nicholas II 
(1894-1917), called a Special Conference of Ministers to deal 
with the Far Eastern crisis. The conference was apparently 
brought about by the dissatisfaction o f the Tsar with the policy 
of acting in concert with European powers in unoffic ia l 
mediation. The Conference reached the following conclusions:
1 . To strengthen our squadron in the Pacific to such an extent that our naval 
forces in those waters will be superior to those of Japan....
2. To instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to attempt to form an 
agreement with Britain and other European powers, principally France, in 
regard to collective action against Japan if the Government of Japan at the 
conclusion of the war with China should make demands which would violate 
our vital interests. . . The principal aim which we must pursue is the 
maintenance of the independence of Korea.
3. If the attempt for an agreement with Britain and other powers concerning 
the above conditions should not be crowned with success, and if it should be
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necessary to accede to a mutual guarantee for Korean independence by foreign
powers, the question of our further course of action. . . will be submitted for
48consideration at a new conference.
The decisions of the conference were put into effect. The strong 
and modern Russian Mediterranean squadron was sent to the Far 
East and was incorporated in the Far Eastern squadron, making it 
temporarily the most powerful naval force in the Far East.49
Russian movements in the Far East were, on 2 February, 
discussed by Kimberley and the French Ambassador in London. 
Kimberley said that he had heard from Trench that he and the 
Russian Minister had made a communication to the Japanese 
Government, not jointly, but separately, and that the French 
Minister was to make a similar communication on the following 
day. Kimberley expressed his satisfaction that the French 
Government were acting on the same lines in the matter, and said 
he considered it most important that in this great crisis of 
affairs in the Far East, France, Russia, and Great Britain, who 
were the Powers whose interests were most im m ediately 
concerned, should act together.50
Informed of the conversation between Kimberley and the 
French Ambassador, Count Kapnist on the same day told Lascelles 
that the Russian Government would welcome an exchange of ideas 
as to the line which it might be advisable to adopt in view of the 
changed condition of things in the Far East, and he repeated the 
earnest desire of his government to act in perfect harmony with 
Britain in this matter. He understood from Kimberley that the 
same applied to the French Government, who were also interested 
in the question, though to a less degree than Britain or Russia.
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Thus in February and March conversations in London, 
Paris, and St. Petersburg established a general agreement that 
the governments of these capitals should act in concert and insist 
on the preservation of the territorial integrity and independence 
of Korea.51 Beyond that, however, nothing was done. By April 
Britain had veered from the agreement, influenced by public 
opinion favouring the Japanese, and by the growing idea in 
governing circles that the success of Japan and her establishment 
as a power in the Far East were beneficial to the British policy of 
checking Russia.
On receiving the Japanese proposals for peace, the Chinese 
Government sent on 5 March Viceroy Li to Shimonoseki as
plenipotentiary for the peace negotiation with Japan.52 On 3 
April, the conditions of peace proposed by the Japanese 
plenipotentiaries to their Chinese counterparts were offic ia lly 
communicated to the foreign Representatives as follows:-
1 . Independence of Korea.
2. Formosa and Pescadores; islands under Formosa jurisdiction; islands 
between latitude 23° and 24° and longitude 119° and 120° to be annexted.
3. Liao-tung Peninsula, as bounded by line running to River Liao from Yu- 
shu-ti-hsia, descending river to latitude 41° and running thence due west 
to longitude 122° which it follows to the sea.
4. Indemnity payable in instalments as follows:-
100,000,000 taels within six months of ratification of Treaty;
200.000.000 at rate of 50,000,000 every ha lf-year; in all,
300.000.000 taels.
5. Expenses of temporary occupation of Shan-tung and Sheng-king to be 
borne by China 53
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Prince A. B, Lobanov-R ostovskii. the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs told the Tsar on 6 April 1895 that, at the 
conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia must decide whether 
to pursue a passive or an aggressive policy. Lobanov argued that 
if Russia adopted a passive policy, China would be the ideal ally. 
Russian frontiers would be secure, and even if projected reforms 
were undertaken in China it would be some time before China 
could recover sufficiently from the war to be dangerous. But if 
Russia adopted an aggressive policy, the aim would be twofold: 
"our acquisition of an ice-free port on the Pacific and an 
annexation of a certain part of Manchuria necessary for a more 
convenient routing of the Trans-Siberian railroad." Opposite the 
quoted passage on the original document, the Tsar wrote the word 
"Exactly,"54 and elsewhere on it: "Russia unquestionably needs an 
open port, free from ice all the year round. This port must be on 
the southeast coast in Korea and must be definitely connected 
with our present possessions by a strip of Land." Lobanov argued 
further that, "unquestionably" Russia's most dangerous enemy in 
Asia was Britain; and the Tsar annotated, "of course." Lobanov 
argued that, in spite of her recent victories, Japan would have to 
lean on some alliance for some time, and that her natural enemy 
in the Far East was Britain. Hence, though Russia might act with 
other powers-principally Britain-to restrain Japan at the end of 
the Sino-Japanese War, she must refrain from any action hostile
5 5to Japan lest she prejudice future Russo-Japanese friendship. 
On this basis Russia made another demarche  for collective 
advisory action on 8 April.
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On 8 April 1895, in an attempt to have a concrete starting 
point for a European concert on "friendly advice" to Japan, 
Lobanov presented his demarche. He suggested that the European 
powers through their representatives in Tokyo state that "the 
annexation of Port Arthur by Japan56 would be a lasting obstacle 
to the establishment of friendly relations between China and 
Japan and a serious threat to peace in the Far East."57 Germany 
and France accepted this suggestion,58 but, on 10 April, Britain 
refused to make such a statement.59 On the same day, Li 
negotiating peace terms at Shimonoseki, was informed of the 
Russian, German, and French view.60
The demarche was a starting point for a joint 
representation; it could not be considered an embodiment of 
Russian policy. It contradicted the above-mentioned opinion of 
the Tsar on the course of Russian policy and made even more 
necessary a new Special Conference of Ministers, which met on 
11 April.61 The conference made the following decisions: <i> 
Russia would attempt to restore the status quo ante in northern 
China and would suggest to Japan in a friendly manner that she 
abandon her intentions of annexing southern Manchuria; if Japan 
categorically refused to abandon them, she would be notified that 
Russia considered herself free to act according to her interests. 
<ii> Russia would inform China and the European powers that she 
had no intentions of annexing any territory, but that she 
considered it vital to her own interests that Japan's hold on 
southern Manchuria be relinquished.62
On 17 April, a Protocol as to the texts was signed at 
the same time as the Treaty at Shimonoseki between China and 
J a p a n .63 On the same day, Lobanov officially asked Germany,
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France, and Britain to support Russia's protest against the 
Japanese claim to Port Arthur. France agreed, with distaste, 
merely following the principle of solidifying the Franco-Russian 
A llia n c e .64 Germany accepted with alacrity, and Wilhelm II 
ordered the German squadron in the Far East to make contact with 
the Russian squadron.65 Britain did not reply immediately; she 
explained that she would continue her policy of noninterference. 
On 18 April, Cassini, at Peking, was ordered to advise the Chinese 
Governm ent to delay the ra tifica tion  of the Treaty of 
S h im on ose k i.66 Subsequently, on 20 April, O'Conor reported to 
Kimberley that he had heard confidentially from Tien-tsin that 
the Russian, French, and German Ministers at Tokyo had been 
instructed to inform Japan that they could not accept the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki, and ask that it might be modified. The report 
also stated that the Chinese Government would be notified of 
the above step by the Russian Minister, under instructions from 
his government.67
On 22 April Prince Lobanov told Lascelles that he 
regretted the refusal of the British Government to join with the 
"Triplice" (Russia, Germany, and France). Lascelles said that, 
great as was his regret at Prince Lobanov's disappointment, the 
situation would have been far worse if Britain, after joining in 
the friendly communication, had then been compelled to withdraw 
if further action had been rendered necessary by a refusal on the 
part of Japan.68
On 23 April, the Triplice handed to the Japanese Acting 
M inister of Foreign Affairs identical notes stating that "the 
possession of the peninsula of Liao-tung, claimed by Japan, would 
be a constant menace to the capital of China, would at the same
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time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would
69henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Far East."
The Japanese Government did not reply immediately, and 
for a time the diplomats and admirals of the Triplice nervously 
expected an outbreak of hostilities. On 30 April, Mr. Kato_. 
Japanese Minister in London, inquired whether Britain would 
support Japan. To this the British Government replied that they 
must adhere to the attitude of non-intervention which they had 
decided on adopting.70 On 5 May, the Japanese General Staff 
realized, therefore,, that Japan could not fight the combined 
forces of the Triplice, and Japan yielded to the demand. On May 8 
the amended Treaty of Shimonoseki was ratified at Chefoo,71 and 
preparations were made by the Russian fleet to resist the cession 
of any part of Manchuria to Japan.72 On the following day Mr. 
Havashi. Foreign Minister, informed Trench in Tokyo that China 
would be so gratified by the return of the Liao-tung Peninsula to 
her that it would be easy to obtain an increased indemnity, but he 
believed she would have considerable difficulty in paying a very 
large sum. Hayashi further mentioned that Russia would likewise 
claim some reward for her support of China, and he believed the 
strip of land she required was that stretching from her frontier 
to the Sungari River. This was probably all she would demand for 
the present, but her other ambition lay not in the direction of 
Korea, but in that of the Liao-tung Peninsula, and later on it was 
to be expected that she would attempt to acquire that territory.73
On 19 July, the Japanese Government gave the following 
verbal message to the Representatives of the three Powers:-
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In view of China's financial difficulties, and her inability to pay the full value
of the Liao-tung Peninsula, Japan will demand only 50 millions of Kuping
taels. When this indemnity, and also the first instalment if the regular war
indemnity, have been paid, Japan undertakes to withdraw her troops within
the limits of the Kinchow Province, and will altogether evacuate the
peninsula when the Treaty of commerce and Navigation, referred to in the
Shimonoseki Treaty, has been ratified, and the second instalment of the war 
74indemnity received.
On 13 September, the Ministers of France, Russia, and 
Germany made a proposal to the Japanese that 30,000,000 taels 
should be the limit fixed for the indemnity for the retrocession of 
the Liao-tung, and that the question should be settled without 
reference to the Treaty of Peace; i.e., that as soon as the above 
indemnity was paid the Japanese should evacuate the peninsula in 
the fixed date.75 On 26 September, the Japanese Government said 
that they were willing to accept 30,000,000 taels for the Liao­
tung Peninsula, and that the three Powers had been asked what 
assurance they could give for the payment of this indemnity by 
China.76 On 8 November 1895, Japan formally renounced her claim 
to gains in Manchuria by the Declaration of the Retrocession of 
L iao -tung .77
The success of the Triplice was a triumph of Russian 
policy. Russia had won all her short-term aims. According to the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, Korea remained independent, and the 
existence of the Triplice insured Japan's evacuation of Korea. The 
Japanese were removed from Manchuria. China defeated and still 
isolated, was an ideal neighbour for Russia and soon become more 
than willing to accept Russian financial assistance as the price 
of Russian political influence. However, the dormant hostility of
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the Japanese toward the Russians was aroused.78 Japan 
immediately began preparations to safeguard herself from any 
repetition of such an indignity as the Retrocession of Liao­
tu n g .79 After the Sino-Japanese War and the resulting Treaty of 
Shimonoseki and the retrocession of Liao-tung, Russia adopted a 
positive Far Eastern policy for the first time since 1860.
Since it had not joined the Continental powers, Britain 
was in 1895 identified as the Power most favourable to Japan. 
Equally, Japan was drawn towards co-operation with Britain 
which was interested in maintaining the status quo in China and 
was less blatantly ambitious there. Consequently, the Powers in 
the Far East became roughly divided into two groups: Russia and
her ally France on the one hand, Japan and Britain on the other.
2. RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN KOREA, AND
ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY, 1896-1898.
After the Sino-Japanese War, Japan especially was loath to see
the appearance of Russian influence in Korea. Japanese policy,
therefore, was aimed at eliminating the pro-Russian faction and
the influence on the court wielded by Queen Min, and in its
desperation to restore pro-Japanese forces to power Japan was
prepared to resort to any means. In the end, then, on the night of
8 October 1895, Inoue's successor as Japanese minister, M iura
G o ro . after consulting with his more experienced advisers at the
Japanese legation, engineered a coup d'etat in which a mob of
Japanese soshi, Korean adherents and members of the Kurentai,
Japanese soldiers, stormed the palace1 and murdered the Queen
of Korea and Members of her family whom she had brought to
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power in an anti-Japanese movement.2
The coup d'etat was an immediate success. The King of
Korea yielded "in panic" to all Japanese demands, repealed the 
reforms of the previous year, published an edict degrading the 
Queen, and generally acted as a "tool" in the hands of the 
Japanese .3 The complicity of the Japanese envoy in the coup of 
1895 was so obvious that the diplomatic representatives of 
foreign powers formed a "united front" against their Japanese 
colleague. They conferred mutually in the absence of Miura, 
befriended the refugee partisans of the Min family, and brought to 
Seoul small detachments of marines.4 Closely cooperating in this 
policy and assuming a leadership over the other representatives 
were Carl Weber, the Russian Minister to Seoul, and Dr. Horace N, 
A llen, a missionary and then secretary and actual charge of the 
American legation, who was acting in defiance of instructions to 
abstain from any influence on the political events in Korea and 
particularly from any joint action with another power.5 Fearing 
an outcry of condemnation from abroad, therefore, Japan recalled 
Miura to stand trial in Japan, but in the end he was declared not 
guilty on grounds of insufficient evidence.6
The assassination of Queen Min roused the hostility of the 
Korean people toward Japan to a fever pitch, and guerrilla bands 
had risen throughout the country to harass the Japanese troops 
still encamped on Korean territory. By February 1896, Seoul was 
again in danger from the approaching rebels.7 Taking advantage of 
this turmoil, the Russian minister, Weber, brought one hundred 
marines to Seoul under pretext of guarding his legation on 10 
February 1896.8 On the same day, Commander Pellv of the
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British ship 'Porpoise' at Chemulpo reported to Vice-Admiral 
B u lle r of the British squadron in Chinese waters, that "the 
Russian ship 'Admiral Kornilov' landed a party of small-arms men 
this morning at 7 a .m ., and sent them up to Seoul. The strength of 
the detachment was as follows: four officers, 100 small-arm 
men, and one machine-gun. Forty-two ponies were engaged to 
carry provisions and baggage for three weeks," and, he added, 
"150 Cossacks from Gensen (Port Lazareff) will meet today the 
detachment from Chemulpo."9
On the following day, the King of Korea asked Dr. Allen 
whether it would be safe for him to take refuge with the Russian 
m in is te r.10 Allen assured him that it would be and personally 
aided his plan by bringing Weber in touch with the officer in 
charge of the King's bodyguard. On the morning of the eleventh 
the King of Korea, the Crown Prince, and some of their loyal 
attendants fled to the Russian legation, and the King remained 
there for more than a year.11
An anti-Japanese reaction began immediately, On 11 
February, the pro-Japanese ministers were massacred almost to a 
man, and the King performed penance for having associated with 
th e m .12 Although Russia was placed in an extraord inarily 
favourable position for influencing a pro-Russian orientation of 
Korean affairs, Weber refused to take advantage of his position. 
The immediate gains were reaped by Allen; the anti-Japanese, and 
later anti-Russian, Korean Independence party of Philip Jaisohn, 
an American-educated Korean adviser to the King; and J. McLeavv 
B row n, the British Director of the Korean Customs, they became 
the leading political figures in Seoul.13 On the same day as the
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King's flight to the Russian legation, Commander Felly landed 
Lieutenant Benson and sixteen marines for guarding the British 
le g a tio n .14
With the recent Russian activity in Korea, on 20 
February, in the House of Commons Sir Ellis Ashm ead-Bartlett. 
M.P. asked C urzon . the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, whether the agreement entered into by the Russian 
Government not to occupy any port in Korea when Great Britain 
withdrew from Port Hamilton was still binding. Curzon answered, 
that "the British Government considered that the pledge by the 
Russian Government in 1886 not to occupy Korean territory under 
any circumstances whatsoever is still binding."15
On 27 February, Ashmead-Bartlett, M.P. asked Curzon again 
whether it was true that the Russian naval forces in the Northern 
Pacific were being largely increased. Curzon answered with a 
c h a rt (Chart 1), "it is believed that the Russian squadron in 
Chinese waters has been increased by five vessels during the last 
yea r."16
(unart u  Hussian Meet in me unina beas.
Armour-Clads
Battle-ship, 2nd class..........................................................
Armoured Cruisers............................................................. .. . . Pamyat Azova.
Admiral Nakhimov.
Vladimir Monomakh.*
Gremyashtchii.
Otvajnii
Unarmoured
Cruiser, 2nd Class, protected.............................    Ad. Kornilov.
Sloops..............................................   Kreiser.
Zabiyaka.
Koreets.
Mandjur.
Smaller vessels....................................................................................... Gaidamak.
Vsadnik
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Bobr
Sivutch
Aleut.
Yakut.
Silatch.
* Said to be coming home; left Hong Kong 17 February 1896; and "Dmitri 
Donskoi" and "Groziasteki" coming out.
Subsequently, Sir Albert Rollot. M.P. asked him whether any 
Russian occupation of Seoul, or any other place in Korea, had 
taken place, or was apprehended. Curzon said that "No Russian 
occupation of Seoul, or of any other place in Korea, had been 
occupied, or, so far as we are aware, is apprehended; 150 Russian 
sailors are guarding the Russian legation in Seoul, where the King 
is still a refugee, his life being in danger from a rebellion which 
has broken out. There are also 500 Japanese soldiers in the
C ap ita l."17
Meanwhile, in Japan, Premier Ito Hirobumi, General 
Marquis Yamaaata. and Count Inouye, the proponents of a moderate 
policy in Korea, came to the conclusion that to avert Russian 
ascendancy in Korea and to prevent a clash of Russian and 
Japanese interests there, Japan must come to an agreement with 
Russia. Negotiations were started in Seoul between Weber and 
Komura, the new Japanese Minister, which resulted in the signing 
on 14 May 1896, of a joint memorandum, known as the Seoul 
Protocol. 18
Japan then planned a broader agreement with Russia.
There was the negotiation of the Lobanov-Yamagata Agreement, 
also known as the Moscow Protocol of 9 June 1896. It was an 
open secret that, in addition to the suspected Russo-Chinese
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negotiations and the Russo-Japanese negotiations, the Korean 
envoy to the Tsar's coronation was conducting talks.19
This Korean envoy. Min Yong-huan. who was the brother of 
the murdered Queen, had a private audience with the Tsar on 15 
June, in which he asked for or was promised a Russian 
protectorate over Korea.20 Consequently, the Russian reply (in 
point 1) did promise "protection" to the person of the King while 
he was in the Russian legation and after his return to his own 
palace. Point 2 indicated an extension of Russian influence:-
ln order to solve the question of instructors [for the army] there will be sent 
to Seoul in the near future a high-ranking and experienced Russian officer, 
who will be empowered by the Russian Government to enter into negotiations 
with the Korean Government on this matter; the said officer will be 
instructed to take up, first of all, the question of creating a detachment of 
bodyguards for the King. An equally experienced person will be sent from 
Russia for the investigation of the economic condition of Korea and for the 
determination of necessary financial measure.21
Point 3 stipulated that the persons mentioned in point 2 
would also act as advisers to the King of Korea under the 
direction of the Russian Minister to Seoul. Point 4 was equivocal 
and stated that a loan to Korea "would be taken into consideration 
as soon as the economic condition of the country and the 
requirements of the country are determined."22
The first consequence of this was that, during the period 
of the King's remaining in the Russian legation, firstly Japanese 
advisers in whatever Korean ministry and Japanese military 
instructors all were dismissed, Russian advisers and instructors 
being appointed in their stead. Within a month after signing of 
the Lobanov-Yamagata Agreement, the Russian Government was
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undermining the idea of a Russo-Japanese condominium (joint 
sovereignty). In July, negotiations were begun to bring in Russian 
instructors for the army. In August, Colonel S tre l'b itsk il arrived 
at Seoul as the Russian military agent, and P.P. Pokotilov as the 
financial agent of the Russian General Staff arrived with three 
offic ia ls and ten noncommissioned officers and began the 
reorganization of the Korean army, starting with the palace 
guard.23 According to Acting Consul-General Jo rd an 's report in 
Seoul to Sir C. M acPonald. the British Minister at Peking on 14 
November 1896:-
The Head of the Russian Military Mission, Colonel Poutiata. has, since his 
arrival here, been almost daily in conference with the Board of war 
respecting the reorganization of the Korean army. The army, as at 
present constituted, if the rabble which does duty as soldiers can be 
dignified by such a name, consisted of a paper estimate of some 7,500 
men, 4,000 of which are supposed to be stationed in Seoul. As a matter of 
fact, the troops in Seoul only number about half that amount, having been 
drafted into the country to maintain order in the disaffected districts. 
About 800 of the Seoul garrison are being enrolled in a separate force to 
be drilled by Russian officers, and will be replaced by a fresh contingent 
as soon as they have attained the requisite degree of proficiency, the 
intention being to put the whole army through an efficient course of
tra in in g .24
Secondly, the actions of the Russian adviser to the 
Ministry of Finance gave the distinct impression that it was he, 
in fact, who headed the ministry, and now a variety of economic 
concessions were handed over to the Russians. But when Russia 
gained concessions the other powers too were encouraged to
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demand equal favour, and so in the aftermath of the King's 
removal to the Russian legation a large number of such 
concessions fell into the hands of foreign governments and
bus in e sse s .25 (chart 2)
(Chart 2) The scramble among the powers for concessions
Year Countrv Concession
1896 U.S. Building of Seoul-Chemulpo(lnchon) railway line
Russia, Mining rights in Kydngwdn and Chongsdng counties, 
Hamgydng province 
Permission to establish coaling station 
on Wolmi Island, off Chemulpo 
Timber rights in the Yalu river basin and 
Ullung Island areas
France Building of Seoul-Uiju railway line
1897 Germany Gold mining rights at Kumsdng, Kangwon province
1898 Russia Permission to establish coaling station on Yongdo, 
off Pusan
U.S. Laying of electricity and water mains in Seoul
Russia Authorization to establish Russo-Korean Bank
Britain Gold mining rights at Unsan, P'yongan province
Japan Exclusive purchase rights to coal produced at 
P'yongan
Building of Seoul-Chemulpo railway 
(Concession bouoht from U.SJ
At the time the Korean people were united in the ir 
condemnation of their King's flight to a foreign legation and the 
continuous granting of economic concessions to foreigners. Their 
outrage coalesced in particular around a campaign launched by the 
recently inaugurated Independence Club. In response to this, in 
February 1897, Kojong moved out of the Russian legation to the 
Kyonggun Palace (today's Toksu Palace), practically next door to 
the legation, where Colonel Poutiata and a group of Russian 
o ffice rs were sta tioned, as com m anders of the Royal
Bodyguard.26
The Japanese Government viewed this Russian ascendancy 
with considerable misgiving and inquired of Russian diplomatic
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representatives in Tokyo and Seoul concerning the right of Korea 
to employ Russian instructors.27 The enquiries did not check 
Russian intentions of gaining control of the Korean army. On 28 
April 1897, a proposal had been submitted to the Korean 
Government by M. Weber for the engagement of 160 Russian 
officers and men in connection with the reorganization of th e  
Korean army.28 On 8 May 1897, the Korean Minister of Foreign 
Affairs refused the offer.29 In St. Petersburg, the Russian 
M inistry of Foreign A ffa irs attempted to qu ie t Japanese 
indignation by giving assurances to Havashi Todasu. the Japanese 
Minister to St. Petersburg, that Baron. R.R. Rosen, the newly 
appointed Russian M inister to Tokyo, would iron out the 
d ifficu lties over Korean affa irs .30 This assurance was also 
treated in an equivocal manner. A fresh Russian officer and ten 
non-com m issioned o ffice rs , who came from V ladivostock to 
Chemulpo in the Russian gun-boat 'Sivoutch', arrived at Seoul on 
27 Ju ly .31
Since 1895, Germany had shown an interest in acquiring 
a coaling station or a naval base in the Far East; in that year 
William II. suggested a base in China, where the trade interests 
of Germany were second only to those of Great Britain. After 
Germany's participation in the Triplice of 1895, realization of her 
desire seemed possible. In the spring of 1897 Admiral Alfred Von 
T irp itz . the commander of the German squadron in the Far East, 
and Baron von. Hevkinp. the minister to China, accepted the report 
of Georg Franzius. a noted German harbour expert, and agreed that 
the port of Kiaochow was the port most suitable for German naval 
requ irem ents.32
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Before proceeding with Chinese negotiations concerning 
the lease of Kiaochow, Germany made inquires about Russian 
interests in Kiaochow Bay. She knew that the Russian squadron 
had used it for a winter station. Furthermore, the so-called 
"Cassini Convention" stated that Russia was to have the exclusive 
use of the port for fifteen years. When Li passed through Berlin 
in June 1896, he was asked directly by Baron M a rs c h a llv o n  
Bieberstein. the German Foreign Minister, whether Russia had any 
rights in Kiaochow, Li answered emphatically that she did not.33 
Despite on equivocal response by the Tsar on 7 November- 
"Cannot approve or disapprove your sending German squadron to 
Kiaochow as I have lately learned that this harbour was ours only 
tem porarily  in 1895-1896"- Adm iral D ie d e r ic h s  entered 
Kiaochow Bay with the German squadron on 14 November. Four 
days later, P av lov , the Russian charge in Peking, was informed 
that the Russian squadron had received orders to follow the 
German squadron into Kiaochow Bay. Although Russia seemed to 
stand behind China and had unofficially advised procrastination in 
the German-Chinese negotiations, the fate of Kiaochow was not in 
doubt. On 20 November the orders to the Russian Pacific squadron 
were countermanded, and 23 November Muraviev, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, admitted that Kiaochow would eventually go to 
the Germans.3*
On the other hand, on 15 November, when news came to 
Peking that the Germans had landed at Kiaochow Li "immediately 
rushed to the Russian legation with an appeal for Russian 
assistance, and he did not leave it until he received a ciphered 
telegram to be sent to St. Petersburg from the Russian charge
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d'affairs." This appeal was an attempt to invoke the Russo- 
Chinese Treaty of 3 June 1896, against Germany. It was also a 
direct invitation to Russia to occupy temporarily some port in 
China as a countermeasure to the German occupation of 
K iaochow.35
In favour of this action, on 23 November 1897, Muraviev 
submitted a lengthy memorandum to the Tsar outlining Russia's 
political and naval situation in the Far East and reviewing 
Russian claims to Kiaochow, which had already been abandoned. 
Muraviev considered Kiaochow lost, but he considered the loss of 
no great importance, since the port was unsuitable for a Russian 
naval station or base because of its remoteness from spheres of 
Russian interest. In fact, he saw in the German occupation of 
Kiaochow a "favourable" turn of events which gave Russia an 
opportunity to acquire an ice-free port. The main problem was 
what ice-port to take.36
On 26 November the proposed conference took place, 
attended by the Ministers of War, Finance, and Foreign Affairs and 
the Director of the Navy Department. In the conference, W itte , 
the Minister of Finance, opposed the policy of compensation. He 
argued that if Russia did not need Kiaochow, the German 
occupation of that port could be ignored. The Minister of War, P.S. 
V annovsk ii. had little to contribute. He deemed the acquisition of 
an ice-free port in the Far East necessary; consequently, if the 
time was opportune, Russia should take Port Arthur. But he felt 
that the decisive vote should rest with the Director of the Navy 
Department.
Admiral P.P. Tvrtov. the Director of the Navy Department, 
was not quite certain that Port Arthur would satisfy the needs of
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the Russian squadron of the Pacific, he still considered the ports 
in Korea more suitable but realized that politically the time was 
not ripe to take them. Hence, he advised that Russia take no port 
at that time and that she content herself with the use of 
Vladivostock for two or three more years. He felt that the future 
would bring another opportunity for obtaining a Korean port. The 
final decision of the conference was not to occupy Port Arthur or 
any other port. The desire to obtain an ice-free port was once 
again made secondary to the policy of restraining other powers 
from a scramble for territory and spheres of influence in China 
and Korea.37
Sometime between 26 November and 11 December 1897, 
Nicholas II and Muraviev,the minister of Foreign Affairs, reversed 
the decision of the Special Conference of 26 November. On 11 
December, the Tsar notified Pavlov through the Russian Foreign 
Office: "In view of our acceptance [of the Chinese proposal of 15 
November], a squadron of our ships, under the command of Rear 
Admiral Reunov, has been immediately dispatched to Port Arthur. 
Instructions must be given for a friendly reception of the 
squadron."38
In Korea, on 5 December, Jordan reported to MacDonald 
that a Russian squadron, composed of eight vessels, under Vice- 
Admiral Dubaroff. reached Pusan to propose the establishment of 
a Russian coal depot there on 15 November, and stopped there 
until 19 November.39 In addition, Salisbury considered Jordan’s 
report of 2 December 1896 respecting the conversation with the 
German Consul, M. Krien who referred to the guarantee given in 
1886, through the Chinese Government, by the Russian Charge
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d'affairs, by which Russian undertook, in the event of the
evacuation of Port Hamilton by the British, not to occupy Korean 
territory under any circumstances. In the course of conversation, 
M. Krien said that some months ago, when Curzon had stated in the 
House of Commons that the British Government still held this 
guarantee to be of binding effect, M. Weber, the Russian Minister 
in Seoul, had informed him and several of his colleagues that the
Russian Government did not recognize the understanding as
pledging them in any way. M. Krien added that Weber had asserted 
that all that had happened was that M. Lodyzhenskii, the Russian 
Charge d'affairs at Peking at the time, had told Li Hung-Chang 
over a glass of Champagne that he thought the Russian
Government would be prepared to give such a guarantee in the 
event of the British occupation of Port Hamilton ceasing. 
Lodyzhenskii had since been dismissed from the Russian service, 
and the Russian Government did not consider itself bound by the 
declaration of a discredited Agent.40 Moreover, Britain had 
already defined her position in the statement by Curzon, in this 
year that Britain wished to ensure that Korean territory and 
Korean harbours were not made the base for schemes for 
territorial aggrandizement so as to disturb the balance in the Far 
East and give to one Power a maritime supremacy in the Eastern 
Sea.41
On 8 December, Salisbury informed the Admiralty 
that it was desirable that an equal or approximately equal British 
naval force should be sent to Korea, with the object of preventing 
the Korean Government and people from assuming that Russian
had any special rights in the waters of that country.42 On the
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same day, Salisbury also told the  Admiralty that he would 
co n s id e r it sufficient for the purpose that the squadron should 
remain at Chemulpo for a week or ten days, and then, unless any 
new incident arose, it might proceed to some other northern port 
•43 Soon after the entrance of Russian warships into Port Arthur, 
on 17 December the British Government dispatched the ships in 
the China waters to Chemulpo, ostensibly to influence the 
Koreans and to add indirect opposition to the Russian attempt to 
oust the British Director of Korean Customs, but actually with 
secret orders to watch the Russian squadron and be ready for any
e ve n tu a lity .44
On 6 January 1898 Jordan reported to MacDonald the
arrival of the British squadron under the command of the Admiral
Buller in Chemulpo; the following British ships were then in
Port:- The 'Centurion,' 'Narcissus,' 'Undaunted,' 'Pique,' 'Rainbow,' 
'Phoenix,' 'Algerin,' and 'Daphne.' Jordan also said that the
presence of such a large number of British war-ships in Korean 
waters had naturally caused considerable excitem ent and 
speculation amongst the Koreans, and the King had sent him 
frequently messages to ascertain the reasons for such a display 
of force. Jordan added that the King likewise inquired if it was 
true that Port Hamilton had been occupied by the British Naval 
forces, and applied to him, through his in te rpre ter, for 
information with regard to a number of other rumours crediting 
Britain with hostile intentions against Korea. Jordan told the King 
in reply, that the presence of the British squadron was doubtless 
intended to manifest and accentuate British interest in Korea, but 
that he had no reason to believed that the reports which had been
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circulated correctly represented the attitude of the Commander- 
in -ch ie f of the British Naval forces.45
In January 1898, a rapp rochem en t between Britain and 
Russia was in evidence. Muraviev in St Petersburg and Baron E.E. 
de Staal, the Russian Ambassador to London, complained to the 
British Government that the continued presence of British 
cruisers in Port Arthur might be interpreted as evidence of 
unfriendliness. Although Salisbury stressed the right of the 
cruisers to remain there, he ordered their withdrawal before 14 
January because he could not find an obvious purpose in 
remaining there .46
At the time, the Japanese fleet was concentrated at 
Tsushima, where it would be in a position to control the Tsushima 
Strait and intercept the Russian units still in Nagasaki. This 
naval tension continued until the beginning of February, when the 
decrease of diplomatic tension led to the gradual abatement of 
the Port Arthur "crisis".47
The obscurity of political alignments, the numerical 
superiority of the Japanese army over the Russian forces in the 
Far East, and the delicate balance in naval forces, influenced 
Russia and Japan to act cautiously and pushed them toward a 
compromise on Korea. On 16 February 1898, the Japanese 
Ambassador to St. Petersburg presented to the Russian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs a project for a new agreement on Korea by 
which (1) Japan and Russia would guarantee the independence of 
Korea, (2) Russia would appoint military instructors for the 
Korean army, (3) Japan would appoint the financial advisers, and 
(4) Russia and Japan would come to a preliminary agreement
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before taking any new measures in commercial and industrial 
m a tte rs .48
Although Muraviev did not accept the offer of 16 
February, he withheld his support from Speyer in Korea. In 
January, Dr. Allen reported from Seoul that Russia was losing her 
grip on Korea, and in March, Allen considered that Speyer's 
influence in Korean affairs was definitely on the decline. Early in 
March, Speyer made a final bid for the preservation of Russian 
interests in Korea. He asked the leading Korean statesmen 
whether they wanted Russian aid and advice, and a few days later 
he received an unexpectedly blunt negative answer; the reason 
being that, during that month, a strong anti-Russian popular 
agitation had been set on foot in Seoul, so that when the Korean 
Government was asked by the Russian Government whether they 
wished to retain the services of the Russian Financial Adviser 
and m ilitary instructors, they had in reply requested their 
w ith d ra w a l.49
On 17 March 1898, Muraviev made a counterproposal in 
regard to Korea, in which he expressed Russia's intention to lease 
Port Arthur and Talienwan and to give Japan a pledge that Russia 
would not interfere in the internal affairs of Korea. Two days 
later, Marquis Ito suggested an agreement by which Russia would 
recognize Japan's freedom of action in Korea and in return Japan 
would regard Manchuria as lying outside Japanese interests. This 
proposal also was apparently ignored or circumvented. Instead, 
Russia made a withdrawal from Korea w ithout committing 
herself to a definite promise of surrender of her interests.89 On 
12 April, Russian m ilitary.and financial advisers resigned in a 
body, and the Russo-Korean Bank was liquidated after a month and
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half of operation. Speyer was replaced by the more amiable and 
easygoing N.G. Matiunin.51
On 25 April 1898, de Rosen, and N ishi. the Japanese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed a convention regarding Korea 
known as the Nishi-Rosen Convention.52 This convention stated 
in A rtic le  I that both s ignatory powers recognized the 
independence of Korea and pledged themselves not to interfere in 
her internal affairs. Article II provided for a mutual agreement 
"not to take any measure regarding the nomination of military 
instructors and financial advisers, w ithout having previously 
arrived at a mutual accord on the subject." The most important 
article was Article III, which stated: "In view of the great 
development of the commercial and industrial enterprises of 
Japan in Korea and also of the considerable number of Japanese 
sub jects residing in that country, the Russian Im perial 
government shall not obstruct the development of the commercial 
and industrial relations between Japan and Korea."53 This was 
Japan's compromise to proceed with economic penetration while 
looking ahead to an opportunity to commit overt aggression in the 
future. Russia too, busied with its Manchurian ventures, for the 
time being was willing to reach an accommodation with Japan. 
However, this agreement did not mean, of course, that Russia had 
abandoned its designs on Korea, and in fact Russian machinations 
continued as before.54
At the time, Britain was interested mainly in the 
international implications and only in so far as her naval and 
commercial intersts were threatened or the peace of the Far East 
was likely to be broken. Until then, she thought the Korean
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Government to be incurably corrupt and doubted the country's 
capacity to retain its independence: She was not prepared to 
interfere actively in Korean affairs to buttress a regime which 
was not likely to last.55 However, as a result of Jordan's report 
of 15 February 1898, the British Government had to think again. 
Jordan reported as follows:-
As the customs Tariff has undergone no alteration, these figures enable us to 
form an accurate idea of the steady progress of Korean trade. The Collection 
for last year- 1,113,168 dollars, or 113,635 L.- as against 691, 784 
dollars (74,943L.) in 1896, is far the largest on record and is more than 
double of what were these figures five years ago. The total collection is still 
relatively small, but it must be remembered that there is no article like 
opium paying a heavy import duty, and that there is a considerable trade 
which does not fail within the control of the Foreign Custom establishment.
British trade seems to have done more than hold its own during the 
past year. (Table 1) The total import of cotton piece goods in 1897 was 
5,062, 823 dollars (516, 829L.) as against 3,338, 545 dollars (361, 
675L.) in 1896, of which over 3,000,000 L. were Manchester goods. Grey 
sh irtings, which are all B ritish, rose from 1,567,967, do lla rs 
(169,863! ) in 1896 to 2,120,761 dollars (216,494 L.) in 1897.56
Moreover, with Russia's aggressive policy in Korea and even 
Manchuria, Britain felt that Russia would be able to have a free 
hand on the Far East and take her "proper place" on the shores of 
the Pacific. Therefore, Britain began to realize that the centre of 
international affairs had temporarily moved to the Far East.
330
(Table 1)
oA
.s0 0) A 8
1 
£
§
1
•s
o
I
!
1
1.
I
4 i i M i i i i
o-sssssssssssss?:
® li!!!!S S I!
^2“ “ S'*’<,DO'*25S2r;
^sS5ssI | | ss2|5.|
«J2SS2SSg2g2SS22
sfltfSSIflsiil!
*e «  O K  M t> < O O M O it< « 9 a 0 < |i
<^ ^^«2«o2'-2°22“ 2
!S>252Jo  •»•«
“ 2=255
d2S 2S SS 2S5SS a2S
a i i i i i l i i l
•xi «
w22•*2,0222e,22,
" l i l g s
oS?2SS?252SS§2S
i
“““Slssss issSs
331
ENDNOTES OF CHAPTER VII
< The Sino-Japanese War>
1. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. p. 34 n.
130 & 131; quoting Constantin von Zepelin. Per Feme Osten. 
Vol. I, pp.211-212.
2. I bid., p. 35 n.140; quoting A.V. Eliseev. "Otchet o ooezdke na
Dal'nii Vostok" (Account of the Voyage to the Far East), pp. 
372-373.
3. In 1885-1889 the Japanese fortified the anchorage of
Tsushima and could convert it into an efficient secondary
base for intercepting ships passing through the strait; 
Malozemoff, p. 263 n. 136.
4. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. pp. 35-
36.
5. I bid., pp. 33-4. n. 128 & 129; quoting N. G. Matiunin, "Nashi
sosedi na krainem Vostoke” four Neighbors in the Far East), 
Vestnik Evropy, XXII, No. 7 (July 1887), op. cit.. p.82 & P. 
Chikhachev, "Kalifornia i Ussuriiskii krai. 'Vestn ik Evropy 
XXV, No. 6 (June 1890), p. 562.
6. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, pp. 180-183.
7. By the summer of 1891 the interests fostered by this control- 
commercial and missionary-were threatened by a widespread 
rising of the Chinese populace along the Yangze River; it was 
an unofficial challenge to informal empire. The Chinese 
authorities appeared to be helpless in the face of this near 
rebellion. The British were momentarily thrown back upon 
their own resources; Wehrle, E. Britain. China, and the anti­
m issionary riots. 1891-1900, p. 19.
8. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. pp. 51-
52.
332
9. 1 bid., p. 52; quoting Cassini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
dispatch, 10 March 1894, K. A, L-LI, p. 5.
10. Telegram received by Korean Home Office from Chulla Do., 
translation, F.O. 405/60, Inclosure 3 in No. 65.
11. Question asked in the House of Commons, 5 June 1894, F.O. 
405/60, No. 1.
12. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. p. 52; 
quoting Kapnist to Secretary of Legation at Seoul, 8 June 
1894. K. A. L-LI. p. 8.
13. O'Conor to Kimberley, No. 22, telegraph, 12 June 1894 (rec'd 
16 June), F.O. 405/60, No. 6.
14. Paget to Kimberley, No 15. telegraph, 10 June 1894 (rec'd 10 
June), F.O. 405/60, No. 5.
15. Kimberley to Paget, No. 59, 13 June 1894, F.O. 405/60, No. 7.
16. Kimberley to Paget, No. 61, 23 June 1894, F.O. 405/60, No. 15.
17. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. p. 53;
quoting Cassini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegraph, 24
June 1894, K. A. L-LI. p. 17.
18. I bid., p. 53; quoting Cassini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
telegraph, 22 June 1894, K. A. L-LI. p. 16.
19. I bid., p. 53; quoting Khitrovo to Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
telegraph, 25 June 1894, K. A. L-LI. pp. 18-19.
20. O'Conor to Kimberley, No. 29, telegraph, 26 June 1894,
(rec'd 27 June), F.O. 405/60, No. 19.
21. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. p. 53; 
quoting several conversations as described in K.A., L-LI, pp. 
21-52.
22. Kimberley to O'Conor, No. 44, telegraph, 30 June 1894, F.O. 
405/60, No. 26.
333
23. O'Conor to Kimberley, No. 31, confidential, telegraph, 1 July 
1894, (rec'd 2 July), F.O. 405/60, No. 27.
24. O'Conor to Kimberley, No. 32, telegraph, 2 July 1894 (rec'd 2 
July), F.O. 405/60, No. 28.
25. O'Conor to Kimberley, No. 36, confidential, telegraph, 6 July 
1894 (rec'd 7 July), F.O. 405/60, No. 44.
26. Paget to Kimberley, No 26. Secret, telegraph, 7 July 1894,
(rec'd July 8.), F.O. 405/60, No.50.
27. Kimberley to O'Conor, No. 50, telegraph, 7 July 1894, F.O. 
405/60, No. 46.
28. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. p. 54;
quoting Memoir of Kapnist, D irector of the A sia tic  
Department, 30 June 1894, K. A. L-LI. p. 21.
29. Malozemoff. Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. p. 54;
quoting Giers to Cassini, letter, 8 August 1894, K. A. L-LI. pp.
58-59.
30. Kimberley to Malet, No. 177, 9 July 1894, F.O. 405/60, No. 57.
31. Kimberley to O'Conor No. 54, telegraph, 11 July 1894, F.O. 
405/60, No. 64.
32. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. p. 54;
quoting Cassini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegraph, 23 
July 1894, K. A. L-LI (1932). p. 46.
33. O'Conor to Kimberley, No. 61, telegraph, 27 July 1894 (rec'd 
29 July), F.O. 405/60, No. 188.
34. Paget to Kimberley, No. 48, telegraph, 1 August 1894
(rec'd 1 August), F.O. 405/60, No. 209.
35. Copy of Reuter's telegram from Indo-China Steam Navigation 
Shanghae Agent to his Company, 1 August 1894, F.O. 405/60, 
Inclosure in No. 213.
334
36. Kimberley to Lascelles, No. 36, telegraph, 1 August 1894,
F.O. 405/60, No. 216.
37. Kimberley to Lascelles, No. 37, telegraph, 1 August 1894,
F.O. 405/60, No. 217.
38. Lascelles to Kimberley, No. 55, telegraph, 2 August 1894
(rec'd 2 August), F.O. 405/60, No. 232.
39. Kimberley to Lascelles, F.O. 405/60, No. 217.
40. Lascelles to Kimberley, No. 57, telegraph, 5 August 1894,
(rec'd 5 August), F.O. 405/60, No. 254.
41. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. p. 57;
quoting Cassini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegraph, 4 
August 1894, K. A. L-LI. p. 57.
42. I bid., p. 57; quoting Cassini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
telegraph, 9 August 1894, K. A. L-LI. p. 61.
43. I b id ., p. 57; quoting Mohrenheim to Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, telegraph, 10 August 1894, K. A. L-LI. pp. 62-63.
44. I bid., p. 57; quoting William L. Langer, The Diplomacy o f 
Imperialism. 1890-1902. pp. 174-175.
45. I bid.
46. Trench to Kimberley, No. 200, confidential, 20 December 
1894 (rec'd 21 January 1895), F.O. 405/62, No. 41.
47. Lascelles to Kimberley, No.4, confidential, 1 January 1895
(rec'd 7 January), F.O. 405/62, No. 19.
48. Malozemoff. Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. p. 60;
quoting K.A. Lll, pp.73-74.
49. Raising the strength of the squadron from 16 ships(with 241
guns) to 22 ships (360 guns); See Thomas Brassey, "Naval
Progress," Naval Annual (London) for 1884-1887. pp. 52,54.
335
50. Kimberley to the Marquis of Dufferin, No. 53, 2 February 1895,
F.O. 405/62, No. 82.
51. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. pp .60- 
61; quoting K.A., XLVI(1931), p. 32.
52. O'Conor to Kimberley, No. 14, telegraph, 5 March 1895 (rec'd 5 
March), F.O. 405/62, No. 160.
53. O'Conor to Kimberley, No. 23, telegraph, 3 April 1895 (rec'd 4 
April), 405/63, No. 24. & Trench to Kimberley, No. 33, 
telegraph, 4 April 1895 (rec'd 4 April), F.O. 405/63, No. 26.
54. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. p. 62; 
quoting K.A. Lll, p. 72.
55. I bid., pp. 62-3; quoting K.A.LII, pp.75-76 and n. 1.
56. Consul Allen to O'Conor, 29 November 1894, F.O. 405/62, 
Inclosure in No. 36.
57. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904.p. 57; 
quoting Marschall to Tschiirsky, 8 April 1895, G.P. (Die 
grosse Politik der europaischen Kabinette), IX, p. 265, Nos. 
2232 ff.
58. Gosselin to Kimberley, No. 6, telegraph, 9 April 1895 (rec'd 9
April), F.O. 405/63, No. 48 & Kimberley to Dufferin, No. 191,
13 April 1895, F.O. 405/63, No. 66.
59. Kimberley to Lascelles, No. 98 a ., 10 April 1895, F.O. 405/63,
No. 54.
60. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. p. 63.
61. I bid., pp. 63-4; quoting Journal of the Special Conference, 
published in full in K.A., Lll(1932), pp. 78-83.
62. I bid.. p. 64; quoting K.A. Lll, p. 83.
63. Protocol signed at Shimonoseki, 17 April 1895, F.O. 405/63, 
Inclosure in No. 467.
336
64. William L. Langer, The Diplomacy o f Imperialism. 1890-
1902. vol.I, pp. 184-185.
65. Malet to Kimberley, No. 89, confidential, 13 April 1895,(rec'd
15 April), F.O. 405/63, No. 83.
66. Malozemoff. Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. p. 57.
67. O'Conor to Kimberley, No. 36, telegraph, 20 April 1895,
(rec’d 20 April), F.O. 405/63, No. 111.
68. Lascelles to Kimberley, No. 44, telegraph, 22. April 1895.
(rec'd 22 April), F.O. 405/63, No. 122.
69. Trench to Kimberley, No. 132, very confidential,. 24 April 
1895 (rec'd 27 May), F.O. 405/63, No. 304.
70. Kimberley to Trench, No. 17, telegraph, 30 April 1895, F.O. 
405/63, No. 193.
71. Allen to Kimberley, telegraph, 9 May 1895, (rec'd 9 May), F.O. 
405/63, No. 240.
72. Allen to Foreign Office, No.16, 8 May 1895 (rec'd 24 June),
F.O. 405/63, No. 452.
73. Trench to Kimberley No. 151, very confidential, 9 May 1895
(rec'd 12 June), F.O. 405/63, No. 398.
74. Lowther to Salisbury, No. 75, 19 July 1895 (rec'd 19 July),
F.O. 405/64, No. 50.
75. Sir E. Satow to Salisbury No. 85, Secret, telegraph, 13
September 1895(rec'd 13 September), F.O. 405/64, No. 167.
76. Satow to Salisbury, No. 87, telegraph, 26 September 1895
(rec’d 26 September), F.O. 405/64, No. 184.
77. Beauclerk to Salisbury, No. 144, telegraph, 5 November 1895 
(rec'd 5 November), F.O. 405/65, No. 42.
337
78. There had been sporadic outbreaks of anti-Russian agitation 
in 1891 and 1894.
79. Japan began an extensive programme of armament. See 
Ono.Giichi, War and Armament Expenditures of Japan (New 
York, 1922), pp. 116-142.
< Russian influence in Korea and Anglo-Russian Rivalry>
1. Consul-General Hillier to O'Conor, 24 October 1895, F.O. 
405/65, Inclosure 6 in No. 128. & Statement of So Chi-sim, 
Orderly to Colonel Hung, in command of the Japanese-drilled 
Korean Troops, 23 October 1895, F.O. 405/65, Inclosure 7 in 
No. 128.
2. Hillier to O'Conor, No. 31, 17 October 1895, F.O. 405/65, No. 11.
3. Lee, Ki-baik. A new History o f Korea. London. 1984, pp. 294- 
295.
4. Hillier to O'Conor, No. 32, 22 October 1895, F.O. 405/65, No. 
112.
5. Hillier to O'Conor, 22 October 1895, F.O. 405/65, Inclosure 3 in
No. 128.
6. Lee, A new History o f Korea, p. 294.
7. Hillier to Beauclerk, 1 February 1896, F.O. 405/70, Inclosure 1 
in No. 109.
8. Consul-General Hillier to Beauclerk, No. 17, telegraph, 11 
February 1896 (rec'd 15 February), F.O. 405/70. No. 40.
9. Commander Felly to Vice-Admiral Buller, 10 February 1896,
F.O. 405/71, Inclosure 2 in No. 7.
10. Salisbury to Satow, No. 14 A. confidential, 19 February 1896,
F.O. 405/70, No. 55.
338
11. Satow to Salisbury, No. 34, 17 February 1896, F.O. 405/70, No. 
110.
12. I bid.
13. Fred H. Harrington. God Mammon, and the Japanese, pp. 291- 
292.
14. Pelly to Buller, 13 February 1896, F.O. 405/71, Inclosure 3 in 
No. 7.
15. Question asked in the House of Commons, 20 February 1896,
F.O. 405/70, No. 57.
16. Question asked in the House of Commons, 27 February 1896,
F.O. 405/70/ No. 72.
17. Question asked in the House of Common, 27 February 1896,
F.O. 405/70, No. 74.
18. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. K orea . Outer 
Mongolia. Manchuria: Treaties and Agreement.W ash ing ton  
D.C. pp. 21-22.
19. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904, pp. 87- 
88.
20. O'Conor to Salisbury, No. 117, confidential, 15 June 1896, 
(rec'd 22 June), No. 72.
21. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904. p.89.
22. Horace N Allen. A Chronological Index. Seoul, 1901, p. 36.
23. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, p.89.
24. Acting-Consul-General Jordan to Salisbury, No. 42, 14 
November 1896, (rec'd 4 January 1897), F.O. 405/73, No.3.
25. Lee, A new History o f Korea, p . 300. chart 2 is reproduced 
here
339
26. Extract from the "Seoul Gazette Extra" of 10 February 1897.
F.O. 405/73, Inclosure 2 in No. 63. & I.L. Bishop. Korea and
Her Neighbours. London 1898, pp. 263-290.
27. Asakawa Kanichi , The Russo-Japanese Conflict. Boston, 
1904, pp. 262-269.
28. Jordan to Sir C. MacDonald, No. 38, confidential, 27 April 
1897, F.O. 405/73, Inclosure 1 in No. 84.
29. Allen.A Chronological Index, p. 36.
30. R.R. Rosen. Forty years of Diplomacy. New York, 1922, Vol. 2, 
p.151.
31. Jordan to MacDonald, No. 60, confidential, 2 August 1897,
F.O. 405/73, Inclosure in No. 107.
32. William L. Langer, The Diplomacy o f Im perialism . 1890- 
1902. New York, 1935, Vol. 2, pp. 449-50.
33. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, p.96.
34. I bid., p. 98.
35. I bid., p. 99.
36. I bid., p. 99; citing N.V. Muraviev, Memorandum to the Tsar, 23 
November 1897, K.A., Lll, par, 28.
37. Malozemoff. Russian Far Eastern Policy, pp. 100-101.
38. I bid., p. 101.
39. Jordan to MacDonald, No. 110, confidential, 5 December 1897,
F.O. 405/80, Inclosure in No. 20.
40. Jordan to MacDonald, No. 93, confidential, 2 December 1896,
F.O. 405/73, Inclosure in No. 12.
340
41. Ian H. Nish, The Analo-Japanese Alliance. London. 1966, P.
71.
42. Foreign Office to Admiralty, Secret, 8 December 1897, F.O. 
405/73, No. 153.
43. Foreign Office to Admiralty, Secret, 14 December 1897, F.O. 
405/73, No. 157.
44. Salisbury to MacDonald, No. 71, telegraph, 17 December 1897,
F.O. 405/73, No. 159.
45. Jordan to MacDonald, No.3, 6 January 1898, F.O. 405/80, 
Inclosure 1 in No. 48.
46. Salisbury to MacDonald, telegraph, 24 March 1898, F.O. 
405/80, No. 95.
47. Malozemoff. Russian Far Eastern Policy, p. 105.
48. I bid., p. 109.
49. MacDonald to Salisbury, No. 80, telegraph, 16 March 1898, 
(rec'd 16 March), F.O. 405/80, No. 56.
50. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, p.110.
51. Rosen, Forty years in Diplomacy. Vol-1, p. 156.
52. Satow to Salisbury, No. 73, 29 April 1898 (rec'd 3 June), F.O. 
405/80, No. 103.
53. Satow to Salisbury No. 83, 10 May 1898, (rec’d 22 June), F.O. 
405/80, No. 110.
54. Lee.A new History of Korea, o. 306.
55. Nish, The Analo-Japanese Alliance. p. 71.
56. Jordan to MacDonald, No. 19, 15 February 1898, F.O. 405/80, 
Inclosure in No. 73.
341
Appendices to Chapter VII
Appendix I.
Manifesto by Tong Haks1
(T ra n s la tio n .)
WE have on the throne a holy and intelligent Ruler, yet 
the people grovel in dirt and ashes. Why is this? The cause of the 
people's bane is the system of Yamen credits; the cause of those 
credits is the covetousness of the officials; and the root of that 
covetousness is the greed of the Ministers of State. Ah! when 
confusion comes to a head, order arises; when the darkness is at 
the deepest, daylight dawns. We are all men acting for our 
country; what difference should there be between the people and 
the Yamen clerks? At the bottom the clerks are of the people.
Bring together all ledgers and account books showing the 
Yamen credits, the people's bane; there is a means of settling 
them. Do not fear to bring them or overpass the time. Be careful!
From the place of Righteousness.
(Seal Resembling those used by district officials.)
1 Manifesto By Tong Haks, posted at Police Magistrate's Office at Pepsong on 8  May 
1894, F.O. 405/60, Inclosure 6  in No. 65.
342
Appendix II.
The Report of the Captain and Chief Officer of 'Kow-
S hing '2
(T e leg rap h ic .)
THE Japanese Government have received the signed 
affidavits of the captain and chief officer of 'Kow-Shing,' British 
vessel sunk by 'Naniwa' off Yasan, and their summary is as 
fo llo w s :-
'Kow-Shing,' hired by the Chinese Government, left Taku 
on the 23rd July with 1,100 Chinese soldiers on board, bound for 
Yasan, for the purpose of landing troops there. 'Naniwa' signalled 
her to stop; she obeyed, and as 'Naniwa' was going away, she 
signalled, "Am I to proceed?" 'Naniwa' answered, "Heave-to or 
take consequences." (This signal was not meant for her, but for 
Chinese man-of-war flying Japanese flag and white flag.)
'Naniwa' sent officer to her to see ship's papers, and, 
among other questions, asked if she will follow 'Naniwa.' Captain 
answered, "We are in your power." Then the officer returned, but 
boat was again sent upon the request to communicate personally, 
and captain told them that Chinese generals do not allow him to 
follow. The officer, after listening to all what he had to say, 
returned to 'Naniwa,' which then signalled to captain to quit ship 
immediately, but captain signalled that he is not allowed to quit. 
Then 'Naniwa' hoisted red flag at the foremast-head, and once 
more hoisted signal to quit ship immediately.
2 Japanese Government to Viscount Aoki, telegram, rec'd 2 August 1894, F.O.
405/60, Inclosure in No. 226.
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Captain warned engineers and other foreigners to be on 
deck. After a while 'Naniwa' sent torpedo and fired. Then captain 
with several others jumped overboard, and while in water Chinese 
soldiers on board 'Kow-Shing' kept firing at captain and others, 
and eventually he was picked up by boat of 'Naniwa,' on board 
which every kindness was shown to him and to the chief officer, 
who was also picked up.
Captain says that while on board 'Kow-Shing' his life was 
threatened by Chinese Generals when he attempted to follow 
'Naniwa' or to leave ship.
Chief officer adds that second visit of officer was in 
order to transfer Europeans on board of the man-of-war before 
firing began, but good-will was frustrated by the Chinese.
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CHAPTER VIII: THE END OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY
IN THE FAR EAST, 1898-1905.
1. THE LIMITATIONS OF 'SPLENDID ISOLATION' POLICY AND 
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE,1902.
TH E  idea that 'isolation' might be, not merely an involuntary 
position of weakness, but also a deliberate policy goes back in 
Britain at least to the eighteen-sixties. For a long time, 
however, 'isolation', even when referred to in this way, was still, 
nevertheless, a term of disparagement. It usually meant refusal 
to collaborate in any way with other powers. A policy of 
'isolation' was something that one attributed to one's political 
opponents or against which one advised one's colleagues. In 1871, 
for example, Gladstone's government was accused in the House of 
Commons by Sir Robert Peel (the son of the Prime Minister Peel) 
of pursuing a 'policy of isolation-of selfish isolation'. In 1877 
Salisbury warned Beaconsfield of the evils that would result 
from adopting a 'policy of isolation' in regard to the Near Eastern 
Question. In the eighteen-sixties and seventies, however, such 
usage was infrequent. It was during the press campaign of 1895- 
96, which reached its climax in the days that followed the 
Kruger telegram ,1 that to refer to Britain's 'isolation' as a matter 
of policy became for the first time common usage. The 
C ontem porary Review, the S p e a k e r , the S p e c t a t o r  and the 
Saturday Review were among the papers that set the fashion.
At about the same time it also became common to refer to 
this voluntary 'isolation' on the part of Britain without any of the 
disparaging implications that the term had usually carried with it 
hitherto. The outstanding example of this new fashion was a
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speech to a Conservative audience at Lewes on 26 February 1896 
bv George Joachim Goschen. the First Lord of the Admiralty in 
Salisbury's Cabinet and the minister responsible for the creation 
of the 'Flying Squadron' during the days of tension that had 
followed the Cleveland Message. "Much has been said," Goschen 
rightly observed, "with regard to the isolation of Britain." He 
distinguished between what he called 'two kinds of isolation', 
observing:
There may be the isolation of those who are weak and who therefore are not 
counted because they can contribute nothing, and there is, on the other hand, 
the isolation of those who do not wish to be entangled in any complications and 
will hold themselves free in every respect.
Goschen then went on to declare: "Our isolation is not an isolation 
of weakness; it is deliberately chosen, the freedom to act as we 
choose in any circumstances that may arise." Thus, claimed 
Goschen, while other powers were "bartering favour for favour, 
promise for promise": "We have stood alone in that which is called 
isolation-our splendid isolation, as one of our colonial friends 
was good enough to call it."2 After that, the phrase 'Splendid 
Isolation' policy was increasingly used to characterize British 
foreign policy.
Russia's policy towards the Far East was motivated by 
only vague ambitions at first. After making an alliance with 
France and after her success in forcing Japan to abandon the 
Liao-tung Peninsula by the Triple Intervention follow ing the 
Sino-Japanese War, however, her policy underwent a complete 
change and became concrete and openly aggressive.
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In September 1896, Russia concluded a secret treaty of 
alliance with China, in which she treated Japan as their 
hypothetical enemy. This treaty, in consideration of the role she 
played in the Triple Intervention, gave Russia the right to 
construct a railway across northern Manchuria to Vladivostok. In 
December 1897, Russian power extended to the Liao-tung 
Peninsula from which Japan had earlier been driven, when the 
Russian fleet occupied Port Arthur and Dalny (Dairen). Later, in 
March 1898, Russia forced China to conclude a Treaty of Lease for 
the Liao-tung Peninsula; at the same time she obtained the right 
to construct a branch railway line from a station on the Chinese 
Eastern Railway to Port Arthur and Dalny.
This advance by Russia was supported, of course, by 
France, her ally, and with the encouragement of Germany which 
had already leased Kiaochow Bay from China. After Russia had 
leased the Liao-tung Peninsula, France leased Kwangchow Bay and 
Brita in  leased W eiha iw e i^  and the Kowloon Peninsula. 
Previously, Britain had obtained from China a declaration not to 
cede any of the Yangtze River Basin provinces to any third 
country; Japan likewise obtained a similar declaration regarding 
Fukien Province.
Although Britain demanded concessions from China every 
time Russia, Germany, France and other Powers exacted various 
concessions from China, this was not necessarily Britain's real 
intention. Rather, Britain was obliged to do so by way of 
compensation, so-to-speak, for the concessions other Powers 
obtained. In short, Britain, unable to prevent such examples of 
aggression in China by Russia and the other Powers, resorted to a
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so-called 'policy of compensation.'4
At the time , Britain's interest in China was primarily 
commercial. Consequently, the open door was the basic British 
policy which required that China's independence and territorial 
integrity be maintained. On the other hand, Russia's aggressive 
policy towards China posed a serious menace not only to Britain's 
commercial interests in China, but also to British prestige in the 
world in that Russian policy could ultimately threaten the 
security of India and other British colonies. Therefore, British 
leaders were divided as to the wisdom of persisting with 
Solisbury's policy of the 'free hand', currently dubbed 'splendid 
isolation.' Hence arose the debate over alternative courses of 
action in the Far East: <i> to conclude an alliance with Japan, <ii> 
to form an alliance with Germany, in which, so far as the Far 
East was concerned, Japan and , in certain circumstances, the 
United States should take part, or <iii> to reconcile herself with 
Russia. Policies <ii> and <iii> were tried first.
In January 1898, Britain initiated secret negotiations 
with Russia in an attempt to settle once and for all the disputes 
of many years' standing between the two countries. Britain took 
the occasion to try to bring about a 'partition of preponderance' 
both in China and in Turkey on condition that both sides respected 
the then existing treaties and the invio lability of territoria l 
sovereignty. In the British view, this would allow Russia a 
preponderance in the Yellow River Basin and to the north 
generally with Britain enjoying preponderance in the Yangtze 
River Basin. Russia, however, did not respond to such a general 
agreement as Britain desired.
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Thereupon, in March, British Colonial Secretary Joseph 
Cham berla in opened negotiations for an Anglo-German alliance 
with the German Ambassador to Britain, count von Hatzfe ldt. 
Although the negotiations lasted until the following year, no 
satisfactory result was forthcoming. In these circumstances, the 
Colonial Secretary also suggested to Kato Takaaki. Japanese 
Minister to Britain, that Japan might propose an alliance to 
Britain. Minister Kato himself strongly recommended the alliance 
to his government, but the Ito Cabinet then in power could not 
reach any conclusion on how to respond to the suggestion.5 
Subsequently Britain succeeded in concluding with Russia and 
Germany limited and specific agreements about China. In April 
1899, an agreement was reached between Britain and Russia 
concerning the construction o f railways, recognizing spheres of 
influence in the regions north of the Great Wall to Russia and the 
Yangtze River Basin to Britain.5
The United States, which so far had lagged behind the 
other Powers in taking an active role in China, started to move 
positively after the appointment of John Hav as Secretary of 
State in September 1898. The new Secretary realized that 
American interests in China were being considerably damaged by 
the aggressive policies of the other Powers and began to 
contemplate a new policy to re-establish America's position. Up 
to then, Britain had advocated the Open Door in China and a 
resolution was adopted in the British House of Commons to 
support the principle of free trade in the Chinese treaty ports. In 
September 1899, U.S. Secretary of State, J. Hay, anticipating 
British approval, issued the well-known Note proposing the 
principle of equal trading opportunities in China, and sent it to
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Britain, Germany and Russia. The same Note was also sent to 
Japan, Italy and France in November.
Hay's proposal was aimed at assuring completely equal 
treatment with respect to trade and navigation for all countries 
within the spheres of influence and the interests of the Powers 
then existing or to be claimed in future. The replies to Hay's Note 
from the Powers were, however, not necessarily based on similar 
assumptions. Japan gave her assent to the Note provided that all 
the other Powers concerned accepted the same, not only finding 
no reason for objecting to its aims, but also noting its usefulness 
in eliminating to some extent the monopolization of interests in 
China by Russia, Germany, France and the other Powers, thus 
contributing to the integrity of China.
Japan thereafter firmly supported the Open Door policy of 
the United States, as did Britain. Consequently, so far as the
problems of the Far East were concerned, the interests of the
United States at that time were entirely identical with those of 
both Japan and Britain. The United States Government were, 
however, not in a position to enter into any negotiations for an 
alliance or entente with European Powers or with Japan out of 
regard for the Monroe Doctrine and in consideration of the views 
of the Senate.7
In the meantime, the Boxer Rebellion** broke out in China 
in 1900 partly as a reaction to the race of the Powers for
concessions. This finally resulted in armed intervention by the
Powers. An international force was organized in which Japan 
formed the main strength, dispatching over twenty thousand men. 
The Japanese force occupied Peking after which the Chinese
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Court moved to Sian. While the Powers jointly forced the Chinese 
to submit, Russia took advantage of the situation and arbitrarily 
carried out a military occupation of many important places 
throughout Manchuria and despatched additional troops to North 
China.^
After the Boxer Rebellion, Britain, seeing Russia advance 
into Manchuria and extend her activities to central China, 
concluded the Anglo-German Agreement concerning China(1900) 
to which Japan adhered, and tried to use it to check the Russian 
advance. However, contrary to her expectations, Britain found her 
interests menaced when Germany made public her view that 
Manchuria was outside the scope of this Agreement. On the other 
hand, a sense of insecurity among the Japanese people reached its 
peak as they realized that Russia was not only assiduously 
engaged in exploiting her influence in Manchuria and Korea but 
also was trying to obtain control of the latter. Later, both 
Britain and Japan lodged protests with Russia over the secret 
Russo-Chinese treaty in connection with the restoration of 
Manchuria to China.
Earlier, Britain had come to recognize Japan's real power 
after the Sino-Japanese War. Further, at the time of the Boxer 
Rebellion, Japan, in compliance with the British request, had 
despatched troops to help the international force of the Powers. 
Again, in executing its ten-year naval construction programme 
starting to build four battleships and other numerous auxiliary 
ships from 1895 onward, Japan ordered the majority of them 
from British shipyards. These kinds of actions created a pro- 
Japanese feeling among the British Government and people. In 
Japan also, the sentiment towards Britain had become very
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favourable because Britain had observed neutrality in the Sino- 
Japanese War, had not joined the Triple Intervention, and had 
protested against Russia's aggressive moves in Manchuria and 
Korea.
With the gradual withdrawal from the control of foreign 
policy by Salisbury, moves for ending so-called splendid isolation 
policy took shape.1 ^ Colonial Secretary Chamberlain in the 
Salisbury Cabinet, in particular, took the lead in seeking British 
cooperation with Germany, sounding the German Charge 
d'Affaires von Eckardstein. In April 1901, in the course of an 
exchange of views with the Japanese Minister to Britain H avashi 
T a sa su . von Eckardstein told him that Japanese participation in 
an Anglo-German alliance had been taken up in the Anglo-German 
talks and urged him to have the Japanese Government propose a 
tripartite alliance between Japan, Britain and Germany.
Regarding von Eckardstein's suggestion of a tripartite 
alliance between Japan, Britain and Germany, the Japanese 
Minister to China Komura Jutaro cabled his support to Foreign 
Minister Kato on 12 April. The Foreign Minister gave his approval 
and instructed Hayashi on 16 April to sound out unofficially the 
views of the British Government. Later, on 8 October, Foreign 
M inister Komura11 authorized Hayashi to exchange views with 
the British Government on the matter. On 16 October, Hayashi 
asked British Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne w hether or not 
this alliance would include Germany. Lansdowne replied that for 
the present this proposal should be kept between the two 
countries, Japan and Britain.
In those days, Japanese political circles were roughly 
divided into two groups, Anglophile and Russophile. The former
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group maintained that since Britain desired to conclude an 
alliance with Japan it was most desirable to pursue proposals 
from London and to confront Russian aggression in the Far East; 
the latter contended that the Russian desire to advance into the 
Far East, particularly into Manchuria, was so obvious and so 
powerful that it was undoubtedly beyond Japan's power to prevent 
it and, further, that as Russia had little interest in Korea there 
was room for cooperation and compromise. In other words, this 
latter group contended that peace in the Far East could be 
maintained on the basis of the exchange of Manchuria and Korea as 
respective spheres of influence.12 Ito proceeded to the Russia 
capital to negotiate with Russia for the purpose, producing the 
contrary result in that the Anglo-Japanese rapprochement was 
accelerated, culm inating in the signing of the firs t Anglo- 
Japanese Agreement of Alliance in London on 30 January 1902.13
The reaction to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty naturally 
differed in different European capitals. In Berlin there was ill- 
concealed annoyance mingled with a certain amount of chagrin 
that Germany had been left out. von Eckhardstein, for example, an 
experienced and relitive detached observer, regretted that 
Germany had "missed this best and last opportunity of a firm 
friendship with Britain". Some Englishmen shared his regret that 
Germany had not been invited to become a party to the Treaty. 
But, according to Hayashi, the British Government, though at one 
time favorably inclined towards the inclusion of Germany in the 
alliance, became reluctantly convinced that "nothing could be 
done with the Kaiser and his ministers". Germany would never 
risk conflict with Russia for the sake of a British alliance. Italy
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and Austria were cordial in their congratulations and believed 
that the Treaty would make for peace. So did Lord Rosebery who 
thought the treaty absolutely right.14
Russia, of course, was dissatisfied and uneasy over the 
first Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance. Although Russia 
outwardly assumed a calm and unperturbed air, there could be no 
doubt that she regarded the Alliance as an obstacle to her 
diplomacy, if not a diplomatic defeat.15 She tried to induce 
Germany and France to issue a jo int declaration with her in 
opposition to the Alliance for the purpose of warning Japan and
upholding her prestige in the eyes of the Chinese. However, as
Germany declined to go along with this, Russia issued such a 
declaration jointly with France in March 1902. A few days later 
French Foreign M inister D e lca sse  declared in the National 
Assembly that on signing this Declaration he had agreed to the
extension of the scope of the Franco-Russian Alliance to the Far
East. However, Delcasse did not want to see France alienated 
thereby from Britain but wished that the Declaration would be 
understood in London as mere empty words.15
The effects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance soon became 
manifest, firstly as regards the military withdrawal of Russia 
from Manchuria. On 8 April 1902, two months after the 
announcement of the Alliance, Russia concluded an agreement 
with China on M anchuria.1 ? In that agreement, Russia promised 
that, if no further disturbances arose and no obstacles were 
caused by the actions of the other Powers, she would gradually 
withdraw her forces from the three Eastern Provinces of China. 
It provided that the strength of the Chinese army and its
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movements in Manchuria during the period of the withdrawal 
would be decided by negotiations between the military officers of 
Russia and China but that after the completion of the withdrawal, 
the Chinese Government would have the right to increase or 
decrease their military forces in the Manchurian Provinces by 
simply informing the Russian Government.1® There was no doubt 
that such an abrupt concession on the part of Russia was mainly 
due to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The second effect was the 
sincere and total assistance Japan gave Britain in the diplomatic 
negotiations held prior to the withdrawal of the various military 
forces from Shanghai towards the end of 1902. As a condition for 
the withdrawal of her forces, Germany, with the object of placing 
restrictions on the British exercise of her rights there, proposed 
that "the Peking Government and the Viceroy of the Yangtze region 
shall engage not to grant to any Power advantages of a political, 
m ilitary, maritime or economic nature nor to a llow  the 
occupation of any other points commanding the river either below 
or above Shanghai."19 Britain objected strongly to this proposal 
and was faithfully supported by J a p a n . T h e  third effect was 
seen when the alliance proved to be effective in strengthening the 
position of Japan in Korea. Now that the special interests of 
Japan in Korea were recognized by Britain, Japan was in position 
to request the recognition of such interests by Russia as well.
2. KOREAN AND MANCHURIAN PROBLEMS AND
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904-1905)
The firs t w ithdrawal of Russian troops from M anchuria, 
prescribed in the Agreement of 8 April 1902, was carried out
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co m p le te ly .1 However, Russia not only failed to implement the 
second military withdrawal, but brought her forces into parts of 
South Manchuria which she had not so far occupied and further 
presented the Chinese Government with a new demand consisting 
of seven articles. The demand included the provisions that China 
should not "lease," "transfer" or "sell" to any other Power any part 
of Manchuria, should maintain "the system of government actually 
existing throughout Manchuria," and should close the Manchurian 
provinces to foreign trade by engaging not to open new ports or 
towns in Manchuria. Such demands not only disregarded the two 
im portant principles of the Open Door and the territo ria l 
sovereignty of China, but also contravened the Agreement on the 
withdrawal of Russian military forces from Manchuria, The 
Chinese Government repeatedly rejected the Russian demands. 
Japan, Britain and United States also lodged strong protests with 
Russia. However, Russia showed no signs of reconsidering the 
situation, but presented still more serious demands.2
In April 1903, Russia notified the Korean Government 
that she would exploit the forest concession on the bank of the 
Yalu: In 1896, the Korean Government granted a Concession to the 
Korean Wood Company, a Russian concern, to fell timber on the 
banks of the Yalu and Tumen rivers, and on Dagelet Island, under a 
Contract, which was to remain in force for a period of twenty 
years, dating from 1 January 1901.3 The Russian Government 
succeeded in occupying Yong-chun and Y6ng-am-po, towns near 
the mouth of Yalu River in early May.4 This sudden change in the 
Russian attitude was the result of the increased influence of the 
faction advocating a military confrontation with Jap an .5
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At the council meeting convened by the Japanese Emperor 
on 23 June 1903, Japan decided to warn China about the danger of 
impairing in any way her sovereignty and territorial integrity or 
of granting to Russia concessions detrimental to the treaty rights 
and interests of other Powers in Manchuria, and at the same time 
to instruct Minister Kurino in Russia to start negotiations in St. 
Petersburg directly with Foreign Minister L a m s d o rff with the 
object of reaching an amicable settlement of the problems 
between Japan and Russia relating to their respective special 
interests in Korea and Manchuria. The basis of the negotiations 
continued to be the "exchange of Manchuria for K o re a " .6
On 2 July 1903, Komura, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
told Sir C. MacDonald. British Minister to Japan, of the decision of 
the Japanese Government that the time was ripe for concluding a 
definite arrangement directly with the Russian Government with 
regard to the maintenance of the "open door" policy in Manchuria, 
and the securing of equal advantages and opportunities for all 
nations both in China and Korea. In putting this proposal before 
the British Government, Komura hoped earnestly that it might 
meet with British approval. MacDonald reported to Lansdowne 
that the Japanese Government feared that, if the present 
unsatisfactory condition of affairs be allowed to continue, the 
feelings of the Russian and Japanese peoples would become 
excited, and so render the task of preserving the peace a very 
difficult one. Consequently, they were strongly of the opinion that 
a satisfactory arrangement should be made with Russia as soon 
as possible which would terminate a state of affairs which was, 
in their opinion, rapidly becoming dangerous to the peace of the
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two countries. MacDonald added, as regards the Anglo-Japanese 
Agreement, that the proposed agreement would in no way run 
counter to its conditions but rather strengthen its object by 
confirming the policy of the open door and contributing towards 
the maintenance of peace in the Far East.7
On 16 July 1903, the British Government told Japan that 
they would certainly not criticise in an unfriendly spirit an 
arrangement desired by their ally, and consistent with the 
interests and treaty obligations of Great Britain as well as Japan. 
They said that they understood the proposal to be to the following 
e ffe c t:-
1. Russia would recognize the special interests of Japan in
Korea.
2. Japan would in like manner recognize Russia's special 
interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria.
3. Should those interests be menaced by internal
disturbances, Russia and Japan would respectively recognize each 
other's right to send troops into Manchuria and Korea, but upon the 
condition that all troops so dispatched would be withdrawn so 
soon as their mission had been accomplished.
4. Russia and Japan would mutually undertake to respect the 
independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea, and to 
maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and 
industry of all nations in those countries.
As to (1.) the British Government would welcome a
recognition by Russia of the special interests of Japan in Korea.
They had themselves, in the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, 
already admitted that Japan had such interests, and they
considered that it would be to their advantage that the position
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of Japan in that country should be strengthened.
(2.) They had themselves already recognized, in the Anglo- 
Russian Agreement of 1899, Russia's special interest in railway 
enterprises to the north of the Great Wall of China. Russia had by 
the same Agreement acknowledged that this country had 
corresponding interests in other parts of China. So long as 
Russian action in Manchuria was confined to what was legitimally 
required fo r the protection of her railways, the British 
Government saw no reason why Japan should object.
(3.) Seemed to require further explanation. Every nation 
had the right to send troops into the territory of another for an 
adequate national object, committing thereby what may be taken 
as an act of war, with the full knowledge of the consequences. 
The British Government assumed that what was intended in the 
present instance was that Japan should be content to leave to 
Russia the duty of restoring order in Manchuria, and would not 
place an embargo on such a proceeding on the understanding that 
Russia would not place an embargo on similar proceedings on the 
part of Japan in Korea.
(4.) The proposed mutual engagement of Russia and Japan to 
respect the independence and territorial integrity of China and 
Korea, and to maintain the principle of the open door, involved the 
reaffirmation by these two Powers of a principle to which the 
British Government had repeatedly given their adhesion, and it 
was satisfactory to them to be assured that the Japanese 
Government still intended to support that policy.8
Both Britain and the United States felt 
great concern over the Manchurian situation and wished to reach
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some sort of agreement with Russia.9 Britain advised Japan to 
keep in close contact with the United States a lso .1 0  But the 
Japanese Government, which wished to negotiate with Russia 
independently, replied to this advice that as it was not their plan 
to take joint action with other Powers and that as "its strict 
secrecy was of utmost importance at this juncture,"11 they 
could see no advantage in communicating with the United States 
Government on the subject.12 Komura stated to MacDonald that 
"the Japanese Government are anxiously striving for peace, but 
they think that the best and only means of obtaining it is by 
negotiating direct with Russia, and that any delay in doing so 
will provoke w ar."13
On the other hand, in Peking, Russia tried to conclude an 
agreement with China in order to exclude the Manchurian problem 
from the subjects to be negotiated with Japan.14 In Seoul, also, 
Russia tried hard to acquire concessions with the obvious 
objective of making use of them in the future. She also 
negotiated with Britain, wishing to have her declare that 
Manchuria was outside Britain's sphere of interest in exchange 
for her recognition of Britain's sphere of influence in the Yangtze 
River region. However, in all these attempts she failed. In the 
meantime , Japan succeeded in opening treaty ports in northern 
Korea and Manchuria with the support of Britain and the United 
S ta tes .15
On 15 September 1903, the Russian Government told the 
Japanese Government that Russia would like to present counter­
proposals, and suggesting that these counter-proposals together 
with the Japanese proposals, m ight afford a basis for
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nego tia tion .1® The Russian counter-proposals offered to Japan 
w e re :-
The firs t Article provided that both countries should 
undertake to respect the independence and integrity of Korea.
Secondly, in so far as was compatible with the due 
observation of the foregoing, Russia would recognize the 
preponderating influence of Japan in Korea, and admit her right to 
assist and advise the government of that country, with a view to 
the furtherance of good administration.
By Article 3, Russia undertook to throw no obstacles in the 
way of Japanese commercial development in Korea.
Article 4 provided that, to carry out the objects specified 
in Article 2, Japan should have the right to send troops to Korea, 
but such troops to be recalled immediately on the attainment of 
their purpose, and their number not to exceed that actually 
requisite for their object. The Japanese Government to notify the 
Russian Government of their dispatch.
Article 5. neither country should make any use of the
peninsula or its coast for strategical purpose, nor should they 
construct any m ilitary works which would obstruct the 
navigation of the Straits of Korea.
Article 6 ran that no Japanese nor Russian troops should
ever be sent to any portion of Korea north of the 39th parallel, 
which should be regarded as neutral zone.
Article 7. The Japanese Government should recognize that 
Manchuria and its littoral were altogether outside their sphere of 
in te res t.
Article 8 said that all previous Agreements were to be
annulled by the present.17
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On 1 November 1903, The Japanese Minister for Foreign 
Affairs had officially presented to Baron Rosen, the Russian 
Minister in Tokyo, the following amendments to the counter­
proposals of Russia:-
Ist Article. A mutual agreement to be made to observe the 
territorial integrity and the independence of China and Korea.
The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Articles were unaltered.
5th Article. Japanese to engage not to construct any works 
of a military nature on the Korean coast so as to threaten 
freedom of navigation in the Korean Straits.
7th Article. This Article in the counter-proposals to be 
altered as follows: Japan to recognize Manchuria as being beyond 
her sphere of special interest; and Russia to recognize Korea as 
beyond hers.
Additionally, first, Russia's special interests in Manchuria, 
and Russia's right to give necessary protection to those intersts, 
to be recognized by Japan.
Second, Japan to engage not to interfere with the rights and 
immunities of commerce and residence, which belong to Russia by 
virtue of her Treaty engagements with Korea; and Russia to make 
a like engagement with respect to Japan's sim ilar rights in 
China.18
Consequently, the Japanese Government continued to 
discuss the matter with Russia in the hope of arriving at some 
basis constructed out of Japan's proposals and Russia's counter­
proposals, on which negotiations might be carried on.
With a view to maintaining peace and settling the pending 
problems, the Japanese Government presented their final proposal
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to Russia on 5 January 1904 with the possibility of mediation 
being proposed by any Power or Powers in connection with the 
present Russo-Japanese re la tions.19 However, the Russian 
Government not only failed to reply, offering various pretexts, 
but also declared to the world their peaceful intentions and 
spread the rumour that they were making concessions in order to 
gain the sympathy of the Powers to propose mediation to Japan. 
In short, the Russian Government, having no sincere intention of 
compromising with the Japanese Government, simply delayed 
their reply to suit their own interests and, while pretending to 
take an outwardly peaceful attitude, secretly strengthened their 
forces in Manchuria, approved the Bezobrazov group's scheme29 to 
gain concessions in Korea, and methodically tried to occupy Korea. 
They attempted to deprive Japan of the sympathy of other Powers 
by stirring up fears of the "Yellow peril."
In view of such an extreme discrepancy between the 
words and actions of the Russian Government, the Japanese 
Government concluded that there was no hope of reaching a 
compromise by further negotiations and therefore terminated 
them on 6 February, notifying the Russian Government that Japan 
would take whatever action she deemed necessary for her self- 
defence and for the protection of her existing rights and 
legitim ate in te rests.21
On 9 February 1904, the Japanese Admiral Uriu was 
notified to the effect that if the Russian cruisers 'Varyag' and 
'Koreyetz' had not left Chemulpo Harbour by 4 p.m., he would be 
obliged to attack them there.22 On the same day, the 'Varyag' and 
'Koreyetz' tried to escape about midday, and were attacked about
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7 miles out by the Japanese squadron, which received them with 
heavy fire, and compelled them to retreat about one o'clock to 
Chemulpo Harbour, in an apparently damaged condition.23 The 
Imperial Edicts on the start of the war were promulgated on 10 
February 1904.24
On the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Britain 
declared her strict neutrality.23 Germany23 and France also 
declared s tric t neutra lity .2? However, despite the fact that 
these last two countries violated their neutrality by permitting 
Russia's Baltic Fleet to utilize ports and bays for coaling and 
other purposes on its way to the Far East, Britain did not change 
her neutral attitude because of terms of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance. In those days, Britain did not want to see the war 
spread to Europe. This was her greatest fear. She tried to avoid 
any action that might incite Russia. This attitude stemmed from 
the fact that she had not abandoned her hope, though very vague 
at that time, of coming to an understanding with Russia.23 Japan 
did not seem to have necessarily been opposed to this British 
a tt itu d e .29
If the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had not been in existence 
at the time of the opening of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan 
might not have dared risk going to war because of the uncertainty 
of the attitudes of Britain and Germany as well as the fear of 
being confronted by the armies and navies of the Franco-Russian 
Alliance. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by guaranteeing that 
Japan would not be faced with another Triple Intervention, had 
the effect of making possible the Russo-Japanese War. Even if 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance failed to maintain peace in the Far 
East, it could not be denied that it served to reduce the area of
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fighting and limit the scope of the war. The British Government 
did not hesitate to give the Japanese Government the following 
undertaking before the outbreak of the war:
His Majesty's Government will fu lfill both in letter and spirit, their 
obligations under the agreement which impresses upon them the duty of using 
their efforts in order to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities 
against their ally.30
Furthermore, Britain attempted to bring the United States into 
the problem of the Far East in order to approach the situation 
jointly. Accordingly, the United States could be counted on as a 
sort of spiritual ally. Lansdowne stated to the United States 
Ambassador "if there were any points in regard to which we were 
better informed than the United States Government, I would 
gladly place any knowledge which I possess at Your Excellency's 
d is p o s a l" ,31 and expressed the satisfaction with which he 
learned that the United States was taking a deep interest in the 
Far Eastern question.32 American President T. Roosevelt had 
already promised Japan, in January 1904, to maintain neutrality 
and warned Germany and France that, in the event of either one of 
them siding with Russia, the United States would proceed to 
whatever length was necessary on behalf of J a p a n .33 As for 
France, it was clear that she had nothing to gain from the Far 
Eastern war, but had a lot to lose. Consequently, she did not want 
to join the war against Japan for the sake of Russia.34 However, 
had it not been for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, France might 
have become less neutral in the war. If that had happened, Britain 
would have had no alternative but to rescue Japan in order to
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maintain the balance of power by preventing Japan from being 
defeated by the combination of Russia and France.35 In such case, 
world war would have broken out regardless of which side 
Germany might have aided. Consequently, a settlement was 
effected in the Anglo-French Entente of April 1904.36
Now, the decisive turning point to a cease fire in the 
Russo-Japanese war was due to the Japanese naval victory: On 16 
O ctober 1904, the Russian Baltic  flee t under Adm iral 
R ozhestvensky had left Kronstradt to sail round the world. The 
only fleet with enough coaling stations to do this successfully 
had been thought to be the British; but French ports in Madagascar 
and Indo-China helped the Russian ships on, and by May 1905 they 
were in the Pacific. Admiral Togo was sure the Russians would 
take the short cut to Vladivostok through the Tsushima Strait and 
his scouts sighted them off Quelpart Island on 27 May. By sunset 
of that day the fate of the Russian Baltic Fleet was sealed. The 
Flagship and three other battleships had been sent to the bottom, 
one admiral had been Killed and another wounded. The third 
admiral surrendered the following day. By the end of this two- 
day running battle in the Sea of Japan, the Russians had lost six 
battleships, five cruisers, and several destroyers and smaller 
craft. Of 18,000 sailors, only 6,000 survived. The Japanese lost 
116 men killed and three torpedo boats. It was a naval victory on 
a colossal scale.37 By this defeat, Russia was brought to the 
conference table by Roosevelt at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 
where the peace treaty was signed on 5 September 1905,38 and 
ratified on 14 October 1905.39
By this peace treaty, firstly, both Russia and Japan
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evacuated Manchuria at the same time; Russia's lease on the Liao­
tung Peninsula from China would be taken over by Japan;40 so 
would the Russian railway south of Chang-ch'un, with the mining 
rights that went with it; the southern half of the island of 
Sakhalin was to go to Japan; Japanese fishermen were granted 
rights in the Okhotsk and Bering Seas; both powers pledged 
themselves not to exploit Manchurian railways for strategic ends. 
All parts of occupied Manchuria were to be returned to Chinese 
administration, except for the leased territory, and Russia had to 
disavow any ambition to secure a monopoly of privileges or 
concessions in China. 41
Secondly, Japan's paramount interests in Korea were 
recognized: On 12 August 1905, the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty
was signed. As Balfour commented with respect to the new 
Treaty, both powers eventually approved of this arrangement for 
the benefits which they gained from it: Britain in India, Japan in
Korea. This was complicated as Balfour explained:
Both we and Japan have interests outside the frontiers of our respective 
dominions, which it is as important to safeguard as the frontiers 
themselves. An attack on Corea would rightly be regarded by the 
Japanese, and an attack on Afghanistan would rightly be regarded by us, as 
in no essential sense to be distinguished from an attack on Japan and on 
India respectively.42
On 5 October, the Japanese Minister passed to the Korean 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pak Che-sun. the substance of this 
second alliance. Even though the Korean Government protested 
to the British Government respecting the reference to Korean in 
the new Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it was already a useless one.
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(Appendix I) Subsequently, the Korean Government had been 
forced to sign a Treaty with the Japanese Government, by which 
it agreed to accept a Japanese protectorate, and to leave the 
conduct of foreign affairs in the hands of the Japanese 
Government. (Appendix II) This Korean -Japanese Agreement was 
signed on 18 October, and published on 21 December 1905.43 At 
last, Japan possessed herself of Korean peninsula.
The defeat of Russia in the Far East had consequences of 
the utmost importance. In the first place, it directed Russian 
thoughts and aspirations away from Asia (Spheres of influence 
agreement with Japan) and back again to Europe, temporarily 
back, that is to say, to competition with the Triple Alliance over 
the Balkans and Constantinople. In spite of the pro-German party 
at Court and in the capital, anti-German sentiment among 
Russians was intense, not least because it had been for 
generations suppressed by the policy of successive Tsars up to 
Alexander 111(1881-1894). The Franco-Russian alliance owed its 
being to Slav antipathy towards the Teuton, exacerbated by a long 
list of material grievances against Berlin and Vienna and by 
jealousy and apprehension of the dazzling empire created by 
Bismarck. That alliance must not be lightly abandoned or 
endangered. The Far Eastern adventure, after all, was only a side 
show, and had turned out disgracefully too. While their eyes had 
been fixed on China, they were conveniently blind to German 
penetration into Turkey. And now the Kaiser and his government 
were making use of Russian misfortunes to threaten their French 
ally, the only friend they had, with the aim of forcing the Powers 
of the Dual Alliance into abject dependence on German good will.
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Secondly, the war had vital results at home in Russia. A 
political and social crisis that rocked the Tsarist system you its 
foundations arose during the war. For a time the country was in a 
state of confusion and the government lost its authority. It 
regained control at the cost of promising constitutional reform, a 
promise partially redeemed. Russian liberalism was naturally 
sympathetic to the Western democracies and hostile to the 
conservative monarchies of Germany and Austria-Hungary which 
reinforced existing policies abroad. Russia now relied on the 
French even more, and badly needed a loan at the moment. Both 
foreign and domestic considerations therefore weighed against 
yielding to German blandishments and tended rather to strengthen 
the Dual Alliance.44
Lastly, as for Britain, she had no more need to be afraid of 
Russian expansion in the Far East, and her special position in 
China, above all in the Yangtze River region, was secured. Taking 
advantage of the war, Britain was also able to strengthen, at 
least on paper, its position in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet by 
negotiating a deal with Russia which would previously have been 
thought unobtainable.
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Appendices to Chapter VIII
Appendix I.
Korean Minister for Foreign Office to Sir J. Jordan.1
(T ra n s la tio n .)
M. le Ministre,
IN the Treaty between Great Britain and Korea it is 
stated " in case of differences arising between one of the High 
Contracting Parties and a third Power, the other High Contracting
Party shall exert its good offices to bring about an amicable
arrangement," also that " both countries shall freely enjoy the 
same. . . . privileges as are enjoyed. . . .  in other countries."
Ever since the ratification of this Treaty Diplomatic 
Representatives have resided in the countries of the Contracting 
Parties, and the friendly relations have daily grown closer, the 
Treaty has been strictly adhered to, and no friction has ensued.
But now Great Britain has signed an offensive and 
defensive alliance with Japan, which contains many provisions in 
contravention of the Articles of the Treaty between Great Britain 
and Korea, a matter of peculiar surprise to us. The equality of 
States has been the ruling principle of recent years among all the 
Powers, and no matter how small a country is, it enjoys the same 
rights and privileges in the eyes of all the Great Powers, in virtue
Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs to Jordan, Translation, 15 October 1905,
F.O. 405/161, Inclosure in No. 67.
of its independence, as they themselves possess. Why then should 
our country be made a solitary exception to this rule?
Korea has never given Great Britain cause for complaint, 
besides the good faith and sincerity of Great Britain are well 
known all the world over; how is it that so little importance is 
now attached to our Treaty? If any other country made an 
arrangement with a third Power affecting Great Britain, would 
Great Britain consent?
This is not what we had hoped for from Great Britain, and 
I cannot refrain from addressing your Excellency to request you 
on our behalf to ask the British Government to rescind the Treaty 
and to take measures to support our country, which will not only 
cause joy to our country but will be beneficial to the whole 
political situation in this quarter of the Far East.
I avail, &c.
(Signed) PAK CHE SUN
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Appendix II.
Agreement between Japan and Korea2
THE Governments of Japan and Korea, desiring to 
strengthen the principle of solidarity which unites the two 
Empires, have, with that object in view, agreed upon and 
concluded the following stipulations to serve until the moment 
arrives when it is recognized that Korea has attained national 
strength
2 Agreement bwteen Japan and Korea.-(Communicated by Viscount Hayashi, 22 
November 1905, F.O. 405/161, No. 48.
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ARTICLE I.
The Government of Japan, through the Department of Foreign 
Affairs in ToKyo, will, hereafter, have control and direction of 
the external relations and affairs of Korea, and the Diplomatic 
and Consular Representatives of Japan will have charge of the 
subjects and interests of Korea in foreign countries.
ARTICLE II.
The Government of Japan undertake to see to the execution of 
the Treaties actually existing between Korea and other Powers, 
and the Government of Korea engage not to conclude hereafter any 
act or engagement having an international character, except 
through the medium of the Government of Japan.
ARTICLE III.
The Government of Japan shall be represented at the Court of 
His Majesty the Emperor of Korea by a Resident-General, who 
shall reside at Seoul primarily for the purpose of taking charge of 
and directing matters relating to diplomatic affairs.
He shall have the right of private and personal audience of His 
Majesty the Emperor of Korea.
The Japanese Government shall also have the right to station 
Residents at the several open ports and such other places in Korea 
as they may deem necessary. Such Residents shall, under the 
direction of the Resident-General, designate the powers and 
functions hitherto appertaining to Japanese Consuls in Korea, and
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shall perform such duties as may be necessary In order to carry 
into full effect the provisions of this Agreement.
ARTICLE IV.
The stipulations of all Treaties and Agreement existing 
between Japan and Korea not inconsistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement shall continue in force.
ARTICLE V.
The Government of Japan undertake to maintain the welfare 
and dignity of the Imperial House of Korea.
In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their 
governments, have signed this Agreement and affixed their seals.
HAYASHI GONSUKE
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.
PAK CHE SUN
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
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CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION.
ON 31 August 1907, the momentous convention between Britain 
and Russia was at last concluded. The scope of the Agreement 
was not nearly so comprehensive as the Anglo-French Agreement 
of 1904, but it covered all the outstanding questions at issue 
between the two Powers in regions where in recent years their 
interests had been most evidently in conflict, namely Tibet, 
Afghanistan , and Persia.
In regard to Tibet the parties pledged themselves to 
respect its integrity, to abstain from all interference in its
internal affairs, to seek no concessions for railways, roads,
telegraph, mines, and other rights in Tibet; not to send 
representatives to Lhasa, and to deal with Tibet only through the 
intermediary of its Suzerain, China.
As regards Afghanistan the conclusion reached was even 
more important. The Russian Government recognized Afghanistan 
as outside the sphere of Russian influence; they engaged that all 
their political relations with Afghanistan should be conducted 
through the intermediary of Great Britain, and undertook not to 
send any agents into Afghanistan. Britain, on its side, declared 
that there was no intention of changing the political status of 
Afghanistan; that British influence would be exercised in a
pacific sense, and that no steps were contemplated, or would be
encouraged, against Russia. Finally there was to be complete 
equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan for both 
countries.
The agreement concerning Persia was in some respects
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the most important of all. Britain and Russia engaged to respect 
the integrity and independence of Persia, and to keep the door 
open to the trade of all other nations. Persia was, however, 
mapped out into three spheres of influence. The Russian sphere 
embraced the north, including the chief cities, Tabriz, Teheran, 
and Ispahan. The British sphere was in the south and east; it 
included the Gulf of Oman and of the Indian Ocean up to the 
frontiers of Baluchistan. Between the two spheres of influence 
was interposed a neutral zone, in which both Powers were free to 
obtain political or commercial concessions while renouncing any 
such freedom in the spheres respectively assigned to them.
Even though the Anglo-Russian Agreement in 1907 did not 
cause it to end, it did happen to mark the end of their rivalry. 
Around the turn of the century, the growing power of Germany 
and the naval and imperial ambitions of its emperor appeared as 
likely to constitute in future the central threat to British 
security. The new political leadership in Britain after 1905 was 
more susceptible to such arguments, especially as they took 
office just when an alarmist interpretation was becoming the 
most obvious way of explaining quarrelsome German diplomacy at 
the time of rapid German naval construction. Grev. the foreign 
secretary, was sufficiently convinced of the latest threat from 
the Germans to pursue the recommended alignment with France 
and Russia, and even to allow precautionary staff talks with the 
French. The 1907 Agreement coincided, therefore, with the most 
radical re-formulation of British foreign policy since eighteen- 
thirties. In the years that followed most British political leaders 
came to identify Germany, not Russia or France, as their principal
381
antagonist in the world at large. German ambitions in Asia, too, 
especially in Persia and the Ottoman Empire, began to take on a 
threatening aspect. And after their humiliation in 1908-9 at the 
hands of the German and Austrian Governments over the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Russians were above 
all concerned to check any further extension of the central 
powers' influence in the Balkans and in the Ottoman Empire. 
Under the circumstances, Anglo-Russian rivalry had lost its 
central role in British and Russian policy-making; it meant that a 
chapter in the relations between two great empires, which for 
nearly a century had been almost uniformly embarrassing and 
painful, was closed.
In concluding my thesis, I will now bring together my 
analysis of Anglo-Russian rivalry and the Port Hamilton episode. 
Initially, I divided Anglo-Russian rivalry into three phases: Each
phase took the form of "Russia's challenge-and-Brita in 's 
response."
(Diagram I)
B -------------—-----B.C(1878)----------—---------- W.P.H(1887)--------------- R-J. W(1905)—  A-R.A(1907)
<Phase 1 > <Phase 2> <Phase 3>
+++++++++++++++ ++++++ ++++++ +++++ +++
B = the beginning O.U = Ottoman upheavals
Cr = Crimean War ' B.C = Berlin Congress
A.C = Afghan border crisis O.P.H = Occupation of Port Hamilton
W.P.H = Withdrawal of Port Hamilton S-J.W = Sino-Japanese War
Ru-K+M = Russian influence in Korea and Manchuria A-J.W = Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
R-J.W = Russo-Japanese War A-R.A = Anglo-Russian Agreement.
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<Phase 1>. Britain's identification of Russia as a threat 
began with the climax to the Greek rising of 1821 which had 
centred on the relation between Turkey and Russia. With the 
aroused sympathies for Greece aroused in both Britain and Russia, 
the rising was recognized as an international question ,1 but there 
was a strong response of Britain against Russia when Russia's 
war against Turkey included substantial gains for Russia itself. 
From that time, as long as the Russians tried their policy to 
advance in the Near East, Anglo-Russian rivalry was sustained. 
The climax of their rivalry in the Near East was the Crimean war 
which registered a definite set-back to Russian expansion in the 
r e g i o n . 2 The Russians were again frustrated in the great Eastern 
crisis of 1875-78,3 and with the Berlin Congress of 1878, the 
first phase of the Anglo-Russian rivalry was ended.
<Phase 2>. After the Berlin Congress, Russia turned her 
policy of expansion increasingly from the Near East to the Middle 
and the Far East because she seemed to believe that her 
international position would be restored when her expansionist 
policy in those regions, accelerated after the Crimean defeat, had 
put the British on the defensive. Russia's challenge there did 
show Britain in difficulties at the time of the Afghan crisis in 
March 1885. The commercial and strategic importance which 
Britain attached to India was threatened by the Russian conflict 
with A fghan istan ,4 and Britain prepared for war in response. 
More particularly she responded with the occupation of Port 
Hamilton to assist in the waging of war against Russia in the Far 
East. Yet it did not come to this, and soon after Britain occupied 
Port Hamilton, the Afghan crisis was peacefully solved, and from
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the time Russia avoided a direct conflict with the British over 
the is la n d s .5 Britain having lost her justification to retain 
possession of Port Hamilton. Britain withdrew her naval 
squadron from Port Hamilton in February 1887 signifying the end 
of the second phase of Anglo-Russian rivalry.
<Phase 3>. With the Sino-Japanese War, Russia had a good 
chance to advance in the Far East, which she took, especially, in 
Korea and Manchuria. Russian involvement in those regions 
constituted yet another serious challenge to Britain. Britain 
adopted as a solution the Anglo-Japanese A lliance. This 
facilitated war against Russia on the part of Japan (Russo- 
Japanese War of 1904-05), and Russia lost another chance to 
expand farther in the Far East. This was the end of the last phase 
of Anglo-Russian rivalry. After this last phase of their rivalry, 
Russia never had so good a chance of East Asian expansion before 
1945. With the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, both Britain 
and Russia at last closed the long chapter of their rivalry.
Next, in my analysis about Port Hamilton, I found one 
direct and three indirect reasons for the British Government's 
decision to occupy the islands. When Britain prepared for war 
because of the Afghan crisis, the British chose to follow a 
traditional strategic plan-to attack Russia with her fleet at weak 
points like the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus or Vladivostock in 
Russia's far flung Asian possessions. Therefore, the British 
Government needed the occupation of Port Hamilton as a base for 
the blockade of the Russian forces in the Pacific and as an 
advanced station to support operations against Vladivostock. This 
is the direct reason of the occupation of Port Hamilton. Three
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indirect reasons are:-
First, the Russian interest in the Far East was in an ice- 
free port on the Pacific. The British thought Port Hamilton would 
be an important depot and naval base to Russia because it was 
free from ice at all seasons, and it was far superior to 
Vladivostock. Therefore, the matter of the ice-free port which 
involved Port Hamilton became a political aspect of Anglo- 
Russian rivalry.6
Secondly, it was natural that Port Hamilton would be 
related to British commercial policy in the Far East. At the time, 
Britain fu lly understood the importance of Port Hamilton in 
relation to Russian commercial interests in China or its 
neighbourhood.7
Thirdly, the British were convinced that the strategic 
importance of Port Hamilton would greatly strengthen the British 
position in the Chinese seas as against Russia, and materially add 
to the security of Hong Kong, or to act with effect against the 
Russian ports.8
After the occupation of Port Hamilton in May 1885, 
Britain had to reconsider the necessity of retaining possession 
of Port Hamilton because the Afghan crisis as the direct reason 
was solved peacefully a few months later.
In the light of reports from departments concerned with 
Port Hamilton, the British Government also had to reconsider the 
indirect reasons; first, the Board of Trade failed to see in what 
manner the occupation of Port Hamilton would tend to any large 
extension or improvement of British trade in those regions.9 
Secondly, unless it was the intention of the British Government 
to fortify and garrison the island, so as to place it in a proper
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condition of defence to resist the attack of iron-clads, the 
Admiralty were decidedly of the opinion that it was not advisable 
to retain possession of Port Hamilton.10
Thirdly, through the Russian newspaper "Novoye Vremya", 
the Russian Government declared that, "We have at present no 
intentions whatever in the Far East, and that any aggressive 
action on our part would be a d istinct political mistake." 
Therefore, the British Government lost the political justification 
of an imminent Russian threat in the Far East as grounds for 
occupying Port Ham ilton .11 At any rate, Britain withdrew her 
naval squadron from Port Hamilton in early 1887.
At the same time, I concluded that the withdrawal of Port 
Hamilton had induced a surprising change in the balance of power 
in the Far East. There were three steps:- 
<Diagram 2>
B= Britain C= China K= Korea 
J= Japan R= Russia
c= compromise r= restraint. t=treaty
< Step 1>. During the second half of the nineteenth century, 
China and Japan always worried about the Russian southward 
advance policy to gain the ice-free territory. Therefore, when
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Britain proposed a compromise to justify the occupation of Port 
Hamilton, they accepted it because they expected to restrict 
Russian policy in these regions. This situation made for a 
balance of power in the Far East; /.e, four Powers (Britain, China, 
Japan and Russia) exercised a balance of power centred on the 
Korean peninsula.
<Diagram 3>
<Step 2>. With the compromise between China and Russia 
(the secret treaty in 1886), Britain found reasons for the 
withdrawal from Port Hamilton, and left the islands. From then 
on, Britain indirectly participated in the Far Eastern balance of 
power with diplomatic support to China. However, this British 
withdrawal from Port Hamilton induced a decisive change in the 
Far Eastern balance of Power: In spite of the British withdrawal, 
Britain with China could control Russian power in the Far East for 
the time being. But, they could not have expected to have to 
control Japan who had ambitions to advance into Korea and 
Manchuria at the time. Consequently, when Japan's ambition was 
revealed in a war with China in 1894, it meant the collapse of the 
balance of power in the Far East.
B <Step 2>
{support} {conflict}
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<Diagram 4>
^ > K<^
R < + <-----
{conflict}
----- Alliance — — *  B <Step 3>
M= Manchuria
<Step 3>. After the Sino-Japanese War, China lost her 
power in the Far East, and Britain who had supported China also 
lost much of her diplomatic weight in the Far East. Now, Japan 
and Russia only were left as the major powers in those regions. 
Russia, especially, had a big chance to advance there because the 
power of her real enemy, Britain, was so weak in those regions 
at the moment. So, the Russians deeply advanced their power in 
Korea and Manchuria. However, Japan who had the same ambition 
as Russia to advance into Korea and Manchuria strongly opposed 
the Russian movement. Moreover, Britain, wanting to restrict 
Russian power in the Far East wherever it was, joined with Japan. 
Consequently, with the following the Russo-Japanese war, Russia 
lost her power there, and Japan became the dominant power in 
the Far East. It meant the end of Far Eastern diplomatic stability 
for a century, and, especially, the destiny of the Korean peninsula, 
the focus of the balance of power in the Far East, fell into 
Japanese hands.12
On the other hand, during my analysis of the above- 
mentioned three steps, I had some doubts:-
(From Step 1), Did the British Government understand the
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Far Eastern balance of Power? Especially, did they clearly 
recognize the position in the Far East they had acquired with the 
occupation of Port Hamilton?
(From Step 2). At the time, it was publicly known that 
China was a very weak country internally, although she looked to 
be one of the Great Powers externally. Then, why did the British 
Government entrust China with full responsibility to solve the 
Far Eastern problem? Is it true that the British Government did 
not understand China's position at that time? Also, did they truly 
not know about Japanese ambition to advance into Korea and 
Manchuria at the time?
(From Step 3). When Britain withdrew from Port 
Hamilton, despite realizing the possibility of further Russian 
advance in the Far East sooner or later, why did she not prepare 
some more direct defensive measures against Russia in addition 
to the indirect way of supporting China?
Given the above-mentioned doubts, I concluded that British 
diplomatic policy in the Far East at the time had its limitations. 
Consequently, while Britain's eyes had been fixed on those Far 
Eastern problems mentioned above in Step 3 . she was slow to 
appreciate the growing power of Germany and the naval and 
imperial ambitions of its emperor which appeared as likely to 
constitute in future the central threat to her security, and in the 
early twentieth century, both Britain and Russia suffered 
extensively from war with Germany, the so-called Great War.
Given this analysis of the three phases of Anglo-Russian 
rivalry, I concluded that the rivalry encapsulated the essence of 
international politics in the Far East during the nineteenth
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century. Moreover, although there is a general view that the Port 
Hamilton affair was merely a local affair during the period of 
Anglo-Russian rivalry, from my analysis of the implications of 
British withdrawal from the islands, I also concluded that the 
Port Hamilton A ffa ir was undoubtedly important enough to 
constitute a decisive turning point in the present era of 
international relations.
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